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Abstract 
Energy Utopianism and the rise of the anti-nuclear power movement in the UK 
This thesis is about the growth of the anti nuclear power movement in the UK from 1955 to 1979. It 
seeks to explore why it emerged at the time and in the form it did. It challenges some of the existing 
histories and provides new explanations as to how and why, and indeed when the anti-nuclear 
movement emerged. It is not a policy history, but a history of activism based on accounts collected 
from the contemporary literature and from the activists. 
Its hypothesis is that an anti-nuclear power movement emerged in LTK in the 1970s because of long 
standing concerns of a minority over the dangers of 'atomic energy' and the continuity of opposition 
to the building of nuclear power stations. The divisions within the nuclear establishment over reactor 
choice in UK (and radiation and safety standards in US) gave new radical groups- the 
environmentalists - an opportunity to build a movement using new tactics of protest. The first part gives a historical account of early criticism, late 1950s protest at public inquiries, 
and campaigns over nuclear power from 1965 to 1979, and is based on literature surveys, 
interviews with anti-nuclear campaigners and research on archive material. The second part, 
mainly theoretical, identifies and discusses what I consider the key concepts of 'the 
environmental impulse', 'nuclear fear' and 'energy utopianism'. The thesis illustrates the 
diversity and continuity of anti-nuclear protestors, and is used to make some generalisations 
about their motivations and tactics, and the likelihood of future protests over new energy 
technologies. 
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I. Introduction: a search for the roots of the UK anti-nuclear 
power movement. 
This thesis is about the growth of the anti civil nuclear power movement in the UK from 1955 to 
1979. It seeks to explore why it emerged at the time and in the form it did. It challenges some 
of the existing histories and associated explanations of the processes involved, and provides new 
explanations as to how and why, and indeed when the anti-nuclear movement emerged. The 
period chosen covers the time from local opposition at the first Public Inquiry into a proposed 
nuclear reactor at Bradwell in 1956, to the impact of the Windscale Inquiry Report on the 
national anti-nuclear power movement in 1978. A cut-off date of 1979 is selected as this marks 
the divide between the moderate tactics adopted by the then largest environmental groups, 
Friends of the Earth and the Conservation Society, and the more militant direct action approach 
of new organizations, like Greenpeace, the Torness Alliance and the Anti-Nuclear Campaign. It 
is not a policy history, but a history of activism based on accounts collected from the 
contemporary literature and from the activists. 
The hypothesis for this thesis is that an anti-nuclear power movement emerged in UK in the 
1970s because of long standing concerns of a minority over the dangers of 'atomic energy' 
and the continuity of opposition to the building of nuclear power stations. The divisions within 
the nuclear establishment over reactor choice in UK (and radiation and safety standards in US) 
gave new radical groups- the environmentalists - an opportunity to build a movement using new 
tactics of protest. This chapter first sets this thesis in the context of the traditional anti-nuclear 
histories, then outlines the structure of the thesis and its sources, and then explains its 
methodology. 
1.1 Old nuclear explanations 
The official histories written from both the pro and the anti nuclear viewpoint both give 
common explanations about how and why, and indeed, when the anti- nuclear movement 
emerged. But these explanations are being challenged as myths by a new generation of 
researchers, particularly Ian Welsh, in his book Mobilising Modernity (2000). The traditional 
explanations are: 
" There was only opposition to nuclear power since the early 1970s. 
" Prior to this there was a 'golden age of public acceptance'. 
" Friends of the Earth (FoE) started and led the anti-nuclear movement. 
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The activities of the anti-nuclear and environmental movements led to nuclear power's 
demise. 
Similarly O'Riordan divided the life cycle of civil nuclear power in UK into four distinct ages, 
the first being 'the age of innocent expectation' from 1946 to 1966 years which he claims were 
characterised by innocence and euphoria, followed by 'the age of doubt' from 1967 to 1974, 
'the age of anguish' from 1975 to 1980, and 'the age of public justification' from 1981 
onwards (O'Riordan 1986: 42). 
Instead this thesis, drawing on the ideas of Welsh and other, gives a generally new account that 
shows that anti-nuclear feeling arose from: 
1. long standing public ambivalence over 'atomic energy'. 
2. disillusionment with claims of 'nuclear utopia'. 
3. the continuity of protest over the building of nuclear reactors 
4. a small network of activists, from a wide variety of backgrounds. 
This thesis hopes to provide both a narrative account and an explanation for the rise of the anti- 
nuclear power movement in the UK in the 1970s. It seeks to answer the question: why an anti- 
nuclear power movement instead of an anti-coal or anti-asbestos movement. What was it about 
nuclear power that generated such opposition? Its environmental impact, its cost, its prospects or 
its symbolism? 
1.2 Structure of thesis 
The thesis is divided into two parts: the first mainly historical and the second mainly theoretical. 
The first part of this thesis - Chapters 2 to 4, gives a historical account of early criticism and 
protest over nuclear power through to the Windscale Inquiry in 1977. The second part. 
consisting of chapters 5 to 7, is based on literature surveys, interviews with anti-nuclear 
campaigners and research on archive material. It identifies and discusses what I consider the key 
concepts of 'the environmental impulse', 'nuclear fear', and 'energy utopianism'. 
1.2.1 Part 1: Anti-nuclear activism 
Chapter 2 to 4 outline the growth in anti-nuclear activism in Britain, from the early public 
Inquiries in the 1950s to the aftermath of the Windscale Inquiry in 1977. Chapter 2 cover early 
criticism and opposition to nuclear power before FoE involvement. Firstly protest at the 1950s 
public inquiries, then the National Coal Board's campaign in the mid 1960s, Schumacher's 
critique in 1967, and details on the largely unknown local campaign against the proposed 
Stourport AGR in 1970. Chapter 3 covers the rise of environmentalist opposition in the early to 
mid 1970s, firstly a few articles in the eco-press, then a campaign by activists from the 
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Conservation Society and local groups, Eke Half Life, which attracted little support or attention. 
At the end of 1975 FoE was able to exploit massive publicity on the proposed THORP plant at 
Windscale, and launch its own high profile campaign. This chapter finally covers the network of 
groups that appeared in response to this publicity. Chapter 4 details the difficulties the diversity 
of groups had in presenting a united case at the Windscale Inquiry, their uneasy relationships 
with FoE, and the reactions of FoE, ConSoc and the anti-nuclear movement to the Inspector's 
decision. 
1.2.2 Part 2: Ideas and explanations 
Ile second part of this thesis - Chapters 5 to 7- analyses the events in the first Part, seeking to 
explain who were these anti-nuclear activists and why they chose to protest about nuclear power. 
It explore the ideas and concepts behind the academic analysis of the anti-nuclear movement, 
and outlines previous research in this area. Chapter 5 explores why and how people become 
environmental activists by looking at the nature of the 'environmental impulse' and of 'social 
movements', the making of 'activist identity' and their recruitment into groups. It draws on the 
work of Joe Weston (1989) and Derek Wall (1999) and illustrates how existing activists are 
recruited into new groups, such as Friends of the Earth (FoE), and how these new groups 
establish their identity through new styles of protest or 'repertoires of action', in this case the 
Schweppes bottle dump in 1971. 
Chapter 6 gives an explanation for the rise in the anti-nuclear power movement. The chapter 
first outlines how science fiction from the very beginning ambiguously portrayed the 'atomic' 
future, and how post war, its vision was mainly bleak due to fear of nuclear holocaust caused by 
the atomic bomb, and how this ambiguity was reflected in uneasy support for nuclear power in 
the opinion polls. It then looks at the 'anti-nuclear impulse', the emotional forces that cause 
people to become anti-nuke. This analysis draws heavily on the work of Spencer Weart (1988) 
who uses the term 'nuclear fear' to explain opposition to nuclear power, and how this fear is 
heavily influenced by images of the nuclear bomb in popular culture. The fourth section looks 
at the growth of anti-nuclear groups, drawing on sociological work which explains activist 
recruitment in terms of 'friendship networks', and gives personal explanations for being 'anti- 
nuke', many obtained by the author in interviews with leading 1970's anti-nuclear activists in 
the UK. The fifth section illustrates these explanations and reasons through examining the rise 
of anti-nuke opposition in the United States from the late 1960s and the recruitment of anti- 
nuclear activists from the anti-war movement. 
Chapter 7 shows how post war official optimism about nuclear power was part of the long 
tradition of 'energy utopianism' - the belief that a new energy source could transform the 
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technical and social life of society (Basalla 1982). This 'energy utopianism' is illustrated with 
details of how hydro-electricity and nuclear power were initially greeted with wide enthusiasm 
and hyperbole. Then as each source failed to achieve its over-hyped expectations, 
disillusionment and criticism rapidly set up. 
The chapter concludes with an examination of long held hopes for solar energy, dating back to 
public enthusiasm in the late 19th century. Post WW2 hopes for solar was dashed by nuclear 
power, but it was rediscovered by the AT movement in the 1960s and vigorously promoted by 
environmentalists as an alternative to nuclear power from the 1970s. 
The final chapter concludes with: 
"a summary of the wide-ranging motives for anti-nuclear activism. 
" the similarity in arguments between the 1960s and the 1970s anti-nuclear campaigns. 
" criticism of previous histories caused by their excessive attention to FoE's role in the 1970s 
campaign. 
the validity of 'emotion' and 'nuclear fear' as a valid reason for anti-nuclear feeling. 
speculation, based on the history of energy utopianism, as to the future of solar (now termed 
'renewable') energy and whether there could be a nuclear revival. 
1.3 Methodology 
This thesis takes an interdisciplinary approach to describing and analysing the history of the 
anti-nuclear movement, but draws heavily on the literature of environmental history and (some) 
concepts from 'social movements' research. It uses previous ignored literature andarchives to 
illustrate its arguments. These sources are: 
" An account of the NCB campaign during 1960s against the expansion of nuclear power, and 
the anti-nuclear critique developed by Schumacher. 
" Research on Worcestershire County Council archive material on the campaign against the 
proposed building of nuclear plant at Stourport in 1970 illustrating the import of American 
criticism of radiation standards. 
" Research on ConSoc documents showing the start of the anti-nuclear campaign by a handful 
of activists from ConSoc, helped by the eco-press, with FoE members initially uninterested. 
" Analysis of internal movement reports and interviews showing the repercussions of the anti- 
nuclear power movement's defeat at the Windscale Inquiry in 1977: media glory for FoE, a 
fiasco for ConSoc and much internal recrimination. 
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1.3.1 Environmental History 
The roots and shades of modem environmentalism are deep and complex and are beyond the 
scope of this thesis. Many academics have devoted themselves to uncovering them, and one such 
author David Pepper argued that to understand them "we must develop an historical perspective 
on how we and others have arrived at our present state of attitudes" (Pepper 19 84: 3). It is this 
that the discipline of Environmental History, to which this thesis subscribes, seeks to do. 
Environmental History is an academic discipline that focuses on the history of the environment 
and the history of environmentalism. One of its founding fathers, Donald Worster has defined it 
as "the interdisciplinary study of the relations of culture, technology and nature through time" 
(Worster 1993: viii). It stresses the importance of continuity of events, and the linkages between 
eras. As Samuel Hays commen s (2000: 226): 
"Events are embedded not only in circumstances: they are also embedded in the flow of 
time. each succeeding event or circumstance is related closely to a preceding one. It is 
dijfIcult, if not impossible, to understand a point in time without placing it in its 
evolutionary context. This is not just a view of history that links events past to events 
present. More important, it is an understanding that emphasizes the way one thing grows 
out of another, it arisesfrom the old and then becomes something a bit different". 
The second prong of Environmental History, the history of 'environmentalism' or of 
4environmental movements' is not so well developed. Gcnerally the histories written of 
environmental groups has either been written by activists or their supporters, such as Robert 
Lamb's Promising the Earth (1996) on FoE. There are few critical and original works. Those 
that are, like Anna Bramwell's Ecology in the 20th Century (1989) have proved controversial, 
while others like Joe Weston's The FOE Experience (1989), Meredith Veldman's, Fantasy, the 
Bomb and the Greening of Britain (1994) and Martin Holdgate's The Green Web (1999) attract 
little attention. Environmental History, labeled 'Green History', is however popular when the 
'lessons from history' (on soil erosion, deforestation, pollution etc) are used to support green 
activism. A notable example of this genre is the writings of Derek Wall, a green activist and 
prolific green historian (Wall 1994a; 1994b; 1996; 1999), as well as the best seller Green History 
(1991) by Clive Ponting. 
1.3.2 The purpose of environmental history 
The appropriate relationship between environmental history and the environmental movement is 
problematic and was debated at the last two ASEH meetings in 2001 and 2002 by Donald 
Worster and Samuel Hays. 'At the 2001 ASEH meeting Donald Worster, according to Samuel 
Hays, argued that the main audience for environmental historians was the environmental 
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movement and their main task was to help the movement understand itself and debate the vital 
relationship between humans and nature (Hays 2002). Hays, believing that Worster's views were 
mistaken, urged that "we look to the entire society, notjust the environmental movement as our 
audience, and use an historical rather than a movement perspective as a vehiclefor asserting to 
the world at large the importance and human relevance of environmental affairs" (Hays 2002). 
Furthermore Hays believed that environmental historians tend to be remote from the movement 
and thus ill placed to understand their concerns. 
Historians, he argued "are part of the environmental intelligentsia which is preoccupied with 
sorting out ideas rather than the environmental movement which is preoccupied with action" 
(Hays 2002). Thus they should concentrate on traly historical questions that go much deeper 
and deal with more comprehensive issues than movement history. Hays' cornments on the 
remoteness of historians from activists was challenged in the subsequent email discussion, with 
Richard Grove making the point that: "In my experience a high proportion of environmental 
historians came into thefield as a direct result of their involvement in environmental 
campaigning". 
This is certainly true for many British authors writing accounts of the history of environmental 
movements. Joe Weston was a leading FoE activist for over 10 years, Derek Wall was a notable 
Green Party activist and anti-roads campaigner; and Ian Welsh was active in SCRAM, the 
Scottish anti-nuclear group, while older writers Eke Michael Allaby were active in the organic 
movement, Martin Holdgate in the IUCN, and Walt Patterson in FoE. 
Too close an involvement with movements can of course damage ones 'objectivity' but too 
great a distance can damage ones 'understanding' of movement motivation. Also academics 
and activists have different objectives in research: as Phil McLeish, an anti-roads activist, said to 
Derek Wall academics tend to ask "why social movements exist, [whereas] activists want to know 
how to win" (Wall 1999: 8). 
There is, perhaps not surprising in the small world of academic research, a continuity of activists 
turned academics. For instance Derek Wall's Ph. D. supervisor was Ian Welsh, who in turn 
studied under Brian Wynne, a participant at the Windscale enquiry in 1977, and Paul Smoker, 
the founder of Half-Life, Britain's first anti-nuclear power group in 1975. 
The links stretch back even further to pre-war activism: Derek Wall discovered after his viva that 
the father of Harry Rothman, his Ph. D. examiner, had led the Kinder Scout Trespass in 1932 
(Wall 1999: xii). 
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1.3.3 Activist literature 
This thesis is influenced by my earlier criticism of academics in search of explanations to 
concentrate not on intellectual texts but on activists literature. For in my review of David 
Pepper's book Modern Environmentalism I complained (Herring 1996: 778): 
"nat is the relation between the -isms and the -ists? Y71at is how influential and 
widespread are the ideas, the environmentalism, amongst the people who do the action, the 
environmentalists? How many dreadlocked protesters against the Newbury by-pass have 
read Bookchin, how many little old ladies demonstrating against animal exports subscribe 
to The Ecologist ? 
"at is missingfrom this book is the voice of the activists, and their little magazines and 
pamphlets that rarely appear in university libraries. Yhey are the voice of modern 
environmentalism not the booky by Edward Goldsmith or Murray Bookchin. 71eir voice has 
not been heard as their history of environmental activism since the 1960s has not yet been 
written". 
Since then several works have appeared along these lines, and my inspiration here are the books 
Senseless Acts of Beauty (1996) and Earth First! (1999) by respectively the activists and 
academics George McKay and Derek Wall. These books draws on a wide range of sources: 
activist papers and diaries, interviews and even record lyrics. This thesis follows that historical 
tradition in giving primacy to the voice of activists rather than the few intellectuals who claimed 
to speak in their name. In doing so the role of women anti-nuclear activists may be much more 
appreciated, for few of them in the 1970s wrote books or even magazine articles. 
1.3.4 Insider accounts 
Theoretical perspectives produced by academics must of course be heeded and are to some 
extent valid but theory alone is not sufficient to explain the emergence of what sociologists can 
an 'activist identity'. As Wall comments, in his book which examined how green movements are 
produced and change, "accounts that explain participation in terms of identity, and imply that 
identity grows_from a singlejactor such as class or upbringing or whatever, are inadequate" 
(Wall 1999: 96). Wall believed that an over-theoretical approach is unhelpful to explaining 
participation. He wrote "Theoretical perspectives can, of course, suffocate accounts of living 
movements with lofty, opaque and often irrelevant intellectual baggage" (Wall 1999: 15). 
Wall's approach instead is to ask movement activists how they got involved, to read movement 
literature, and to reassess his own experience as an activist. 
Similarly Joe Weston, a FoE activist in the 1970s and 1980s, believes that theoretical analysis of 
groups do not convey the intricate relationships which exist either between itself and the rest of 
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society or between the individuals which run the group and organize its activities (Weston 1989: 
5) In his history of FoE he stated "In attempting to locate groups within a theoretical knot-hole 
it is so often forgotten that those groups are made up of individuals and that some individuals 
can have a massive inj7uence over the character of a whole organisation" (Weston 1989: 5). 
Citing the work of Andy Blowers (1980) he believes that the examination of politics and 
political organizations from the 'inside' makes possible a far greater insight and understanding 
of internal clashes, faction fighting and consequent organization change than any empirically 
based 'scientific' study could ever achieve. Weston in his study of FoE argued that, it is only 
through "the witnessing and reporting of these clashes and changes that a true 'taste' of 
Friends of the Earth can be transmitted and understood and as a result a fuller understanding 
of green politics as a whole can be achieved" (Weston 1989: 10). 
This thesis also aims to follow the tradition of environmental history in being written in clear 
prose that is accessible to the non-specialist reader. Its model here for clarity and readability is a 
recent book The Origins of the Organic Movement (2001) by Philip Conford, although one 
reviewer complained it had a 'propensity to under-theorise' (Reed 2002: 216). This thesis will 
plead guilty to that academic crime as well as the charge of being 'over referenced'. The 
copious reference in this thesis, particularly to the texts in movement magazines available in 
only a few libraries, is intended as a help for future researchers. I also provide footnotes which 
appear at the end of the thesis, which provide flu-ther sources of information. Thus this thesis is 
written in the knowledge that there is little written on British post war environmental activism in 
the 1960s and 1970s and in the belief that there should be much more. 
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2. Nuclear criticism and protest 1955: 1970, 
This chapter and the next one challenges the conventional view as put forward by Wolfgang 
Rudig that "practically all anti-nuclear opposition before the late 1970s was expressed within 
the public inquiry system in Britain. Aere were no demonstrations, pickets, or any other signs of 
protest which local opposition groups would consider to adopt outside the inquiry procedure" 
(Rudig 1990: 119). This chapter refutes this by giving an outline of the National Coal Board's 
(NCB) campaign in the mid 1960s against the expansion of the nuclear industry in the 1960s, 
and Schumacher's ethical critique of nuclear power in 1967. It also gives extensive details on a 
local campaign against a proposed AGR at Stourport on Severn in 1970. 
The chapter starts with early specialist criticism about the scale and costs of the Government's 
proposed nuclear plans. It then covers most of the 1950s public inquiries giving attention to 
objectors' environmental concerns. These early concern over protection of nature, the cost of 
economic growth, and the dangers of radioactivity were issues which were to resurface in the 
1970s campaigns. 
2.1 Early Specialist criticism 
O'Riordan has characterised the first 20 years of the UK new power program as one of 
innocence and euphoria, "where powerful men backed by powerfiW organisations ruled with a 
combination of arrogance and complacency" (O'Riordan 1986: 42). Until the 1970s criticism 
of nuclear power was restricted to specialist journals, elite newspapers (generally The Times) 
Parliament and industry forums. Overall nuclear power was seen by nearly all the establishment 
as part of "the white heat of an oil-free technology that would bring Britain into a new age of 
prosperity" (O'Riordan 1986: 42). The 1953 White Paper (HMSO 1953), on the organization 
of the atomic energy industry, was generally well received by the press, although there were 
reservations about the power and the autonomy of the proposed UKAEA. 
The 1955 White Paper (HMSO 1955), on the first nuclear power programme, was greeted with 
even more acclaim by the press, "with the sole expression of reservation" in the ensuing HoC 
debate a solitary question on the measures for the disposal of nuclear waste (Welsh 2000: 56). 
The 1957 Electricity Act, following the triumphal opening of Calder Hall (see Welsh 2000: 56- 
8) in October 1956, was a finther opportunity for the Government to promote nuclear euphoria 
and triple the expansion of the nuclear industry. However expression of nuclear optimism from 
within scientific and political circles did not go completely uncriticised. A small group of 
parliamentary backbenchers raised a series of issues, including reactor safety, the adequacy of 
plans for nuclear waste disposal, the dangers of low-level radiation and the absence of any 
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integrated energy policy (see HCD 569: 57,136,157). In response the Government was 
'perplexed' at the expression of 'anxieties which it is not usual to hear' (Welsh 2000: 63). 
Both The Times and The Economist were critical of the tripling of the nuclear programme, 
calling it too ambitious. The Times commented "Atomic energy has the power to evoke 
fantasies. It is not only looked on as an 'answer to Suez' but as a fairy godmother source of 
cheap electricity" (Times 1957). It further cautioned against prophets who visualize that in 
twenty years time there will be "electricity on tap in every home like water, laid on for a low 
fixed charge irrespective of the quantities consumed". The Times unswayed by the myth of 
cheap atomic energy warned that "The hardfact is that electricityfrom the first atomic power 
stations will be dearer, not cheaper, to generate than power made in new coal-based stations" 
(Times 1957). 
In conclusion The Times argued in favour of a more balanced approach to energy, including 
the underground gasification of coal, rather than a massive financial commitment to nuclear. 
This latter criticism was echoed by The Economist (19 January 1957) who protested against 
"the immense capital expenditure" before "the first atomic power stations had time to prove 
themselves". However according to Welsh "Such concerns could scarcely be heard within the 
overall climate of adulation" (Welsh 2000: 64). Even internal critics like Hinton who viewed the 
trebling of the programme as "complete madness and I said so but I was just a voice crying out 
in the wilderness" went unheeded (Welsh 2000: 64). ' 
2.1.1 Stretch Critique 
One vocal critic from within the AEA was Kenneth Stretch, works manager at Calder Hall from 
1.954-7, who argued against the dominance of theoretical work as a guide to policy 
development. According to Williams he put forward in the journal Nuclear Powff in December 
195 8, "A rare and powerful critique of British nuclear economics" (Williams 1980: 73). 
Stretch, commenting on a lecture the previous year in Sweden by Hinton (1957), questioned 
both Hinton's cost forecasts for nuclear electricity and the wisdom of so large a commitment to 
one reactor system (Stretch 1958). Williams commented "Stretch's analysis of Hinton'sfigures 
suggested to him that they were 'Seriously biased in favour of nuclear powerý Hinton's estimate 
of coal costs was already too high while his estimate of nuclearfuel costs had no real evidence 
to support if' (Williams 1980: 73). Stretch himself did not expect nuclear power to be 
competitive with coal until 1980-90. It was therefore "extremely rash for this country to rush 
into building a large number of obsolescent nuclear stations" and over optimistic forecasts of 
nuclear costs were "likely to rebound very awkwardly" (quoted in Williams 1980: 74). 
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Although Stretch's paper was published in a prominent journal and was drawn to the attention 
of ministers in parliament, it was ignored by both Hinton who 'never troubled to read it', and 
the AEA (Welsh 2000: 64). Stretch, according to Welsh (2000: 64) was harshly treated for his 
criticism, he was ostracized by his colleagues and became known with the AEA as 'The 
Renegade'. He eventually resigned to teach engineering in Birmingham, and he ftirther 
expanded his ideas on the nuclear power industry and failings of modem science in a book 
published in 1961 (Stretch 1961). Hinton only acknowledged the truth of Stretch's critique in 
1975, admitting that it was an "over ambitious nuclear programme" in a retrospective review of 
nuclear policy in a House of Lord debate, and in an article published in New Scientist. in 
October 1976 (Hinton 1976). 
2.1.2 1960s Fuel policy 
Most criticism in the 1960s was of the decisions made on the speed, scale and reactor choice of 
the nuclear program, not of the nuclear project. In the early 1960s the AEA forecasts were 
quickly proved in several respects over-optimistic: the Magnox reactors took longer and cost 
more to build than expected, while the cost of power from coal fell. The formation of OPEC in 
1960 was generally dismissed, except by Fritz Schumacher at the NCB who continually 
prophesied on the dangers of oil dependency. Similar views were expressed in a letter to The 
Telegraph on 15 August 1961 by Captain Herbert Atkins, whose later criticism of the AEA, over 
its marine reactor system and its monopoly position as both designer and assessor of reactors, 
was reported in The-Guardi of 21 February 1963.1 His immediate dismissal from Vickers 
created a political storm which resulted according to Pocock in the AEA never again be able "to 
enjoy the fteedom from criticism that it had known since the early days of Calder Hall" (Pocock 
1977: 141). 
The secrecy of the deliberations on reactor choice by the Powell Committee had by 1964, 
bought criticisms of excessive nuclear secrecy from the press. The opinion of Natur (27 June 
1964 ppl247-8) was not untypical "the secrecy maintained over the proceedings of the Powell 
Committee is indefensible", and New Scientist (19 March 1964) complained about "poorer 
decisions were to expectedfrom a secret technocracy than from a more open policy mtem". 
The nuclear programme attracted criticism from academics of the period, who were very critical 
of the size of the first nuclear programme, and of the decision to concentrate on one reactor 
type alone. Typical of such criticism was the work of Mary Goldring who believed that worst 
mistakes of the nuclear power programme were its rigidity and inflexibility. She warned in 1964 
that "Too much atomic planning is done by people pushing atomic power" , and that cost 
estimates are "games played by accountants" (Goldring 1964: 12; 14). 
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However the decision to choose the AGR, rather than the LWR, for Dungeness bought rave 
reviews for the nuclear industry. Williams wrote "Echoing 1955 the British press gave the AGR's 
success an enthusiastic, and mostly uncritical, reception. The stock words were used: 'triumph, 
'breakthrough', 'decisive advantage' " (Williams 1980: 145). He notes however, based on 
critical reference in the non British technical press such as Euronuclear that "Few outside the 
technical community recognized, however, it was on the basis of the CEGBs assumptions and 
not on basic technological and economic merit that the AGR had won" (Williams 1980: 145). 
One vocal critic of the AGR decision was Duncan Bum, whose book criticising the AEA's 
monopoly over R&D (Bum 1967) "caused a sensation and prompted many influential 
personalities within the industry to commit themselves either to Burn's attitudes or to the defense, 
as they saw it, of the Atomic Energy Authorioý' (Pocock 1977: 183). 
The years 1965-68 had two White Papers on Fuel, in 1965 and 1967, accompanied by much 
internal fighting between the coal and nuclear industries, and extensive newspaper coverage on 
the (bleak) future for coal and (rosy) prospects for nuclear. 'Me most organized opposition to 
nuclear was from the coal industry led by Lord Robens', the Chairman of the NCB (see section 
2.3). He was described by Pocock "as one of the most severe critics of the nuclear power 
programme, which he saw as the principal threat to the mining industry and an outspoken man 
andformidable opponent, from early 1966 he was in conflict with a Minster of Power who had 
a similar reputation - Richard Marsh" (Pocock 1977: 172). Such was the threat to coal from 
nuclear that the NCB took the highly unusual step of effectively dissociating themselves from 
the Government's fuel policy in its Annual Report for 1966/67. It argued (quoted in Williams 
1980: 155): 
"Estimates that the cost ofproviding electricityfrom nuclear stations will be less than the 
cost of doing so from thermal stations need close and dispassionate examination. Nuclear 
stations cost huge sums in capital and account needs to be taken of the use to which excess 
capital expenditure could be put if it were not sunk in these stations. To the extent that the 
basic technology remains unproven, the justification for spending these large sums of 
capital must be open to question". 
The 1967 White Paper was meant to resolve these economic questions but as Robens commented 
"No doubt the Labour Government though that when the "ite Paper was published in 1967 
the public debate about the relative merits of nuclear power and coal would come to an end. On 
the contrary, I continued to clamourfor an independent inquiry into these matters" (Robens 
1972: 166). In desperation the NCB commissioned a report from the Economist Intelligence 
Unit, which was published in September 1968, but the Ministry of Power rejected its 'middle of 
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the road policy' (Williams 1980: 168). A further critical report of Government policy came in 
1968 from the Brooking Institute which concluded "Coal output should probably be cut back 
more slowly than is planned and the investment programme for electricity (especially nuclear 
generation) should be substantially reduced' (Caves et al 1968). 
However overall nuclear had a very good press in the 1950s and 1960s, and the few critics, like 
Stretch, Burn and the NCB were easily dismissed. The next sections looks at protest against the 
building of nuclear power stations, firstly in the 1950s, then by the NCB and the coal industry in 
the 1960s, and finally by the inhabitants of Stourport in 1970. 
2.2 The 1950s Public Inquiries 
Between 1956 and 1961 there were 7 public inquiries into proposals to build Magnox stations. " 
The first (commercial) Magnox, at Berkeley in 1955, was approved without an inquiry but from 
then on every Magnox, except Sizewell A in 1960, was subject to an Inquiry lasting from 2 to 5 
days. This compares to all 5 AGRs built without an inquiry in the 1960s. In fact there was a 10 
year interval (1961-71) without an inquiry. Ile 1970s saw a return to nuclear inquires. In 1971 
there were two: the first over Connay's Quay lasted 28 days during March and April (DT1 
1971a), and the second over Portskewett for 3 days in June (DTI 1971b). Then in 1974 there 
was 8 day inquiry over Torness followed by the marathon 100 day inquiry over the Windscale 
THORP plan in 1977. 
Brian Rome, a law lecturer and Conservation Society Activist at Bristol Polytechnic in the 1970s 
and 80s, compiled extensive indexes of all nuclear power inquiries. Writing in 1979 he believed 
"that past inquiries contain much information relevant for forthcoming ones" and that these 
"will involve disputes on specific issues MOST of which were disputed in 1956177 nuke P. Ls and 
that many grounds-of-objection will be as relevant and valid in 1980 as they were in the 
Magnox days" (Rome 1979b). In his 1979 Index to Past Public Inquiries, Rome (1979b) 
provides references to previous inquiries to show that the issues of need, non-nuclear 
alternatives, reactor safety, emissions, economics, and accidents which dominated the 1970s anti- 
nuclear campaign had already been raised in the 1950s. In his Index the need for nuclear power 
was raised at the Bradwell inquiry in 1956, at Hinkley in 1957, at Trawsfynydd in 1958 and 
Wylfa in 1961. Reactor safety was an issue at Bradwell, Trawsfynydd, Dungeness and Oldbury, 
while economics was raised at Bradwell, Oldbury and Wylfa. As the public inquiries progressed 
the range of objections widened from initial concerns on amenity, nature conservation and 
economic interest to what Rudig described as "afar more sustained attack in terms of the safety 
and economics of nuclear power" as occurred at the Oldbury inquiry, held in April and May 
1960 (Rudig 1990: 116). However national press coverage of the inquiries was mostly confined 
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to short reports or letters, mostly on wildlife or amenity issues, with local press giving more 
space to opposition groups. 
2.2.1 Bradwell 
The first Public Inquiry over a nuclear power station occurred at Bradwell-on-sea, Essex in April 
1956. Initially Aubrey Jones, the Minister of Fuel, hoped it might be possible to avoid an 
inquiry but opponents of the scheme exploited the contradictions in the siting criteria. If nuclear 
was as safe as conventional industries why must it be placed in remote rural areas? The local MP, 
Brian Harrison, had taken informal soundings at the beginning of 1956 and found that the 
safety issue had been "worrying local residents more than anything" (Luckin 1990: 174). 
Although large number of villagers, at a parish gathering in March, declared themselves in 
favour of the scheme, the opponents, who included national figures like Tom Dribere, ex NIT 
for the area, and John Betjeman, a conservationist for Victorian architecture and later to become 
Poet Laureate, were better organized and better able to influence public opinion through use of 
local media. The opposition formed the Blackwater and Dengie Peninsular Protection 
Association (BDPPA) with the intention of 'creating the strongest opposition', to the project by 
running a 'campaign to excite national interest' (East Anglian Daily Times 26 May 1956). By 
mid March the Minister of Fuel had received more than 150 formal objections, and therefore 
had little option but to sanction a public inquiry. The BDPPA reflected two sets of organized 
local interests centred around the oyster industry and local sailing enthusiasts. According to 
Welsh it also acted as a focus around "which a much more diverse and less clearlyfocused 
range of objections coalesced', many from outside the local area (Welsh 2000: 73). 
The Inquiry lasted five days from 26 to 28th April and on 8th and 9th May and is covered in 
detail by Luckin (1990: 174-8) and by Welsh (2000: 74-8 1). It was, as the Inspector noted, well 
attended by the public with objections received from afar afield as Somerset and the Midlands. 
The Inspector however judged the evidence submitted purely in terms of expert testimony on 
amenity, the alleged danger to the oyster fisheries, and the toredo worm. The everyday fears and 
suspicions of the objectors were dismissed as 'unreal'. As Welsh commented "The concerns of 
the objectors which had been expressed in such impassioned terms were thus defined away as 
being real only within the confines of the Inquiry. Subjected to the rigours of the 'real world' 
they would dissolve away into 'unreality"' (Welsh 2000: 79). This left only the testimony of 
the two expert witnesses for the objectors on the possible damage to the oyster beds and the 
prospect of an increase in 'torpedo worms' and 'gribble' which were detrimental to yacht hulls. 
According to Welsh "ne Inspector dispatched their evidence by recourse to a childhood 
reminiscence of a summer spent watching the oysterfisherman of Nitstable. From his extensive 
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study, the Inspector concluded that "oyster culture was a very chancy business" and that "one 
cannot always accountfor a bad harvest" " (Welsh 2000: 79). Finally the Inspector dismissed 
the amenity issue which was "an emotional one upon which the whole opposition case hinged" 
by saying that amenity must bow to the face of progress and the inevitability of change which 
was already occurring (Welsh 2000: 79). 
2.2.1.1 National media coveraii 
The coverage by the national media was patchy, and there were no in-depth feature articles as 
there had been for the Magnox reactors at Calder Hall! Objectors fears about nuclear safety 
went unreported; the press tended to follow the prejudices of the Inspector in its reporting, with 
headlines described by Welsh as 'verging on the inane at times' (Welsh 2000: 81). The Minster 
of Fuel, Aubrey Jones, under pressure to keep to a demanding nuclear timetable, accepted both 
his Inspector's report without qualification and his dismissal of the objectors' case (Luckin 
1990: 178). Objectors were left to plead their case through the letters column of the national 
press. The objectors wrote to every MP arguing that their case had not been given adequate 
consideration and urging that the inquiry be re-opened (BLe Times 23 May 1956). Their plea 
fell on barren ground. As Welsh commented: (Welsh 2000: 81): 
"At the level of the local inquiry the status, prestige, and unassailable position of nuclear 
expertise were sufficient to ensure the success of the CEA's application. At the national level 
the tendency to accord status to the pronouncements of the Inspector at the Inqui? y, and 
the overall enthusiasm for the nuclear project, combined to ensure that the reservations of 
the objectors over nuclear safetyfound little expression. At the national level the 
unassailable position of the nuclear enterprise remained inviolate". 
2.2.2 Hunterston 
The Inquiry to build a Magnox station at Hunterston, on the Clyde in Scotland, lasted 11 days, 
and was held between the 29th January and 13th of February 1957. It was re-opened briefly on 
June 14th to enable an Inspector's Report to be submitted as the original Inspector had died in 
the intervening period. The proceeding were published as a )White Paper issued by the Scottish 
Office (HMSO 1957). Objections were received from forty individuals and organizations. These 
included an individual from Kent and a petition bearing 208 signatures. Unlike Bradwell no , 
comme ial interests were represented. In this case the major objector was the Hunterston Estate 
upon whose land the station was to be sited. Objections covered both nuclear and non nuclear 
concerns. The former were about the 'effect of radioactive dust and fumes' and their 
implications for human life and flora and fauna of the area. The latter covered the loss of 
agricultural land; the presence of alternative sites; damage to roads; disturbance; long term 
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economic impact due to imbalances created within the local labour market; the impact upon 
fisheries; and finally, amenity considerations. 
During the Inquiry it became known that the final contract for the station had already been 
awarded before the Inquiry had even opened. This caused a filrore that found its way to the 
House of Commons where it was described as 'the worst mistake' and gave the "impression that 
the Authority was ready to ride roughshod over the rights of the individual" (HCD 569: 107). 
Thus there was a feeling among objectors that the outcome of the inquiry was a fore-gone 
conclusion (Welsh 2000: 86). This feeling was intensified when the SSEB physically trespassed 
upon the estate to conduct preliminary site evaluation. This stirred up a 'great deal of ill 
feeling' and the inspector commented that "Excess zeal does not atonefor trespass" (HMSO 
1957: 12). Thus the Hunterston Inquiry raised the issue, made with much effect in the mid 
1970s by Flood and Grove-White (1976), that the development of nuclear power represented a 
threat to individual liberty and human rights. 
2.2.3 Trawsfynydd. 
The second round of sites selected for Magnox stations by the CEA were located in areas where 
MPs and councilors welcomed the developments and the prospect of local opposition was 
minimi ed. However the selection of Trawsfynydd in the recently created Snowdonia National 
Park generated controversy. The locals were strongly in favour on employment grounds, whilst 
national conservation groups, which included the Ramblers Association, the Youth Hostel 
Association and most importantly the National Parks Commission, were opposed on 'amenity' 
grounds. 
This involved not only dispute over the aesthetics - the modernist architecture of the station - but 
also its location in an area of outstanding natural beauty. The building of large industrial plants 
in rural areas was considered as a threat to England's 'green and pleasant land' and found 
expression in the House of Lords, the press and at the inquiry. The tendency for the press and 
inquiry inspectors to focus on 'amenity' issues within early inquiries reflected the fact that 
tamenity' was a familiar category of dissent, and according to Welsh "In the prevailing 
discourses of the day 'amenity' had a similar connotation to NIAM Y in more recent times" 
(Welsh 2000: 70). 
A3 day inquiry was held from 12-14th February 1958 (HMSO 1958), with daily reports in The 
Times. The opening of the Inquiry, according to Sir Stanley Brown, the Chairman of the CEA, 
"attracted a demonstration march of supporters, complete with banners... We were duly 
gratefur' (Brown 1970: 5). Delay in announcing the result caused local restlessness with The 
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Times reporting on 6 June 1958 that local people showed eagerness to attract the project with 
them calling for 'bread before beauty'. 
The Times in its editorial (6 June 1958) said: 
"The NFU branch complained that the National Parks Commission was retarding progressive 
development in the country generally, which was having a depressing effect on agriculture and 
economic development". Furthermore it gave the opinion that "The government was 
withholding permission for a decent interval to placate the amenity interests, whose arguments 
and interventions must be recognized as stemmingfrom the most worthy motives". 
2.2.4 Dungeness 
The argument that economic development should take precedence over amenity and wildlife 
issues had few critics in the late 1950s. One person who was prepared to take a stand was Max 
Nicholson, the Director General of Nature Conservancy, an organization set up by the 
Government in 1949 to protect wildlife sites. 
The proposal to build a Magnox station at the site of the Dungeness nature reserve bought an 
uncompromising and explicitly 'environmental' response from him. ' At a press conference on 8 
December 1958, the week before the Inquiry was to open, Nicholson said he would oppose 
absolutely Dungeness power station at the Inquiry. He said we must "avoid the sacrifice for all 
time of byJar the most important shingle structure in the British Isles and probably in Europe" 
(Times 1958a). The Conservancy in its evidence to the Inquiry wrote that the land in question 
"is of unique and irreplaceable permanent importance to science, while the project for which 
compulsory-powers are proposed to be exercised is of relatively short ter7n utility" (Nature 
Conservancy 1958: 4). Furthermore in an attack on nuclear siting policy it declared that "The 
long term national economic interests which the programme of nuclear power development is 
designed to serve, are inconsistent with the selection of a site so farfrom the point of 
consumption" (Nature Conservancy 1958: 17). Thus it asked the Inspector not to recommend 
the scheme. 
At the Inquiry, which lasted 3 days from 16 to 18th December 1958 (HMS0 1959), counsel for 
CEGB, Mr. S. Cooke, made a strong attack on the Nature Conservancy. He said that their book 
(of evidence) about the proposed Dungeness station was 'intellectual opportunism', was full of 
exaggerated language and false suggestions, and was a lamentable performance by a public 
authority. Cooke stated "At best the book was obscure, and at worst it was an equivocal 
evasive and disingenuous. The arguments were irresponsible. ... How Ujustiflies this ill-advised 
and ill-informed incursion into matters which are quite outside its-functions is difficult to 
understand but it is disturbing to see" (Times 1958b). 
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A CEGB witness, D. Clarke, the Chief Planning Engineer, put forward the contemporary view 
that the amount of damage done to minority interests would be relatively small by comparison 
with most sites that could be found. Two days later, in his evidence to the Inquiry, Nicholson 
replied to his critics and said "everybody connected with the inquiry as having a "split 
personality" what was being discussed was a collision between the two personalities - we 
wanted economic development and a higher standard of living but we also wanted to leave 
something of our inheritance to our children" (Times 1958c). 
However his evidence was seen more in scientific terms rather than ecologically ethical terms, 
and Dungeness was presented as a conflict between scientific research and economic 
development. After the station was approved in June 1959, Francis Rose, Chairman of the Kent 
Naturalist Trust, wrote to The Times expressing his shock at the decision, saying that the site was 
unique in Europe and of great scientific value. He wrote (! he Time 15 July 1959): 
"The irony of the situation is that in the name of the advance of science, the Authority is 
destroying an area which isfar more valuable as a sitefor scientific study that as a sitefor 
a power station. ne power station could go elsewhere but we cannot move the unique 
structure ofDungeness nor its wild life". 
The result of the decision was that the Nature Conservancy abandoned its proposed Dungeness 
National Nature Reserve. It said "A clear choice had to he made between on the one hand the 
conservation of the unique national interest of Dungeness for scientific research and education 
and on the other the exploitation as an engineering site" _e 
Times (T11 
_ =, 
24 November 1959). 
Other naturalist bodies expressed their disappointment. The Council for Nature (! he Time 14 
July 1959), said that this tract of shingle was preserved through naturalists efforts to maintain its 
wild character in perpetuity as a national asset. They suggested a review of nuclear siting policy, 
with the construction of nuclear stations nearer to built up areas. This they hoped would protect 
remaining undeveloped coastal area. This echoed arguments put forward at the Inquiry that if 
nuclear stations are safe why build them in isolated spots? Ironically when the Government did 
decide to change its siting policy in February 1968, and allow AGRs to be built much nearer to 
built up areas than previously, one result was the support of the Nature Conservancy but strong 
opposition from local residents. This is what occurred at Stourport-on-Severn in early 1970 (see 
Section 2.4). 
2.3 The NUM anti-nuclear campaign in the 1960s 
This section looks at the anti-nuclear campaign waged by Alf Robens and Fritz Schumacher, at 
the National Coal Board, in the 1960s. For Robens it was a vested interest campaign to protect 
miners'jobs, but for Schumacher it was about ethical and conservation issues. Their campaign 
27 
ended in defeat in 1968. The appointment of Alf Robens as Chairman of the National Coal 
Board (NCB) in 1960 heralded the start of the first national campaign against nuclear power in 
Britain. As Robens wrote in his autobiography "The battle of nuclear power versus coal began 
as far as I was concerned in October 1960, the month that I took up my post as Chairman 
Designate of the Coal Board" (Robens 1972: 179). His ten year campaign, during his tenure at 
the NCB, was ably assisted by Fritz Schumacher", the Chief Economist of the NCB. 
Schumacher's eldest daughter and biographer, Barbara Wood, wrote "Robens was not the sort 
of man to preside over a declining industry. He understood at once it was important to keep the 
coal industry going and used Fritz to feed him with all the arguments he needed in the battle to 
keep the industry not only alive but also thriving. Roberts did the fighting, Fritz supplied the 
ammunition" (Wood 1984: 301). As Barbara Wood pointed out: (Wood 1984: 302): 
"Ihe arguments with which Fritzfurnished Robens, and which he himselfput forward 
endlessly in lectures and articles, were basically the same as those he had putforward in the 
1950s, only stronger. He pointed out thefinite nature of the non-renewable energy 
resources, and the foolishness of abandoning one major source just because one happened 
to be cheaper in the short term". 
Robens was not anti-nuclear per se, and his campaign can be seen as a vested interest one. He 
remarked "Neither the Coal Board as a whole nor Ipersonally were against the building of 
nuclearpower stations... Our criticism was that the programme was too bigfor a new process, 
and that before proceeding to a large (and, as it turned out) disastrous programme operating 
experience shouldfirst be gained" (Robens 1972: 181). He wished to protect the coal industry 
from a too rapid shut down, and argued vociferously that nuclear power was being unfairly 
subsidized. Schumacher, in contrast, was against any nuclear power. Wood wrote of the NCB 
members (1984: 303): 
"To Fritz theirfaith in nuclear energy horrified him more than anything. He had been 
collecting statistics about nuclear energy since his joining the industry.. There was no 
question in his mind that the impact it would have on the supply of energy in the 1960s, 
1970s and 1980s would be negligible. Not only was it the wrong kind of energy, 
contributing only to baseload electricity needs, but in percentage terms of total energy 
needs, its contribution was insignificant .. To replace coal by nuclear energyjust did not 
make economic sense" 
2.3.1 The Hartlepool Crisis 
Robens' campaign to protect the coal industry and to expose the subsidies given to nuclear 
power, had the backing of many Labour MPs, especially those from mining constituencies. 
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However the Labour Government, under Harold Wilson, was very pro nuclear and the 
established view was that the coal industry had no future and should be run down. The Labour 
party, in opposition in the early 1960s had promised support for coal, but in government, from 
1964-70, reneged on their promises and accelerated the coal industry shutdown. 
The campaign reached a climax in 1967-68 with the ran up to the 1967 White Paper on Fuel 
Policy, and the decision on the proposed AGR nuclear power station at Seaton Carew, near 
Hartlepool, south of Newcastle. Robens realized that if this station was built, on the very edge of 
the Durham coalfield, then the coal industry had a bleak future as a supplier of coal to the 
electricity industry. Williams agreed writing "if coal could not compete successfully with nuclear 
energy there, then itsfuture was bleak indeed. The psychological stake for the mining 
community was thus enormous" (Williams 1980: 165). Feelings amongst miner ran high, as 
Robens remarked "Even to suggest putting a nuclear power station on the coatfleld was 
regarded by the miners as the kiss of death and an act of treachery on the part of the Labour 
Government" (Robens 1972: 194). 
Robens, along with the 1967 Select Committee on Science and Technology, repeatedly called 
for an independent financial investigation of the economics of nuclear power (Williams 1980: 
166-8). He did not believe CEGB claims that nuclear was cheaper than coal. He complained 
bitterly about nuclear secrecy on costs "This conspiracy of silence is a sinister development. 
Parliament is being denied information of the greatest national importance - information that is 
essentialfor seeing whether the vast sums of money being invested by a nationalised industry are 
being wisely spent' (Robens 1972: 184). Robens justified his campaign: "I had already been 
criticised in many quarters for presuming to question the economics of the AGR question. My 
justification was the hat( a million people on the coal industry's payroll". 
However the Government had been persuaded, by a 1964 review, that nuclear power in the form 
of the AGR was the power station of the future. The result, however, was a foregone conclusion: 
the media and many MPs, such as Tony Benn, were solidly pro-nuclear and there were then few 
anti-nuclear critics in Britain. One critic was Duncan Bum who in his 1967 book savaged the 
AGR and Britain's nuclear policy stating (Bum 1967: 108): 
"The policy of having a large programme ofpower stations, originally planned to cost 
; C1,000 Million by 1965, was a badly judged use of resources, which was not imposed by 
what was wrongly called the 'energy gap. The UK Government's central guidance and 
control led to a use of lavish resources wasteJully". 
However leaders of both main parties in Parliament joined in expressing disapproval of Bum's 
book. Tony Benn, then Minister of Technology, concluded Bum's analysis was 'polemical'and 
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the picture it presented wasTalse' (Bum 1978: 14). Benn expressed his "belief that this count? y 
had been given good valuefor the money it has spent in thefield of civil nuclearpower" and he 
thought "the position will be seen more clearly in ourfavour in a few years' time" (Bum 
1978: 14). 
2.3.1.1 Schumacher's 1967 SPeech 
In such a pro-nuclear climate, Schumacher's speech on 19 October 1967, giving the annual Des 
Voeux Memorial Lecture on 'Clean air and Future Energy - Economics and Conservation' to the 
National Society for Clean Air Conference, at Blackpool, to 900 delegates caused a storm 
(Schumacher 1967a). In it he raised doubts about the safety of nuclear reactors, drawing 
attention to the problem of the radioactive wastes and arguing for watchfiilness on the effects of 
this new technology. Williams commented (1980: 160): 
"Schumacher also offered what wasfor its time a very unorthodox opinion, to the effect 
that nuclear stations represented an incredible, incomparable, and unique hazard to 
human life: worse still, this did not enter any calculations and was never mentioned". 
Schumacher's remarks were widely reported in the press with a headline of "Nuclear stations 
'hazard to life"' in The Times the next day. A statement from the Ministry of Power dismissed 
his remarks as "so inaccurate that they cannot be regarded as a serious contribution to any 
discussion of the subject. This may be explained by his having no scientific qualifications in the 
nuclear field" (Times 1967). The Ministry defended the nuclear safety record by saying: "His 
suggestions that safety considerations have been disregarded in the development of nuclear 
power is totally unfounded Public safety issues are and always have been of the greatest 
concern to the Government'. 
Peter Williamson, a GEGB delegate at the conference, linked Schumacher's speech to the 
campaign run by the NCB in favour of coal and against nuclear power, saying (Times 1967): 
"For Dr Schumacher to suggest that there is a conspiracy of-silence to prevent the public 
from learning of the health and safety aspects of nuclear power suggest to me that he is 
more remote from the subject than his paper might imply. It is ironic that this attack on the 
safety of nuclear power should comefrom a senior official of the National Coal Board, 
although maybe it is just part of the anti-nuclear campaign that you may have noticed in 
the past few months". 
Richard Marsh, the Minster of Power, rebuked Schumacher saying that his lecture "was one of 
the most extraordinary and least profitable contributions to the current debate on nuclear and 
, ph 
21 October 1967). Schumacher defended himself a week later coal cost" e Daily Tele&La 
30 
in letter to The Times on 25 October, but then received no more publicity until the launch of his 
book in 1973. 
2.3.1.2 Defeat 
Robens realized, with the publication of the 1967 White Paper (which gave an enhanced role to 
nuclear and reduced one to coal) together with the approval given to the Hartlepool nuclear 
station in 1968, that the coal industry had suffered a serious defeat. He wrote "The effect on the 
industry's morale was shattering everywhere.. there was no concealing thefact this was a 
devastating reverse" (Robens 1972: 199). His anti-nuclear campaign had been in vain. Both he 
and Schumacher left the NCB in 1971, and in neither of their biographies is there any mention 
of nuclear power after 1968. Robens concluded "It saddens me to think that the country 
suffered because the advice I and my colleagues (notably Schumacher) gave was ignored by the 
civil servants and the politicians. We were regarded as bloody nuisances at the time" (Robens 
1972: 226). 
Schumacher felt more bitter, as Barbara Wood commented (1984: 301): 
"The Labour government believed in cheap oil and in high technology nuclear energy.. 
Wilson's Government, blinded by the benefits of short term, cheap energy, turned their back 
on the people; blinded by the seductions of high technology they put their money into 
nuclear powered stations andforced the pace ofpit closures to accelerate. Life under 
Labour wasfar worsefor the industry than under the Tories. Fritzfelt disgusted and 
betrayed". 
Schumacher was, however, to continue his opposition to nuclear power particularly after the 
publication of his best seller Small is Beautiful, in 1973, where his 1967 speech is reprinted in a 
chapter with the provocative title 'Nuclear Energy - Salvation or Damnation' (for further 
discussion of Schumacher's ethical views on nuclear power see section 6.4.1). 
2.4 Stourýort 
The Government decided in February 1968 to change its siting policy to allow the construction 
of nuclear power stations in more built up areas than previously (see Openshaw 1986: 131-8). 
This may have pleased conservation groups, like the Nature Conservancy, but the result was to 
increase opposition to nuclear power stations amongst the proposed host communities. 
Although there was an uncontroversial acceptance at Heysham in 1969, a proposed station at 
Stourport (near Kidderminster) was withdrawn before an inquiry after strong local opposition in 
1970. There. were two public inquiries in 1971 - the first for a decade - over the proposals to 
build AGRs at Connah's Quay (near Chester) and at Portskewett (near Chepstow). The first 
lasted 28 days, between 9th March to 6 May, and the inspector, for the first and only time at a 
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public inquiry into nuclear power, refused consent (Rudig 1990: 118; DTI 1971 a). The second 
in June lasted only 3 days; approval was granted but the station was never built. 
The campaign against the Stourport nuclear power station in early 1970 illustrates many of the 
perennial themes of the British nuclear debate. Nuclear utopianism by its supporters, arrogance 
and dismissal of fears by the CEGB, a backlash against hype and the suppression of debate, the 
founding of a campaign by marginal political elements, lack of support from established 
conservation groups, and the strength of fears about the hazards of radiation. It was utterly a 
local campaign, with no national media or conservation group interest or support. 
2.4.1 National Press coverage 
The national press only covered the beginning and the end of this event, and attempted to 
provide some explanation. The proposals for two AGRs to be built next to two existing coal 
stations at Stourport-on-Seven, in Worcestershire, was announced in The Times on 20 January 
1970. There was no further national publicity until 9 months later, a few days before the 
decision was announced to withdraw the proposal on 22 October 1970. 
A report in The Times on October 19th stated that there had been many objections to the 
proposal, including those from Worcestershire County Council, the Worcestershire branch of 
CPRE, the Sevem River authority and the citizens of Worcestershire, who had signed petitions 
(Times 1970). The Times seemed confused as to whether this opposition was more against 
pylons than the power station by saying "rural conservationists have recently being saying that 
power stations... are often less of a threat to the countryside than the big pylons which connect 
them to the national grid" (Times 1970). However it admitted that there was opposition to the 
power station by saying "The countryside lobby has also been displaying scepticism to the 
generating boards stock answer on 'thermal pollution (Times 1970). 
However five days later The Times (24 October 70), reporting on the Government's decision to 
refuse consent, now remarked that this decision "is seen as an important environmental 
victory". In face of a virtually united front from the whole spectrum of local governmen in the 
region it said the proposal 'never got off the drawing board'. The Guardian. on the same day, 
reported that rejection had been based 'mainly on grounds of safety'. Another factor in the 
proposal's defeat was that Peter Walker, the newly appointed Environment Minister and MP in 
an adjoining constituency, opposed the scheme. The official grounds for refusing consent were 
that the site did not meet the Government criteria (of February 1968) for building AGRs close 
to urban areas. 
Welsh attributes the withdraw of the Stourport application to the Government's fear of a public 
inquiry "where the government's siting policy would have been subject to expert challenge" 
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(Welsh 2000: 138). Given the absence of any detailed technical report to legitimate the near 
urban siting policy an extensive cross-examination would have been potentially embarrassing 
and damaging, and Welsh argues that "To have allowed the Stourport application to proceed to 
the inquiry stage would have been to run the risk ofplacing expert dissent over the effects of 
low-level radiation and safety of the A GR firrnly in the public eye" (Welsh 2000: 13 8). 
2.4.2 Local Opposition 
The proposal for the Stourport nuclear power station sparked much local press coverage and 
debate. The two local papers, Kidderminster Times & Stourport News (KT&SN) and The 
Kidderminster Shuttle (KS), naturally gave the proposal headline status, and their letters column 
was the outlet for an emerging opposition. 
The proposal was greeted with enthusiasm, with the KS, (23 January 1970: 1) carrying the 
headline 'Stourport a 'Boom' Town' and quoting Cllr. Stanley Jones, the chairman of local 
planning committee, as saying "everyone will get very prosperous ftom the R 00 m station". 
This would be because several thousand workers would be employed, and the station would 
double the ratable value of Stourport. He dismissed any possibility of dangers, saying that it was 
obvious the Government would not allow it to be built if it was unsafe. Stourport Council, he 
said, was unanimously in favour; in fact it had encouraged the CEGB to build it, having been in 
negotiation with them for several years. The article noted that this would be the first nuclear 
power station to be built inland, also the first within an urban area. After this euphoric support 
from a leading local politician it is intriguing to see, a week after the proposal was announced, 
that the other local paper, the KT&SN (30 January 1970: 12), had the headline on its editorial 
column entitled 'Nuclear Power Station opposition expected'. The author commented 
prophetically or invitingly that: 
"one can expect the opponents to the scheme to show their hands, in fact there are already 
indications that some residents of the town arefarfrom keen on the idea... although there 
has been some talk of Stourport becoming a "boom" town, many people will need more 
convincing proof that the erection of the il 00,000,000 plus nuclear station will indeed 
bring greater benefits to the majority of the inhabitants". 
The column then went on to discuss fear of modernization of the nearby town of Bewdley from 
a proposed bypass and that its supporters were now have doubts. It quoted the views of David 
Edwards, a local craftsman (KT&SN 30 January 1970: 12): 
" Why is it that so many people today are strivingfor something worthwhile to look at - 
such as representational painting or a Tudor halkimbered cottage?... Because such things 
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were made with the hands, hearts and mind offolk who cared enough for the beauty and 
above all, the pride of their great English craftsmanship". 
Xurthermore Edwards said that "we are bowing down to the march of the planners and so Big 
Brother who likes to use theirflag ofprogress as an excuse to hide behind, while they destroy 
our countryside further" (KT&SN 30 January 1970: 12). Whether the author of this column 
intended to link (expected) opposition to the Stourport nuclear power station with the fear of 
modernization existing in a small rural town is unclear. But doubting questions and criticism 
were soon forthcoming in the letters column of both papers. In the KS of 6 February, James 
Millington wrote posing questions, while on the 13th a Prof. Bono Publicoll wrote supporting 
Millington's doubts. Interestingly Publico raises the issue of nuclear safety, mentioning the 
Windscale accident of 1957, and stressing the need to study the effects of radiation emissions. 
Similarly, in the KT&SN, for the first 3 weeks of February, there were 9 letters printed, only one 
in favour of the proposed power station. To counter this adverse comment CUr Stanley Jones, 
chairman of the local planning committee, accused his critics of being accused 'stirrer-uppers', 
in an article entitled 'Nuclear Power will bring better life for Millions' (KS 20.2.1970: 11). In it 
he spoke of the need for more electricity in the West Midlands due to economic growth, and the 
threat of power shortages if the station was not built. His nuclear euphoria was not shared by all 
his fellow councillors. In the same issue CUr Betty Gazard, in a letter, made an appeal to people 
to write in to the Ministry of Technology and object to the proposed station, and she said 
petitions were being organized. 
2.4.3 CEGB arrogance 
At the end of February the CEGB tried to win over support with a four day exhibition with 
experts available to answer questions. The KS (27 February 1970: 1) with the headline 'Nuclear 
Power: The Big Choice', reported on this exhibition. It also mentioned that Cllr Betty Gazard, 
one of the few Stourport councillors against, was with her husband, Cyril collecting signatures 
for a mammoth protest petition be lodged by 14 March at the Ministry of Technology. The 
article said that the CEGB were dismissing fears of radioactive dangers, and very interesting for 
1970 made the claim that it was not a bureaucratic juggernaut. It was quoted as saying "we are 
not a huge powerful, unapproachable authority trampling down all before us in pursuit of some 
seyish purpose of our own" (KS 27 February 1970: 1). Thus the CEGB, even in 1970, was 
acutely aware of its image and unpopularity, and its reputation for arrogance. However its 
refusal to acknowledge resident's fears on nuclear safety and the dangers of radioactivity, made 
it impossible for it to shake off is reputation as an unresponsive and aloof organization. Further 
its inability to provide a convincing answer to the frequently asked question (dating back at least 
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to the first nuclear Inquiry at Bradwell in 1956) of why, if nuclear power stations were so safe, 
were they built in remote areas? And why were there such detailed emergency measures in the 
event of any release of radioactivity? The change in siting policy in February 1968 to allow 
stations to be built in built- up areas, was accompanied by detailed arrangements for the 
emergency evacuation of all residents within a radius of about 2/3 mile of the nuclear reactors, 
together with curbs on housing development within a radius 2 miles. " It was these emergency 
measures which provided the rationale for Worcestershire County Council opposition. 
2.4.4 Opposition mounts 
In the KS, of 6 March 1970, the headline story was 'Nuclear Power Station: County Probe'. 
This reported that a county sub-committee (of the Planning Committee) was to look into whole 
matter, particularly the question of radioactive hazards both in the air and into the water 
discharged into the River Severn. Their report published in late April led to headlines in the 
KT&SN (24 April 1970) of 'Hundred evacuated if emergency occurs' and gave support to 
opposition concerns about radioactive safety. This County action was perhaps in response to 
increasing local opposition for in late March the KS (27 March 1970), in its front page story, 
'1,700 Sign N-Protest', reported that Cyril Gazard had sent a petition bearing 1,700 names to 
the Ministry of Technology. The KS reported that this petition had a list of 10 objections to the 
proposed nuclear power station, and it remarked on the wide area from which signatures had 
been collected. 
The first calls for a public inquiry came in mid March. In a front page story, 'Nuclear Power 
"An Inquiry is Essential" ' the KS reported (13 March 1970: 1) that the County Council had 
lodged a formal objection, and that Norman James, a local councillor, said that a public inquiry 
was "absolutely essential". The nuclear power station proposal was causing splits in the 
Stourport Council. In a letter to the KS of 20 March, Cllr. A. Hall, complained about Cllr. 
Stanley Jones, the chairman of local planning committee "attempting to steamroller this matter 
through and using dictatorial methods to silence anyone who opposes him". Hall further 
undermined Jones' assertions that Stourport could become a boonitown by saying that this 
"cannot be substantiated by thefacts" and in fact fewer people would be employed in the new 
nuclear station than at the current coal-fired station (KS 20 March 1970). He again made this 
complaint at a public meeting in June by saying about Cl1r. Jones "He has consistently done his 
best in the past to stop questions being asked in the Council chamber" (KT&SN 5 June 1970: 
10). 
By the beginning of April, the KS headline (3 April 1970) was 'Second Thoughts? Opposition 
to N-Plant Mounts at Stourport'. The report said that a powerful group of councillors may 
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persuade Stourport council to change its mind,. The recent Maud-Ratcliffe report on local 
goverment financial reforms, meant that the town would now not be able to keep the rate 
revenue from the nuclear station. It also mentioned that Mrs. Gazard now had over 2,000 
signatories on her petition (the final count by late April was 2,200). Local MPs were now 
coming out against the proposal. Peter Walker, a neighbouring MP, was reported as having 
joined 'the fight' against the power station, while the local MP, Sir Tatton Brinton, had 
demanded a full public inquiry so that objections could be heard. He asked why if the nuclear 
station is completely safe were there restrictions on the number of people who can live within a 
two mile radius? 
2.4.5 County Council report 
The most powerful blow against the proposal was the publication of the report by the Planning 
Committee of Worcestershire County Council in late April. In it the Committee recommended 
that at the next County Council meeting on 4 May, the Council lodge an official objection and 
demand a public inquiry into the proposal. This they duly did (see KS 6 May 1970: 1). The 
committee report made headline news in both local papers. The KT&SN (24 April 1970) had 
the headline 'Hundred evacuated if emergency occurs' while the KS more soberly had '7 point 
objection to Nuclear Station'. 
The seven points of objection as reported in the papers were: 
1. The proposal would restrict future residential development (due to emergency 
arrangements). 
2. Visual impact of power station with its massive cooling towers. 
3. Impact on river flows due to massive need for cooling water. 
4. A degree of risk posed to nearby residential areas. 
5. Loss of amenity and lower house values to those living near the power station. 
6. Burden of maintaining emergency arrangements. 
7. Stourport was already too crowded. 
Minutes of the County Planning Committee reveal that it was the restrictions imposed by the 
emergency arrangements that was the deciding factor. The minutes of special sub-committee of 
3rd April state (WCC 1970: 74): 
,,... in the light of restrictions upon development... we recommend the Committee to oppose 
the proposal on general planning grounds because of the restrictions which would result 
upon housing development in Stourport.. We also suggest that the Committee consider an 
amenity objection based on the massive structural dominance of the proposed reactor and 
turbine house buildings together with the cooling towers". 
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2.4.5.1 Radiation daneers 
The recommendations of the special sub-committee were duly accepted by the Planning 
committee held on 22 April and they also identified other concerns including danger to health 
from radiation. The Sub-Committee had written for advice to number of organizations, both in 
this country and abroad. They decided to ask Profs. D. C Leslie and I Shaw, of Queen Mary 
College, University of London, to give an independent evaluation of the CEGB proposal. Their 
report was reviewed by P. W. Spiers of the University of Leeds, with gave particular emphasis to 
their views on the views of Gofinan and Tamplin. 
Leslie and Shaw (1970) produced a3 volume report which gives an interesting view of expert 
opinion on nuclear power in 1970. Broadly they were in favour, with some technical 
reservations, and they much preferred nuclear to coal stations. They state (Leslie and Shaw 
1970, Volume 1: 4): 
"Provided that the Council is satisfied about the safety aspects, the AGR would appear to 
be preferable in every way to the coal-fired station. Chief advantages of nuclear station: 
1. It is smaller 
2. There is no coal dump 
3. There is no chimney of any sLze. 
4. No combustion products are discharges 
5. One construction has been completed, the traffic to andfrom the nuclear station will be 
very much less. 
It is interesting to note that there is a discharge of radioactivityfrom a coal-fired station: 
depending on the type of coal used, this can be comparable to the dischargefrom a 
nuclear station. When considering the potential health hazards of a nuclear power station, 
it should be remembered that the discharge of combustion products from a coalfired 
station represent an actual and unavoidable health hazard". 
In their recommendations they state (Leslie and Shaw 1970: Volume 3: 1): 
"We consider that, provided there are no overriding objections to it, the proposal to site an 
AGR power station at Stourport is in the national interest. The demandfor electricity is 
increasing, and we must hope that the rate ofgrowth of demand will increase as the 
economy recovers... we feel that, provided the Council is satisfied about the radiation safety 
aspects of the proposal, a nuclear station is much to be preferred to one fired by a 
conventional fuel such as coal". 
They consider three possible objections (Volume 3: 1): 
1. Effects of steam plume. 
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2. Excessive demands on, and damage to, the river. 
3. Radioactive hazards. 
In their discussion of radioactive hazards they discuss the consequences of a possible reduction 
in radiation doses to the general public. They mention the work of Gofinan and Tamplin in the 
US on the need for a reduction in permitted doses. They state (p. 4): 
"Gofinan & Tamplin are responsible people.. and should not to be confused with Prof 
Sternglass, who recently got a lot ofpublicityfor his views that bomb tests had killed 
hundreds of thousands of children. Our colleagues are unanimous that the statistics will not 
bear the interpretations which Sternglass is trying to put on them". 
They pose the question of what would the CEGB do if standards were tightened. Their report 
concluded by saying: (p. 5) 
" While we think that the proposal is basically advantageous, we have a number of 
reservations about it. Those are mainly technical and we advise that the Council should 
attempt to settle them by negotiation ... 
before going to a Public Inquiry". 
Professor Spiers was even more pro nuclear. In a letter to the County Health Department he 
wrote (Spiers 1970a): 
"I. The site is near a populated area as distinctftom the sites so far used. 
2. This practice is almost certain to increase as more reactors are built in this small highly 
industrialized country. -proposals for Stourport will have been very carefully 
drawn up by 
experts to ensure the radiation levels and effluent discharges are well within what are 
internationally accepted levels". 
On the question of a possible accident, he wrote (Spiers 1970a): 
"... I believe Windscale-type accidents are unlikely or impossible with the present closed 
circuit type of reactor, but I imagine some kind of accidental escape is conceivable and I 
imagine the Council to be concerned about this, particularly in view of the recently renewed 
press and TV discussions on radiation dangers". 
Gofman and Tamplin assertions that the existing maximum permissible levels should be lowered 
was too much for Professor Spiers. In his brief review of the report by Leslie and Shaw, he stated 
that Gofinan and Tamplin are combining the most pessimistic risk estimates of the ICRP (Spiers 
1970b). Furthermore Spiers attacks their assertions that the ICRP levels should be reduced by a 
factor of 10 to a population dose level to 17 millirems by saying that it "cannot be very 
compelling in the light of the variations in the natural dose level - the difference in the means 
for the population of Aberdeen and Anglesey already differ by twice this amount" (Spiers 
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1970b: 3). Thus the 'nuclear experts' could find no grounds to oppose the CEGB proposal on 
radioactivity grounds, despite public fears. 
2.4.5.2 Nuclear siting polic 
One of the key questions was whether the proposed nuclear station at Stourport would meet the 
Government's new policy on nuclear siting. A short report commissioned by the sub-committee 
from the consultants, Associated Nuclear Services reported "It is doubtful whether the choice of 
site is a reasonable interpretation of the Government's policy statement ofFebruary 1968 in 
view of the intensive development close to the proposed site" (ANS 1970). 
Leslie and Shaw however were of the opinion (Volume 3: 3), which was stated in the Planning 
Committee minutes, that "it is notfeasible to oppose the new national policy to allow nuclear 
power stations to be sited much nearer to built-up areas than had been the practice before 
1968" (WCC 1970: 85). The Planning Commi ee then considered the question of "whether the 
Stourport site is so near a built-up area that it presents an unacceptable hazard". The same 
minutes report that "Dr. Gronow (an expertftom the Ministly of Technology) told the Sub- 
Committee off the cuff that Stourport appeared to be well below Heysham (a comparable urban 
site in Lancashire, but not yet built and tested) as regards the elements of risk by inhalation" 
(WCC 1970: 85). 
2.4.5.3 Risk versus benefi 
It thus appears that the Commi ee did not have evidence to oppose the station either on siting 
grounds or risk grounds. Despite this W. J. Balderstone, the Chairman of the Planning Sub- 
Committee, wrote his own paper entitled Engineering Aspects of a Nuclear Power Station at 
Stourport. This was considered at the Planning meeting on 22nd April which stated that this 
paper "was intended to show the many points at which leaks of radioactive material could 
occur" (WCC 1970: 85). In a prophetic sentence, which was reprinted in the KT&NS of 24 
April, he warned "Human error, carelessness and lazy indifference are liable to occur in the 
management of any plant, however well designed, especially perhaps at night when the rest of 
the world is asleep" (WCC 1970: 85) . 14 Balderston fiirther warned, with his remarked reprinted 
in the KT&NS on 24 April, (WCC 1970: 85): 
"Already insurance companies have notified householders in the immediate 
neighbourhood that nuclear risks are excluded. The emergency arrangements, however well 
presented, must be a source of anxiety and are likely to dampen the ready sale of houses. 
Yhefear of a much greater danger than really exists will prey upon the minds of many 
people". 
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This issue of risk was at the heart of the debate on the proposed stations. Associated Nuclear 
Services commented (ANS 1970: 100): 
"Behind the Government policy statement there is a broader principle that in siting the 
nuclear power station there should be an appropriate balance between risk and benefit, 
and in this case it seems most unlikely that the additional benefits in theform of reduced 
costs will compensatefor the additional risk to the local communiv'. 
The Planning Committee, seems to have adopted ANS view, for it stated (WCC 1970: 85): 
"... the Council as planning authority may well decide that the applicants should be put to 
the test to prove that the risk does not exist or is justified in the national interest by the 
counterbalancing gains. If so, a suitable wordingfor this ground of opposition might be: - 
"The proposed site so near to a built-up areas presents a degree of risk which has not yet 
been justified" ". 
This demand that proof be provided that 'risk does not exist' was to become a central theme of 
anti-nuclear protesters in the 1970s. In contrast the argument that nuclear stations were 'justified 
in the national interest' became a major plank of Government's attempts to push forward their 
nuclear policy. 
2.4.6 Stourport: the end. 
With the publication of the Planning Committee's report in late April, and the proposal's 
negative portrayal in headline news in the local papers, the proposal was effectively dead. The 
local campaign nevertheless intensified. In early June there was the founding of the Anti- 
Powerport Station (APS) with a Committee composed of many councillors and with 60 members 
(KT&NS 5 June 1970: 10 and 13). At a public meeting organized by the APS the promoter of 
nuclear station, Cllr. S Jones, was heavily criticised by his fellow councillors. There were calls for 
a register of objectors, and 'militant anti-nuclear power station rallies'. There was finther talk of 
raising money to employ a barrister to state their case at a public inquiry. Cllr. Eric Higgs, the 
secretary of the APS committee, was stated as saying "We are objecting because we do not want 
this in Stourport. There will always be an element offear, and we don't want to live with ie, 
(KT&NS 5 June 1970). This fear of radiation was a dominant theme. Cllr Betty Gazard, a prime 
mover behind the campaign, said "None of us know how much we shall receive, or if we shall 
receive any or if it will do us any harm" (KT&NS 5 June 1970). 
Interestingly there are no further reports after this date in the KT&NS of the nuclear proposal or 
of the APS, only a few letters mainly about conflicts over the handling of this issue in the 
Stourport council. The official announcement in late October that the proposal was being 
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withdrawn was not mentioned. Thus it seems that from June onwards it was a dead issue to the 
local media. 
2.5 Portskewett 
The campaign at Stourport against their proposed AGR had a knock on effect at the next site 
proposed by the CEGB for an AGR. This was at Portskewett (located south of Chepstow on the 
River Severn estuary in then Monmouthshire) just 50 miles down river from Stourport. The 
concerns expressed and the associated public campaign at Stourport, together with the actions of 
the Worcestershire County Council (WCQ, were common knowledge in Portskewett (Welsh 
2000: 138). Whilst Monmouth County Council (MCC) and the Rural District Councils 
supported the application, Portskewett Parish Council strongly opposed it. The reports prepared 
for WCC had been studied, and the council "regretted the absence o any such professional )f 
approach" by MCC (quoted in Welsh 2000: 138). According to the public inquiry transcripts 
the County Council were accused of having delivered the whole project to the CEGB 'on a 
platter', and the public of Portskewett had 'lost all confidence' in their elected county officials 
because of "their excessive enthusiasm... in projecting the merits of nuclear power" and their 
'subservience' to the CEGB (DTI 1971b: 32). 
The concerns of Sternglass, Gofinan, and Tamplin over low level radiation were raised once 
more, and Portskewett Parish Council urged that Sternglass' work be checked by the UK 
government. Particularly concerned about exposure to radiation were the local women's group, 
the Portskewett Young Wives (Rudig 1990: 119). The CEGB however portrayed these concerns 
as the product of press reports (such as on Sternglass that appeared in The Observer on 16 May 
1971) of discredited scientific work, relating to a different type of reactor, the American LWR 
rather than the proposed AGR. 
Despite these public concerns over radiation dangers, they found 'limited reflection' at the 
Portskewett public inquiry (Welsh 2000: 139). The main concern of Government and the CEGB 
was over challenges to its urban siting policy which lacked any (published) technical basis. 
However their position at the Portskewett Inquiry was strengthened by the precedent of the 
granting of a site licence at Heysham in 1969, where the policy had gone unchallenged. As 
Welsh remarked on Heysham "An application which had never been subject to scrutiny was 
thus used to legitimate those which were to be contested" (2000: 139). 
The Portskewett public inquiry lasted just three days in June 1971, and the application was 
approved but the CEGB never built an AGR there - most probably because by the early 1970s it 
became aware of serious design defects with the AGR (Williams 1980: 204-5). " 
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Overall, as Rudig remarked, local opposition before 1975 was on the whole rather weak with 
most objections having a clear 'ND4BY' or 'vested interest' rationale (Rudig 1990: 119). The 
next chapter examines the widening of opposition beyond these two concerns, due to the 
emergence of a broader based national network of environmental organizations. 
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The building of the UK anti-nuclear power movement in the 
1970s 
This chapter examines the building of a national network of organizations opposed to the 
expansion of nuclear power, and in particular to those groups involved in opposing the THORP 
project at Windscale. Protest was initially small and scattered, but under the leadership first of the 
Conservation society (ConSoc) then of Friends of the Earth (FoE), it attracted increasing support 
from a wide range of groups. In the early 1970s protest may have been inspired by the 
continual drip of articles on the dangers of low level radiation in the national press. For instance 
The Times, gave front page coverage in January 1970 to the allegations of Stemglass (Wright 
1970a), then there was a favourable review of Curtis and Hogan's book (Herbert 1970), and 
anti-nuclear letters to the paper. One such letter was by I. M. McNall (on 14 September 1971) 
where he outlined the conservationist case on energy (similar to that made by Schumacher in the 
1960s) which would be adopted wholesale by latter environmentalists. He wrote that it was "time 
to stop burning up limited stocks offossilfuels, to stop producing ever-increasing quantities of 
nuclear wastes, and to invest in the two sources of energy which are nearly perpetual, clean and 
free, - sunlight and theforce of the tides" (McNall 1970). 
This criticism in the early 1970s however resulted in little action, mainly because there was no 
national group willing to promote the anti-nuclear power message. Interestingly Peter Bunyard 
claimed that "one of thefirst anti-nuclear demonstrations in Britain" was organized by 
foreigners and that it (Bunyard 1981: 181): 
"... took place on Easter Monday in London in 1970, and could muster only a handful of 
people of whom nearly all wereforeigners. The demonstration then merged with the 
thousands of CAD marchers... Many of the CND marchers were surprised at the 
demonstration 6gainst nuclear reactors; they did not consider the connection between 
reactors and the production of weapons-grade plutonium to be an important issue". 
3.1 Nuclear power in the eco-press 
This demonstration and press coverage of the dangers of radiation from nuclear waste, may have 
inspired environmental writers, for in mid 1970 there were three articles published critical of 
nuclear power, concentrating on the dangers of waste disposal. First in May John Davy (1970a) 
published an article 'Atomic Waste' in S12an (the Journal of the Soil Association). ` Then in 
June 1970 Walt Patterson published his first nuclear article entitled 'Odourless, Tasteless ... and 
Dangerous: Hazards of Radioactive Waste' in Your Environment (Patterson 1970; see Lamb 
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1996: 41). Finally in the July (in the first) edition of The Ecologist Peter Bunyard (1970) 
published his article 'Is there a peaceful atomT 
Both Walt Patterson and Peter Bunyard were to go on to become prolific and well known writers 
on nuclear issues. Walter Patterson, then a commentator on UK environmental affairs for the US 
journal Environment, became editor of the UK journal Your Environment in 1971 and in 1972 
(after its demise) joined FoE. Peter Bunyard subsequently joined the editorial board of The 
Ecologist and regularly provided coverage and book reviews for that magazine of nuclear issues 
throughout the 1970s. He was the first writer in the UK eco-press to report on nuclear 
opposition in Europe- the protests at Fessenheim, in Germany on Easter Monday 1971 
(Bunyard 1971b) - and on Scotland's energy and nuclear problems (Bunyard 1971a). 
According to Welsh, the two journals, The Ecologist and Environment (from the US) were 
"amongst those responsiblefor the introduction of detailed arguments about the implications of 
nuclear power in the UK.. they provided extensive coverage of nuclear issues throughout the 
1970sfrom a critical ecological perspective" (Welsh 1988, Chpt 6-26). 
Initially the eco-press concentrated their criticism on the American LWRs, the British AGR 
reactors overall receiving a relatively favourable press. For instance Patterson writing in 1972 
praised the AGRs as 'more efficient' and 'more environmentally sound' (Patterson 1972b). 
However wider anti-nuclear arguments were steadily introduced (from the US), including the 
risks of low level radiation, the link between civil and military uses, and the dangers of nuclear 
terrorism. As Welsh commented "The introduction of a wide range of issues other than reactor 
safety and the presence of embryonic campaigning groups combined to create a climate within 
which opposition was inevitable irrespective of reactor choice" (Welsh 1988, Chpt 7-27). 
Then on 13 December 1971 came a TV documentary, 'A Question of Survival' with its second 
part on radiation; a reviewer said that its message (echoing Tamplin) was that there was 'no safe 
dose' (Banks-Smith 1971). Pocock notes the importance of this programme, writing "Well 
organised and well publicised opposition to plans for the expansion of nuclear power in Great 
Britain may be considered to datefrom the beginning of 1972 as a result of this broadcast and 
of similar coverage by other media" (Pocock 1977: 227). By the end of 1972 Patterson noted 
with satisfaction that newspaper reports, television programmes and public discussions were "at 
last beginning to take a more critical attitude towards nuclear power than has hitherto been the 
case in Britain" (Patterson 1972b: 9). 
However, unlike the US, France or Germany there was no mass anti-nuclear campaign. Partly 
this was because no new stations were being proposed, and partly that there was little public 
discussion of nuclear affairs. The old style conservationists and New Left socialists were 
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generally in favour of nuclear power, while most environmentalists were concerned with issues 
of global doom - the Limits to Growth and Blueprint for Survival debate. Few had thought about 
nuclear issues. As Williams observed "Opposition to nuclear power had increased throughout 
the seventies in all the liberal democracies, drawing strength from a substantial measure of 
international co-ordination, but the movement in Britain remained distinctly muted until the 
Windscale issue in 1976-7" (Williams 1980: 263). 
Harold Bolter, BNFL's Director of Information, places the start of the anti-nuclear campaign in 
1976, saying that it took a highly critical (Flowers) report "to give the campaign its early 
impetus and credibility" (Bolter 1996: 169). With that report the opposition had to be taken 
seriously as the "Royal Commission's views could not be shrugged off as thefevered ravings of 
people with vivid imaginations and suspect political motives - the nuclear industry, s customa? y 
response to opposition in those days". Patterson too agrees on the importance of the Flowers 
Report in "conflinningfor thefirst time in semi-official terms that some of the main points raised 
by 'environmentalists' warranted genuine concern" and that the political credibility of criticism 
of civilian nuclear power was immeasurably enhanced (Patterson 1979: 159). 
3.2 ConSoc debate and early action 
The anti-nuclear campaign in the 1970s can be considered to have started with the ConSoc 
debate over nuclear power following the reprint of a BBC Radio 3 talk by Jon Tinker (given on 
27 June 1972) on the Stockholm Conference. The text published in Conservation News later 
that year, said that the Stockholm Conference had "totallyfailed to come to grips with nuclear 
power.. At the moment, only a handful of countries have atomic power stations. In less than 
thirty years'time, haýCthe world's electricity will comefrom the atom. By then, two new 500 
megawatt nuclear power plants... will be opening every day" (Tinker 1972: 5). Tinker then 
described the problem of radioactive waste, he said there was no safe way of disposing of it, and 
that "This devils broth can never be released, for it contains more radioactivity than a dozen H- 
bombs ... Nat sort of environmental legacy is thatfor our children and grand-children? " 
(Tinker 1972: 5). Tinker then warned "The trouble is, by the time wefind out if the long term 
waste problem is insoluble or not, thirty or so of the world's leading nations are going to be 
hooked on nuclear power, unable to give it up without crippling their electricity supply" 
(Tinker 1972: 5). 
He remarked that at Stockholm the hazards of nuclear power was not on the UN agenda, and 
hence not discussed officially, but was discussed at many unofficial forums and conferences ." 
Professor Fremlin, who was active in ConSoc in promoting the nuclear cause, and gave talks to 
local branches, came to the defence of nuclear power in the Conservation News January 1973 
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newsletter. " He said that Tinker has made an "absurd and incorrect statement that the "devils 
broth" contains more radioactivity than a dozen H-bombs" (Fremlin 1973: 13). Fremlin 
pointed out that the burning of fossil fuels was causing the death of something in the region of 
10,000 people a year, while the danger of nuclear power was hundreds to thousands times less 
than that of other more conventional methods of power production. In the April edition, John 
Davoll, the Director of ConSoc, said that Fremlin was being 'mildly disingenuous', and that 
"not everyone shares Prof Fremlin's optimism about the ability of humanity to manage vast 
amounts of nuclear wastes safelyfor millennia" (Davoll 1973a: 5). Davoll's lack of confidence 
in nuclear experts is apparent in his review of Patterson's first book, Nuclear Reactors, where he 
said "Nuclear power is only part of a even more intimidating nexus ofproblems related to the 
use and generation of energy.. Can any society so dependent on the advice of experts.. have 
any hope of ar7iving at informed ands democratic decisions on the most vital questions thatface 
it" (Davoll 1973b). 
Davoll in his review of ConSoc's activities in 1974 again warned on the dangers of seeking 
reliance on increased energy supplies "Even more seriously, the commitment to nuclear energy 
is gathering momentum, and may well soon become almost irreversible, the nuclear waste it will 
produce represents industrial society's ultimate gesture of indifference to the future" (ConSoc 
1974b: 8). 
3.2.1 ConSoc Nuclear Policy 
On 15 December 1973, ConSoc Council accepted an Energy Working Paper (by David Corry its 
Convenor) which expressed opposition to the building of any more nuclear power stations until 
an absolutely safe method of disposing of the long lived radioactive wastes had been perfected. " 
This was to lead to the start of ConSoc's anti-nuclear campaign lead by Jane and John Pink, of 
the Merton Branch from December 1973. Soon afterwards, in early 1974, ConSoc Leaflet issue 
an 4 page leaflet Nuclear Power: Salvation or Deathtrap? which briefly explained the dangers 
of nuclear power and gave the Society's views (ConSoc 1974a). As the ConSoc 1974 Annual 
Report stated "It is hoped to use this widely in opposingfurther reliance on nuclear power, and 
particularly the implicit commitment to the plutonium-basedfast breeder reactor" (ConSoc 
1975: 17). 
Then at the ConSoc AGM, held on 16-17th November 1974, two anti-nuclear policy resolutions 
were passed. These stated (ConSoc 1975: 10): 
"la) calls upon the British Government to halt the building of any more nuclear power 
stations while there is no absolutely safe method of disposing of long lived radioactive 
wastes 1b) urges that the Society... should launch and sustain a campaign to alert the 
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general public and to inform the Government about the dangers to life, born and unborn, 
created by nuclear technology and c) calls for an investigation into alternative sources of 
power". 
The campaign continued assisted by the strong support of John Davoll, who stated, in his review 
for 1974-75, that much effort had gone into a campaign on nuclear power "Most o this has ?f 
been devoted to increasing public knowledge about the implications, principally because Jane 
and John Pink of our Merton Branch were willing to initiate and manage a substantial 
campaign" (ConSoc 1975: 15). There was however much internal division within the Society 
over its anti-nuclear message, as is evident from the Letter Page of Conservation News during the 
next year. In the letter column Professor John Frenihn was the first to oppose the Pinks' 
campaign and defend nuclear power (Fremlin 1975) but was rebutted by the Pinks in the next 
issue. Conservation News 59 (January 1976) had four letters on nuclear power: one defending 
by B. K. Jones but three opposing: by E. C. Durham, B. K. Jones and Beryl Kemp (1976a), the 
new Convenor of the Energy Working Party. Although ConSoc's campaign was couched in 
technical language, about reactor choice, energy supply issues and risks of radioactive waste, it 
was, according to Beryl Kemp, at its heart about the moral issue of intergenerational equity 
(Kemp 1976a). 
The debate in Conservation News on nuclear power was further enlivened by interviews in spring 
1975 with two 'establishment' figures, Lords Avebury and Robens, who both supported its 
continuation. Lord Avebury, the Society's President, was not in favour of the Society's policy 
of abolishing nuclear power saying "I must confess that I don't go all the way with the 
Conservation Society in saying that we shouldn't have a nuclear programme at all" (CN 55). 
He was in favour of a small programme of steam-generating heavy water reactors, as it was 
"intrinsically a safer reactor than the American pressurized water reactor, because it cannotfail 
catastrophically". Lord Avebury believed that the main problem with the expansion of nuclear 
power was "not the disposal or storage of the wastes but the risk of nuclear terrorism". Overall 
he believed that "we should proceed with great caution and not expand our nuclear 
programme to the extent that we become unduly dependent on it". The policy should be "of 
preserving a basefrom which the nuclear industry could expand in thefuture, if thought 
21 desirable" (CN 55). 
In the next issue (CN 56), Lord Robens, the ex Chairman of the National Coal Board was in 
favour on nuclear power (despite his great opposition during the 1960s - see section 2.3) stating 
"As far as nuclear power is concerned, of course we have to go ahead with this. There can be 
no argument about it' (CN 56). Robens was aware of nuclear problems, particular 
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environmental and the threat of terrorism, but he believed that these could be solved by the 
international cooperation of scientists. He concluded that he did not believe "that You put 
nuclear power on one side. You recognise that it has certain problems. You identify these 
problems with great clarity, then seek the solutions to them" (CN 56). Despite this support for 
nuclear power from 'establishment' figures a few activists still pressed ahead with their campaign, 
largely ignored by Conservation News until the Windscale Inquiry two years later. 
3.2.2 Anti-nuclear campaign 
The ConSoc campaign against nuclear power was initially led by Jane and John Pink of the 
Merton Branch of ConSoc. They started their campaign with a short piece in Conservation News 
the ConSoc newsletter, entitled 'Nuclear Power: the dangers from long lived radioactive wastes' 
in September 1974 (Pink and Pink 1974). In it they emphasized the dangers of long-lived 
radioactive wastes, and outlined their campaign to bring 'the facts' to public attention. There 
was also a two part feature by Peter Dickson; entitled 'Plutonium Nightmare' in the November 
1974 and March 1975 issues on the possibilities of nuclear sabotage and terrorism (Dickson 
1974). 
The Pink's campaign consisted firstly of a 'letter of concern! to be signed by prominent people, 
and linked to this a petition to "demonstrate to the Government that this is a matter of concern 
to many people". In the January 1975 newsletter they reported "that there had been 
considerable supportfrom Members and others outside the Societyfor the project to publicise 
these dangers" (Pink and Pink 1975). They note the starting point of their campaign - the 
petition and the letter- was "our Council's expressed opposition (December 1973) to the 
building of any more nuclear power stations" with this opposition being fally supported in a 
resolution passed at the ConSoc AGM in November 1974 (Pink and Pink 1975). The 'letter of 
concern' appeared in The Guardian on 7 January 1975, with 43 signatories, including those of 
E. F. Schumacher, Bishop Hugh Montefiore, and Peter Hain (Bryce Smith et al 1975). A copy 
was sent to all MPs, and the Pinks hoped that "If it got good publicity, it should give impetus to 
the local campaigns and we hope thereby attract more supporters for the petition" (Pink and 
Pink 1975). 
Two replies to the petition appeared in The-Guardian on 13 January 1975, the first from Prof. 
G. N. Waltone and Dr M. L Brown, of Imperial College, and the second, a long detailed rebuttal, 
from Dr. Franklin of BNFL. By coincidence the letters appeared in the same issue as reports of 
the deaths of two workers from Windscale, that could have been caused by exposure to low level 
radiation. The cause of their deaths was disputed by radiation experts, including Joseph Rotblat, 
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and lead to much media coverage including a TV documentary 'An Awful Coincidence' 
(Patterson 1975: 4). 
3.2.3 Downing Street march 
The next ConSoc action was delivery of the petition (as planned) to Downing Street on 22 
March 1975. According to the 1975 Annual Report (ConSoc 1975: 10): 
"Petition forms were distributed to Friends of the Earth groups, Young Liberals and 
student environmental groups, as well as ConSoc members and branches, and a final total 
of 8906 signatures were obtained to the petition. On 22 March 1975,90 people were 
present to march to the entrance ofDowning Street; the petition was delivered to No 10 by 
Alison Pink and Irene Coates, accompanied by Professor Tom Kibble, Dr Kit Pedlar, Peter 
Hain and Diana Reeks". 
The event was covered by TV and local radio, the national and local press; an oblique mention 
of this petition is made a few days later in The Observer which gives a full page story to the 
dangers of nuclear waste (Hawkes 1975a). However the march had minimal coverage in the 
environmental press and only a few lines appeared in Conservation News (No. 56: 21). This is 
not surprising as ConSoc's campaign had attracted no attention from the environmental press; 
the first mention of its campaign was in Undercurrents (UC) No. 10, just before the delivery of 
the petition to Downing Street (Undercurrents 1975c). 11 Nuclear issues had only received 
prominence in the previous issue (No. 9) of Undercurrents in early 1975 which had 16 pages 
devoted to nuclear power, with the lead article entitled 'Why the NUCLEAR POWER 
PROGRAMME MUST be STOPPED'. In an article entitled 'Methinks we do protest too little' 
Undercurrents bemoaned the lack of nuclear opposition in this country compared to others and 
remarked "So how much longer will we in Britain go on swallowing our nuclear medicine 
without a murmur? " (Undercurrents 1975b). 
Furthermore at that time local branches of FoE had little interest in nuclear issues, so had little 
representation on the march. Undercurrents in Spring 1975 reported in a news piece entitled 
'Where have all the FOE'rs GoneT (Undercurrents 1975d): 
"Yhe march to Downing Street on March 22nd.. was supported by only 90 people, mostly 
from ConSoc. FOE'rs, though supposedly the more radical group, were thin on the ground 
Yhe Camden FOE Group, for example... elected to spend the morning shifting the tons of 
(now valueless) wastepaper they had been diligently collecting. And they are supposed to 
be one of the most active and radical groups. A fine sense ofpriorities". 
A meeting after the march to decide on future strategy ended inconclusively. UC reported that 
ConSoc and FOE agreed to go their separate ways, with the former preferring the 
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"constitutional approach - letters to MPs, and so on" (Undercurrents 1975d). ConSoc's 
campaign and the Petition was taken over from the Pinks by Beryl Kemp, the new Convenor of 
ConSoc's Energy Working Party. On the effectiveness of the Petition Jane Pink commented "It 
is always difficult to assess the effects of this type of action, but there is no doubt that the DEn, 
MPs and others are now more ready to acknowledge that there are legitimate groundsfor 
concern" (Pink 1974). Following this Petition ConSoc was invited to give evidence to the Royal 
Commission on Environmental Protection (RCEP) on the hazards of nuclear power. " This was 
done at a meeting held on 11 April 1975, with Amory Lovins and Walt Patterson from FoE, and 
Fritz Schumacher and John Davoll being present. By late 1975 Beryl Kemp was becoming 
disillusioned with lack of progress with the 'constitutional' approach. She reported to ConSoc 
Council that she had spent most of 1975 in "endeavouring to stop the nuclear power 
programme (with little result Ifear) but it is intended to step up the pressure in 1976 in the form 
of non-violent resistance action, since other democratic methods seem to havejailed" (ConSoc 
1976a: 15). Her calls for 'direct action' while popular with some anti-nuclear campaigners 
would undoubtedly have been opposed by John Davoll, and also by FoE. 
3.3 Early FoE Attitudes 
As Tom Burke remarked in 1996 it is now forgotten that in the early 1970s FoE was 
predominantly in favour on nuclear power (Burke 1996). During 1970-71, the first two years of 
FoE existence they 'broadly saw nuclear favourably' but by 1973 "we saw the 'idiocy' of 
nuclear, being influenced by Amory Lovins and Walt Patterson, who understood the technical 
arguments and convinced us. " (Burke 1996). Their first opportunity to publicize FoFs new 
found views on nuclear came at the 1973-74 hearings of the Select Committee on Science and 
Technology (known as the Science Committee) on nuclear power. As Williams remarked (1980: 
262): 
"FoE's principal initiative in 1974 was a memorandum of over 30 pages and with some 80 
footnotes which two of its members, Amory Lovins and Walter Patterson, submitted to the 
Science Committee. Lovins was to become one of nuclear power's chief international 
opponents, while Patterson was effectively to lead the British campaign for FoE'. 
FoE's submission highlighted the safety concerns with the PWR, and drew on the extensive 
critiques done by the American anti-nuclear movement. They were able to exploit divisions in 
the UK nuclear establishment about whether to abandon British technology and go for the 
American PWR (as the CEGB wished), or press on with a new AEA design (the SGHWR)I and 
was welcomed by some sections of the business press (Pocock 1977: 227). 1 Thus FoE 
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established themselves over the period 1974-75 as 'reputable' nuclear critics and source of 
dissenting technical expertise. At first the principal lines of FoE's opposition were geopolitical 
and economic, not environment, with the early issue being over misuse of resources. As Burke 
remembers (1996): 
"The development of arguments over the period 1973-76 was first the accident risk of 
PWR, then rate and magnitude of building 40 GW of nuclear, then safety, then resources, 
then economics, then electricity generation, andfinally soft energy paths. After the Flowers 
Report FoE added work on proliferation issues, and opposition to fuel cycle and then 
reprocessine'. 
With the PWR no longer in the news there was little to campaign against, and FoE took no part in 
the debate over the SGHWR. The only public inquiry was in June 1974 over a proposed station 
at Torness in Scotland, at which Patterson gave evidence against, to little avail and publicity (see 
Lamb 1996: 83). 
3.3.1 Lack of campaign 
The FoE leadership were perhaps stung by criticism in Undercurrents of their lack of support 
for the ConSoc anti-nuclear campaign. As UC reported in spring 1975 "FOE are continuing 
their low key campaign. Yhey are concentrating on building up a solid base of well-infor7ned 
opinion in the country as theirfirst priority; they are trying to stir up local opposition at 
proposed power station sites; and Walt Patterson is writing a new pamphlet- 77je Fissile Society 
" (Undercurrents 1975d). Walt Patterson had indeed been trying to interest FoE members in 
nuclear issues, without much success (Patterson 1996). Ile nuclear debate was in the elite media 
but not at the grass roots. FoE's defence of its lack of nuclear campaign is intriguing, and 
perhaps disingenuous, in the light of its subsequent activities. UC reported "FOE pointed out 
that they couldn't orchestrate an anti-nuclear campaign ftom Poland Se (their London (head) 
office]" (Undercurrents 1975d). This UC 11 believed saying "This is certainly true: they have 
a highly anarchic constitution which allows each local group to decide for itself what issues to 
campaign on" (Undercurrents 1975d). 
The relationship of FoE local groups to the head office was certainly complex and a source of 
much conflict, but while the constitution may have been anarchic (a contradiction in terms? ), the 
power always lay with the head office as local groups frequently complained (Weston 1989; 
Lamb 1996). As Tom Burke, the first local groups co-ordinator appointed in 1972, reminisced 
on the London office in that day, "These were mythical figures, magical people we were in awe 
opf' (Lamb 1996: 80). Furthermore he saw his job in writing the first FoE Newsletters for local 
groups as "mobilising the groups to support the campaigns". He became Director of FoE in 
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1975, and with what Lamb calls his 'robust management style' was able to focus and direct 
FoFs campaigns towards what Burke termed 'achievable objectives' instead of "dithering over 
the directions its campaigns should go" (Lamb 1996: 92). 
The lack of focus, and radicalism, in FoE in early 1975 was clear to UC when it said "there is a 
widespread realization that FOE is about something more important than collecting wine bottles 
and wastepaper, but thisfeeling has yet to crystallise into a coherent consensus. Hopefully, 
when it does, the results may be quite startling". It then urged "disaffected radicals of all kinds 
to join their local FOE group... and to work to turn it awayfrom garbage collection to more 
serious tasks" (Undercurrents 1975d). FoFs activities were defended in a letter to 
Undercurrents No. 13 by Dave Roberts the local co-ordinator for Cardiff FoE who agreed that 
FOE needed a more radical membership to achieve its goal of "the universal adoption of 
sustainable and equitable life styles" but he did not mention any nuclear issues (Roberts 1975). 
3.3.2 Development of a campaign 
As Tom Burke commented on local groups there "was no groundswellfrom the grass roots" 
for an anti-nuclear campaign in 1975 unlike that for whales and transport where they led (Burke 
1996). They did not know about nuclear issues, and there was much 'ignorance and apathy'. 
He remembers that "John Price ' and I wentfor a2 week tour of local groups in 1974 telling 
them of nuclear issue. The oil crisis hadjocussed attention on energy, we saw nuclear power as 
a pivotal issue, the nub of the wider energy debate and societal issues. To us nuclear was litmus 
test of social choice. We posed the question 'Do you want to live in a nuclear society? ' "(Burke 
1996). Burke remarked that FoE started to campaign on nuclear "because we had the 
intellectual resources: Amory Lovins, Walt Patterson, John Price, Czech Conroy, Mike Flood, 
and Peter Harper on the margins. The original thinking was done by Amory Lovins and John 
Price, they drew in and analysed the material. Walt Patterson was the energyjournalist and 
polemicist, he could interpret and communicate, and had a fine sense ofjudgement" (Burke 
1996). So as Burke remembered it "the anti-nuclear campaign had the resources, opportunities 
and interests of these people with a profound understanding of energy, which lead them to 
develop sustainable lifestyles as they were convinced nuclear was the wrong direction. We were 
paving the way, bringing the message to the public" (Burke 1996). 
Thus it was a combination of factors that launched FoE's anti-nuclear campaign in mid 1975: a 
more focused head office, committed and expert staff, more radical local groups and an issue on 
which to campaign: BNFL's expansion plans at Windscale. FoE's first nuclear campaign event 
was in May 1975 when it held a tenth 'birthday party' for the still unfinished Dungeness AGR 
station, attended by many people from the nuclear industry and the media, and for which it 
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published a four page tabloid called Nuclear Times (Patterson 1979: 159). On its front page was 
a story about BNFL's expansion plans, which would make Windscale "one of the world's main 
radioactive dustbins". This story attracted little attention as BNFL's plans were well known to 
the press and generally supported. It had been public knowledge since late 1974, and The 
Observer had even carried an article entitled 'Swedes Dump Atom Waste on Britain' on 20 April 
1975, without creating any public furore (Hawkes 1975b; Wynne 1982: 48). 21' Even 
Undercurrents did not publicize this remark, and reviewing Nuclear News in the autumn of 1975 
it just said "The excelkntfirst issue contains a guide to the nuclear industryý the nuclearfuel 
cycle and an account of the planned British reactor programme, plus information on 
researching and organising against your local reactor" (Undercurrents 1975e). 
Then, on the 21st October 1975, the Daily M had a front page story, headlined 'Plan to 
make Britain World's Nuclear Dustbin' followed in November by another story entitled 'Sign 
Here for Japan's Atom Junk' (Williams 1980: 289). These typical Mirror style 'shock reports' 
on the proposed Windscale reprocessing plant bought widespread publicity to FoE's nuclear 
campaign (Patterson 1985: 111). With increased activist interest FoE held their first 'Campaign 
Workshops' weekend in November 1975 on nuclear issues and developed a coherent strategy 
for local activists (Patterson 1984: 149). They were thus in a good position to assume national 
leadership of the 1970s anti-nuclear campaign which up till then had involved only 
campaigning by local groups. 
3.4 Early Local Campaigns 
Local branches of ConSoc and FoE were involved in the mid 1970s in the formation of local 
anti-nuclear groups which campaigned against the nuclear power stations at Heysham, Tomess, 
Sizewell and Hinkley. The largest and best known of these were Half-Life (at Heysham) and 
SCRAM (at Torness). Little is known about the other two, Survival (at Sizewell) and the Nuclear 
Reactor Vigilantes (at Hinkley). With Windscale front page news from late 1975, new opposition 
groups sprang up, and long established ones, not previously involved with nuclear matters 
'joined the fray' (Patterson 1979: 159). However the proliferation of groups led to the 
impossibility of agreeing on a unified body to present the opposition case at the Windscale 
inquiry, and finther complicated fund raising. 
3.4.1 Half-Life 
The first specifically anti-nuclear organization in the UK, Half-Life, was formed in Lancaster in 
early 1975 to campaign against the nearly completed Heysham AGR. It consisted of activists 
from Lancaster as well as members of the Whitehaven branch of FoE and the North Lancs. 
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branch of ConSoc (see Welsh 2000: 235 note 1, Williams 1980: 289, Conroy 1978: 6). A 
founder member was Paul Smoker, a long time anti-nuclear campaigner and peace activist at 
Lancaster University, who according to Ian Welsh, had been almost alone in voicing concern 
about routine releases of radiation from Heysham in articles in the local papers from 1971 
(Welsh 2000: 235 nl). 11 
The ConSoc branch secretary Avril Orlawski wrote as early as May 1974 to Conservation News 
over its nuclear concerns "We are to apply, not very optimistically, for representation on the 
local Nuclear Liaison Committee. We have an AGR power station under construction in the 
borough" (Orlawski 1974). There was farther mention of Half-Life under the section 'Public 
campaign on nuclear power' in the 1975 ConSoc Annual Report (ConSoc 1975: 16): 
"It is worth mentioning in conclusion that another anti-nuclear group, 'Raýfllife' was 
established in North Lancashire to oppose the Heysham nuclear power station proposal; 
Mrs. Orlawski, the secretary of our branch, took an active part in setting up this group and 
arranging a 'nuclear awareness week' that included two symposia and much effective 
publicity". 
This 'nuclear awareness week' at the beginning of June 1975, which was reported on in UC was 
the typical mix of street theatre, public meetings and debates. Half Life described their 
campaign as "a multifaceted attack on nuclear power, comprising local and national lobbying, 
a sustained publicity campaign and, when we have sufficient community support, direct action 
where necessary. A crucial part of the campaign is to press for alternative energy policies" 
(Half Life 1975). During this week of action there was a public meeting attended by about 80 
people (Mathews and Usher 1977: 153), with Half Life reporting that the response of the public 
was encouraging, and that "local councils and Ws are pressing questions about nuclear safety 
to the elctronuclear establishment" though the CEGB "has resolutely boycotted our public 
debates and refused to answer questions" (Half Life 1975). Throughout 1975 Half Life 
continued their campaign against the Heysham station, which was widened to opposition to the 
proposed Windscale reprocessing plans, and a few days after The Mirror story, Half Life 
presented a petition on the 25 October 1975 to Downing Street against the proposed plant 
(Kemp 1975). There were also demos by Half-Life and ConSoc at Barrow-in-Furness (the local 
port for Windscale) against the arrival of spent fuel from Sweden destined for Windscale (Breach 
1978: 95). These attracted the sympathy of dockside cargo handlers at the port of Barrow who 
voted (in late 1975) not to unload any more casks of spent fuel bound for Windscale, a decision 
which was later reversed by one vote (Patterson 1976a). BNFL, disturbed at these stirrings of 
public dissatisfaction, hastily arranged a meeting at the town hall in Barrow on Friday 12 
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December 1975, with a near capacity audience. According to Patterson's report in the journal 
Enviromnent (Patterson 1976a): 
"Local dignitaries, union representatives and spokesmen for Raýf-Life and Friends of the 
Earth were invited to join BNFL on the playbrm to air their differences. ... The discussion 
was wide ranging and intermittently heated. Local residents demanded reassurances about 
possible hazards associated with the transport of radioactive materials through Barrow, 
while Friends of the Earth spokesmen expressed more concern about plutonium security, 
proliferation implications, and the economic validity of the reprocessing industry". 
The next day, on Saturday 13 December, there was a Half Life rally at Barrow with Patterson 
reporting that "a generally good-humoured crowd ofprotestors, somefirom other nuclear sites, 
staged a demonstration through Barrow, carrying banners and talking to bystanders about their 
reasons for objecting to the nuclear shipments" (Patterson 1976a). 
3.4.1.1 Half Life' s campaign for a public ingui 
On I June 1976 The Times reported that Half-Life and the local branch of FoE had decided to 
press for a public inquiry to be set up as soon as BNFL submitted its expansion scheme for 
planning approval to Cumbria County Council - which it did that month (Boyle 1983: 21). But 
the Council would not be rushed into taking a quick decision. "' The activities of the protestors 
had began to cause resentment among some local people, particularly trade unionists who 
worked at the Windscale plant. Many trade unionists did not share Half-Life's fears about the 
environmental and other hazards of Windscale and they welcomed the prospect of 1,000-2,000 
extra jobs being created in the area (Boyle 1983: 22). This view was supported by the national 
executive of the General and Municipal Workers Union (GMWU) who, at their annual 
conference on 8 June 1976, opposed a motion calling on the Government to hold a public 
inquiry. Local trade unionists also started a petition supporting the Windscale expansion plans, 
to counter an opposing one organized by South Lakeland (near Kendal) District Councilor 
Edward Acland. 10 
Cumbria County Council as the main part of their consultation exercise, organized a public 
meeting at Whitehaven Civic Centre (or Hall) for the evening of 29 September 1976. It was well 
attended by about 800 people and according' to Conroy "This tense and impassioned meeting 
was widely covered by both national and local media, Radio Carlisle, broadcasting the whole 
meeting live" (Conroy 1978: 6). Polly Toynbee reported in The Observer (3 October 1976) 
"The hall was packed: 800 people, many diverted into an overflow room, stayed through the 
wholefour hours in the heat and discomfort of the dazzling television lights. The battle lines 
were drawn for a classic confrontation, with environmentalists and residents on one side, and 
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Windscale employees (some in company ties) and theirfamilies on the other; safety versusjobs" 
(quoted in Boyle 1983: 24). 
Friends of the Earth, Half-Life, the Conservation Society, the Town and Country Planning 
Association and others all made impassioned appeals for the matter to be referred to a public 
inquiry. Paul Smoker, from Half-Life, made clear that the environmentalist's objection was only 
to one out of the three BNFL proposals: the proposed thermal oxide plant - the THORP plant- 
and they were not opposed to the refurbishment of the Magnox reprocessing facilities, or the 
development of a method for glassifying high-level wastes. The ConSoc newsletter again 
reported that over 800 people attended this meeting, with Half-Life and FoE Lancaster "to be 
congratulated on the results of their efforts to ensure a truly ýpublic' debate' (Kemp 1976d). In 
the autumn of 1976 there was another Branch report from Half Life in Conservation News 
outlining its campaign for a Public Inquiry Commission (Orlawski 1976). 
On 2 November 1976, in spite of the protests expressed at this meeting and objections lodged 
with the Council, Cumbria Planning Committee decided that in principle they were 'minded to 
approve ' BNFL's application. But wanting to pass the ultimate decision to Peter Shore, the 
Minister responsible, they decided to give him every available chance to 'call in' BNFL's 
proposal by declaring that it considered BNFL's proposals to be a "departurefrom a 
fundamental provision of the County development plan". If however, Mr. Shore had not called 
in the application in 21 days, the committee would go ahead and ratify the permission to which 
it had already in principle agreed. Thus they passed the 'buck' to the national government. 
3.4.2 Network for Nuclear Concern 
The Network for Nuclear Concern (NNC) was according to Brian Wynne (1982: 98) a regional 
grass roots anti-: nuclear group, whose main constituent was Half Life and local Cumbrian FoE 
groups. It was founded and co-ordinated by Edward Acland, a District Councilor from near 
Kendal, and one of the local organizers of opposition to THORP (Breach: 1978: 99). In 
November 1976 Acland organized a petition, collecting 28,000 Cumbrian signatures in less than 
10 days from November 12th, calling for a public inquiry (Wynne 1982: 82). In contrast the 
Windscale workers collected 18,000 signatures over several weeks demanding a go-ahead for the 
project (Cook 1976). 
These petitions came at a sensitive time in mid November 1976, just when Shore was deciding 
whether to 'call in' the planning proposal. The trade unionists presented theirs first to Shore, on 
19 November, when a deputation led by Bill Maxwell of the GMWU traveled to London from 
Windscale (Boyle 1983: 27). Two days later, Acland, presented his petition against the Windscale 
expansion. " In an interview withXle Guardia he said there were "overwhelming reasons for 
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the plans for a large oxide fuel plant to be put before a properly constituted planning 
commission. The issues are international and national, not local, and they require expertise and 
a depth of understanding of the implications which are far beyond those available to local 
authorities" (Tucker 1976). 
By the time of the Inquiry NNC had also gained the membership of several hundred 
individuals, a Mothers Union group, and a coalition of Quaker Meetings, and the Northern 
Friends Peace Board (Wynne 1982: 98). NNC decided to be represented at the Inquiry, and to 
concentrate on safety and radiation release issues. It decided its best course was to use an 
amateur advocate, well versed in the technicalities, and also most importantly open to the groups 
influence; and Brian Wynne volunteered for this position and became the group's spokesman. " 
He had no legal background, but learnt rapidly helped by other barristers, including 
copposition' ones, present at- the Inquiry who used to discuss cases and methods with him in the 
evenings (Wynne 1996). 
At the Inquiry NNC concentrated on the issues of environmental discharges and radiobiology, 
and was keen to show what a local group could achieve in putting up a highly technical case 
without use of a professional advocate (Wynne 1982: 103). It therefore rejected a coalition with 
the TCPA, and the possibility of using Sir Frank Layfield" - reputedly the best planning silk in 
the country - who was TCPA's QC, and instead allied itself with PERG, with Wynne acting as an 
adviser. 
3.4.3 SCRAM 
SCRAM, the Scottish Campaign to Resist the Atomic Menace grew out of a loose umbrella 
organization formed in November 1975 which included FoE, ConSoc, Edinburgh University 
Ecology Group, Science for the People and others (Hall 1986: 142). However according to Ian 
Welsh, a SCRAM activist, it formed as a splinter group from Edinburgh FoE with one activist 
saying to Welsh "FoE wanted us to campaign to save Otters- well sod that when the world is 
being poisoned by plutonium" (Welsh 2000: 156). SCRAM's view was that nuclear power was 
important enough to require a specific campaign focus and could not be just part of wider 
environmental remit. FoE and ConSoc had participated in the original two week public inquiry 
into Torness in mid-June 1974 at which Walt Patterson of FoE had appeared as a witness. 14The 
two organization, and Patterson, had worked together in 1973 on North Sea oil issues, 
particularly on opposition to plans to build concrete oil platforms at Drumbuie. 11 This campaign 
ran by an umbrella organization called the North Sea Oil Coalition involved representation at a 
public inquiry. The decision in their favour in August 1975 greatly encouraged Patterson and 
other groups. As Robert Lamb commented on FoE's performance "in the Drumbuie process it 
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had learned that public inquiries were winnable and that there was scope to play a worthwhile 
co-enabling role on the side of a local community defending a prized environment against 
energy Goliaths and the powers-that-be" (Lamb 1996: 84). 
However defeat over the Torness Inquiry in 1974 galvanized the local opposition. As Tony Hall 
commented "But when the inquiry report showed that their arguments had been ignored, they 
set out "to show that public opinion was on our side". And, as one of the members put it "when 
public opinion was ignored, direct action was the only tactic left open to us" " (1986: 142). In 
April 1976 SCRAM organized an occupation of proposed Torness site. Hall reckons this was 
"the first example of direct action to oppose a nuclear power station in Britain" (Hall 1986: 
142). A hundred protestors camped the weekend at (the then vacant) site of Torness. However 
the style was more 'free festival' than political. According to UC who publicized the event 
"There will be music (a pipe band andfolk groups) in the barn on the Thorntonloch campsite, 
an anti-nuclear exhibition, beachcombing and kiteflying competitions, and, on the Saturday 
night, a public meeting in Dunbar" (Undercurrents 1976a). 
Another similarTree festival'was to follow at Torness in May 1978, when a much larger 
weekend camp on 6 and 7th May was attended by 4,000- 5,000 people (Undercurrents 1978d). 
Then in October 1978 came the first serious 'direct action: a month long occupation of Half- 
Moon Cottage. This received much publicity and argument about non-violent protest in Peace 
News. " However nuclear protest in Scotland pre 1978 was mainly based on the issues of 
uranium mining and waste disposal. In February 1977 several hundred inhabitants of the 
Orkney Islands demonstrated against the prospect of uranium mining, while 3,000 people 
attended a rally organized by COND (Campaign Against Nuclear Dumping) at Loch Doon, 
Galloway in June 1977 against the possibility of it becoming the site for nuclear waste (Rudig 
1990: 186-188). 
SCRAM was an objector at the Windscale Inquiry, focusing on opposition to nuclear waste 
disposal in Scotland, and calling for an end to nuclear power. Both these positions bought it into 
conflict with FoE, particularly over FoE's (reluctant) support for the AEA's drilling programme 
for disposal sites in Scotland, something that SCRAM was uncompromisingly opposed to 
(Wynne 1982: 108). 
3.4.4 Survival 
Opposition to the proposed SGHWR nuclear plant at Sizewell was led by Survival, a "lively 
Cambridge based coalition of FOE and ConSoc groups" according to Undercurrents (1976a). 
On 24 April 1976, simultaneously with demonstrations at Windscale and Torness, Survival 
Planed to organize at Sizewell "a picnic with home-brew beer, street theatre and music... 71e 
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workers and management have been invited along and Survival hope to arrange an impromptu 
debate on nuclear power on the beach. They are also, as a publicity stunt for the local media, 
putting on street theatre and dumping Nuclear Dustbins (Not to be opened until Easter 
5000,000 AD 9 in the Market Square' (Undercurrents 1976a). How this event went is unknown 
since in the next issue UC only reported on the Windscale demo (Undercurrents 1976b). 
3.4.5 Nuclear Reactor Vigilantes 
The group 'Nuclear Reactor Vigilantes', was Somerset based and active in demonstrating against 
the Hinkley Point Magnox and AGR reactors. Little is known about this group, save that ConSoc 
minutes in January 1976 report that this group, organized by Jane Buxton from South 
Petherton, was planning possible sit-ins, protests, fasts at Hinkley Point and needed a leaflet to 
hand out explaining why they were protesting (ConSoc 1976a: 5). In UC there is a report about 
a demonstration at the Open Day (no date given) for the Hinkley Point AGR, which was 
organized by the Somerset branch of FoE and the Nuclear Reactor Vigilantes and aimed "to 
further the ýpublic debate' requested by Tony Benn by handing out leaflets which questioned 
nuclear power" (Undercurrents 1977c). The demonstrators were quickly escorted off the 
premises by Security, but managed to give out 500 leaflets to members of the public and 
Hinkley employees. " 
3.5 Network of Groups 
Contemporary commentators found it not easy to describe accurately or adequately the extent 
and the nature of the anti-nuclear movement. Surrey and Huggett remarked that (1976: 305): 
"Rather than being a united movement with common interests, the opposition comprises 
coalitions of different interest groups, with some opposing nuclearplants in their locality, 
some general environmentalist groups wanting tighter controls, and some specifically anti- 
nuclear". 
Another observer saw a strong anarcho-liberationist streak mixed in with conservationist, 
ecological and politically pink threads (Weightman 1979: 3 10). Weightman saw four disparate 
strands: 
I. the broad centre environmentalists, mainly middle class - like ConSoc and FoE. 
2. the orthodox left wing -like the Socialist Workers Party. 
I Scargill and Yorkshire miners; and 
4. a conglomerate of anarchists and the 'brown bread and sandals brigade' -a euphemism for 
hippies. 
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There was a wide variety of organizations and reasons for opposition, and as Weightman 
concluded the national movement looks distinctly disorganized, eco-minded, left-of-centre, and 
rather lacking in muscle, but there was local group strength as at Torness, but overall "The 
people who join such groups would probably oppose a coal fired power station or an airport on 
the same site, and many are not perhaps, strictly anti-nuke" (Weightman 1979: 311). 
The section below outlines the main groups that sprung up to oppose the Windscale expansion 
and which coalesced into a national network. Also involved were individuals from pre-existing 
amenity, peace and religious groups, who tried to steer their organizations into taking up an 
anti-nuclear position. For instance the National Federation of Women's Institutes passed a 
resolution in 1977 urging the government to postpone the building of the FBR until a better 
way had been found of disposing of the waste, however it did not receive a two-thirds majority 
needed to campaign on the resolution (Weightman 1979: 311). 
3.5.1 Nuclear Information Network 
On 14 October 1976 a meeting was called by (London) Greenpeace and other organization to 
discuss the possibilities of joint action on nuclear matters. Twenty nine people from 15 
organizations attended plus members from the Open University with "much of the discussion 
centred on the differences, mostly of emphasis, between the groups" (NIN 1976). A second 
meeting was held on II November 1976 and it was decided to set up a small working party to 
sort out "the practical details of making a working link without spawning a new organisation", 
and to avoid unnecessary duplication (NIN 1976). The name proposed for this organization was 
'Central Information on Nuclear Energy Control' (CINEC). 
Beryl Kemp from ConSoc was a member of this Working Party, along with Martin Lowe 
(Greenpeace), Sheila Oakes (National Peace Council), Sue Boothman and Martin Aitken. They 
decided to call a public meeting for 11 January 1977 at Friends House, Euston Road, London 
and another on 30 April at the TCPA Institute, London (NIN 1977a). By then the organization 
was known as the 'Nuclear Information Network' (NIN). This meeting was attended by 36 
people from 24 organization - including CANTO, ConSoc, FoE, Greenpeace, Half-Life, SCRAM 
and SERA besides various peace groups. The meeting was dominated by the upcoming 
Windscale Inquiry, and how best to co-ordinate evidence. The 10 proposed objectors at the 
Inquiry outlined their cases, with Czech Conroy from FoE saying FoE's main expertise 'lay in 
economic and technical aspects'. 
NIN saw itself as a co-ordinating and information network or exchange, not an organization, it 
having no staff and a very low subscription. It saw its value in being able to bring together a 
wide variety of environmental, political and peace groups to campaign on the Windscale issue, 
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with groups still able to retain their diversity of viewpoints. As such it played an important role 
in building the anti-nuclear movement, and in mobilizing people. By mid 1977 it had 42 
organization on its 'membership' list, many of them almost 'one-person groups', such as 
Alternative to Nuclear Technology (Mike Filgate), Branscombe 2000 (Sir Kelvin Spencer), 
Cambridge Energy Group (Tom Pettitt), Campaign against Nuclear Energy (Ken Barker), 
Nuclear Reactor Vigilantes (Jane Buxton), People for a Non-Nuclear world (Renee-Marie Parry), 
Safe Energy Petitioners (Jane Pink), and South Yorkshire Nuclear Action Group (Richard 
Turner). 
There was a meeting on 30 April 1977 to co-ordinate objectors evidence. The meeting of NIN 
on 26-27 November 1977 was a two day post mortem on the Windscale Inquiry, and in 
particular FoFs (strained) relationship with the other groups. Held at the TCPA, London it was 
attended by 21 groups and 30 people (NIN 1977b). On the first day (which FoE did not attend) 
each group present at the Inquiry gave lessons learnt from attending the Inquiry, in terms of 
presenting their case, co-ordinating with other groups, and preparing for the expected CFR-1 
inquiry. 
On the second day Czech Conroy from FoE attended; his disowning of CANTO a year 
previously had already caused bad feeling finther heightened by the perceived lack of co- 
operation by FoE with other groups at the Inquiry. Conroy was unapologetic, stating that FoE's 
case was threatened by the disparate number of groups giving evidence and by the duplication 
of evidence. " 
3.5.2 CANTO 
The group 'CANTO' was founded by John Hanson, a film maker, in late 1976, with assistance 
from Edward Dawson - formerly an employee of ConSoc from 1973-77. ConSoc reports that it 
had "no identifiable membership or structure" (ConSoc 1979: 1), and its 'supporters list' is 
very similar to NIN's. Its main activity (and claim to fame) was the organization of the first anti- 
nuclear rally at short notice in Trafalgar Square on Saturday 20 November 1976 three days 
before the expiry of the deadline to 'call in' the Windscale application (CANTO 1976; Morris 
1976). Also Edward Dawson, organized a letter to The Times on Windscale, that was published 
on Sth November 1976 signed by Anthony Woolf, Chairman of the Lawyers Ecology Group 
and other distinguished lawyers. 19 
John Hanson is credited with having influential contacts, firstly in attracting 'celebrities' to 
attend this rally, and then using his contacts to obtain from Sir James Goldsmith a donation of 
over E10,000 for the Windscale Appeal and a similar one for FoE (ConSoc 1979: 1). It also 
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dominated the Windscale Appeal Committee, out of its 5 members two were from CANTO (John 
Hanson and Edward Dawson). 
3.5.3 People for a Non-nuclear world 
This group, according to Conroy, "was an ad hoc group of individuals" fronted by a Renee- 
Marie Croose Parry (Conroy 1978: 75). On its headed notepaper it had an 'ad-hoc committee' 
of 21 people including E. F. Schumacher and James Robertson, as well as activists John Hanson 
(of CANTO) and Beryl Kemp (of ConSoc). In April 1977 it rapidly collected over 2,000 
signatures to an open letter to President Carter in support of his nuclear policy and also raised 
E10,000 (Conroy 1978). Some of this was used to publish the letter, as a full page advertisement, 
in The Guardian on 2 May 1977 (see Boyle 1983: 35 Figure 17). The rest was donated to 
objectors at the Windscale Inquiry, with E2,000 given directly to the Windscale Appeal, and; C5OO 
to ConSoc (ConSoc 1979: 1). ' 
In a letter to Leonard Taitz, in August 1977, Renee-Marie Parry refers to "the mass meeting at 
Trafalgar Square in the Spring, which you suggest" Parry 1977). This was indeed to take place 
in April 1978, organized by FoE with Arthur Scargill (of Energy 2000) as the star speaker. 
3.5.4 PERG 
PERG (The Political Ecology Research Group) based at Oxford consisted of about a dozen 
scientists who undertook detailed and 'non-partisan' studies on the social and political issues of 
nuclear power particularly proliferation. Peter Tayl&', PERG's co-ordinator (and member of 
both FoE and ConSoc), attempted to be an intermediary between all the groups seeking 
representation at the Windscale Inquiry. At the Inquiry Taylor worked with Brian Wynne from 
NNC on safety and radiation issues - including public acceptability- which received favourable 
publicity from Ian Breach, the New Scientist reporter (Breach 1977j). 
3.5.5 Society for Environmental Improvement 
The Society for Environmental Improvement (SEI) was founded by Gerard Morgan-Grenville 
and was responsible for the setting up of the National Centre for Alternative Technology, near 
Machynlleth, Wales in late 1973. Gerard Morgan-Grenville was interested in taking part in the 
anti-nuclear campaign, and the January 1976 minutes from the ConSoc Council reveal that he, 
in discussions with John Davoll and Edward Dawson, was interested in the possibility of non- 
violent resistance action, similar to that taking place in Europe. Morgan-Grenville attended 
many of the NIN meetings and became a founder member of the Green Alliance (see Section 
8.4.3). 
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Because of the SEI's interest in alternative energy sources and scenarios it became involved in 
the Windscale Inquiry, producing in June 1977 the report An Alternative Energy Strategy for the 
United Kingdom (Todd and Alty 1977). This included a foreword by Sir Martin Ryle, who in 
May had written in Nature, expressing his support for alternative energy sources, particularly 
wind, rather than nuclear power (Ryle 1977). At the Inquiry Justice Parker expressed his interest 
in hearing about non nuclear energy options. Thus the SEI presented evidence, using John 
Tyme' their lay advocate, on non-nuclear energy strategies based on coal and renewables. 
Witnesses included Arthur Scargill (active in Energy 2000), on the need to double coal output 
by the end of the century, Stephen Salter on wave energy, and Peter Musgrove on wind energy 
(Breach 1977d). 
3.5.6 SERA and the Left 
SERA, the Socialist Environment 'and Resources Association, mainly through the efforts of Stan 
Rosenthal, Tony Webb and Dave Elliott was actively involved in raising the nuclear power issue 
in the Labour movement. Their campaign concentrated on Trade Union rights and health and 
safety issues, particularly after the Windscale strike in February 1977 (Boyle 1983: 38). It was 
also the first to emphasize the employment potential of investing in renewables and conservation 
instead of nuclear power. SERA was a founder member of NIN. 
SERA's opposition to BNFL plans was, as Godfrey Boyle commented "founded not only on a 
concern for the environment, but on a libertarian socialist conviction that the widespread use of 
nuclear power would require an authoritarian society which would increasingly infringe the 
rights of working people" (Boyle 1983: 51). SERA presented evidence at the Windscale 
Inquiry. Its witness Dave Elliot argued for alternative energy technologies as these would 
enhance workers' creative and productive skills. In contrast the development of nuclear power, 
and the construction of THORP in particular, were "steps on the road to deskilling society and 
exacerbating structural employment" (Breach 1977h). 
The other 'radical' group to oppose nuclear power (and to have a general interest in 
environmental issues) was BSSRS (the British Society for Social Responsibility in Science), an 
association of radical (and generally Marxist) scientists. For a statement of its views on nuclear 
power -"a form of economic, and by implication, social development, seriously at odds with 
the needs of socialist socieV'- see an article in the November 1976 issue of their journal 
Science for PeoT)le (Croll and Buck 1976, extract in Boyle 1983: 51). Policy on nuclear power 
varied across the Marxist groups. The Socialist Workers Party (SWP) came out firmly against 
nuclear power, supporting the Windscale rally in April 1976 and devoting considerable space in 
its paper Socialist Worker to the nuclear issue in 1977 (Elliott 1978a: 130). The other major 
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New Left group, the International Marxist Group, also came out against nuclear power, whilst 
other groups, such as the Workers Revolutionary Party, only opposed nuclear power under 
capitalism. As Dave Elliott concluded "In general, while many left groups are currently critical 
of nuclear power as developed by capitalism, there still remains a belief, at least amongst some 
of the more traditional Marxists, that nuclear power could be beneficial under socialism" 
(Elliott 1978a 131). 
3.5.7 Energy 2000 
Energy 2000 was set up by Leonard Taitz, ConSoc chairman from 1977 to 1980, and Convenor 
of the Transport Working party, with the backing of Arthur Scargill, President of the Yorkshire 
Miners' Union. "' It was formed at Barnsley in Yorkshire on 2 April 1977 and aimed to not only 
oppose nuclear power but to press for research into other energy sources, not only coal but also 
renewable energy sources (Boyle 1983: 34). It presented itself as a cross-party lobby group and 
was able to attract the support of many MPs interested in energy issues, such as Robin Cook 
(Labour), David Penhaligon (Liberal), and Nigel Formen (Conservative) as well as outside 
groups (Tucker 1977). 
Taitz's association with Arthur Scargill was controversial amongst some ConSoc members who 
viewed Scargill as an 'extreme left-winger'. In a letter to J. H. Goodland (ConSoc chairman in 
1968) in February 1977 (copied to Lord Avebury) Taitz defended his decision to approach 
Scargill for assistance in the anti-nuclear campaign, writing "nen I approached Mr. Scargill, it 
was not in his capacity as a Marxist or extreme left-winger, but as a leader of a powerful trade 
union, who expresses anti-nuclear views.. [that] come from a powerful personal belief that 
nuclear energy is dangerous" (Taitz 1977). 
Taitz modeled Energy 2000 on his previous association with Transport 2000", where he was 
Chairman. He strongly believed in coalitions between conservation bodies and trade unions, and 
in the need to seek powerful allies in order to be effective. Taitz wrote "On a more fundamental 
level, it seems to me that the Conservation Society dare not reject support where it is offered, and 
indeed must seekfor allies where itfinds them... One of the factors that has prevented the 
Conservation Society becoming a more powerful organisation, is that many of the people who 
would have supported us, have considered it in the past to be too elitist and right wing" (Taitz 
1977). Writing 18 months later to Beryl Kemp, Taitz said after his meeting with Tony Benn and 
Peter Shore "Yhis was an extremely useful occasion and I thinkfirmly illustrates the value of our 
association with the Yorkshire Miners through Arthur Scargill. It gives us a great deal of muscle, 
at least while the Labour Party is in power, that we would not otherwise have" (Taitz 1978). 
Arthur Scargill bought an air of left-wing radicalism to the anti-nuclear movement. He was one 
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of the main speakers at the Windscale demonstration in London in April 1978, and his call for 
civil disobedience was well received (see section 4.3.2). 
The next chapter describes how these disparate groups attempted to present a common front at 
the Windscale inquiry, and how anti-nuclear enthusiasm was no substitute for nuclear expertise, 
at least in the eyes of the national media. 
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4. The Windscale Inquiry: glory or fiasco? 
This chapter examines the campaign by the anti-nuclear movement from late 1975 to 1978 
against the plans by BNFL for an expansion of the Windscale nuclear reprocessing plant 
(THORP). This campaign started when the Daily Mirro dramatized BNFL's proposals with a 
front page headline 'Plan to Make Britain World's Nuclear Dustbin' on Tuesday 21st October 
1975. "1 It culminated in the Windscale Inquiry in late 1977 attended by a wide variety of 
disparate groups. " The rejection of their case by the Inspector in early 1978 caused shock and 
recrimination amongst them, and led to deep changes in the environmental movement. 
4.1 The Great Energy Debate 
Tony Benn, Secretary of State for Energy, in the light of media interest and environmentalist 
concerns over of BNFL's proposals, was keen to practice his ideas on 'open government', and 
thus have a 'great debate' on all aspects of nuclear policy in Britain. To open this debate BNFL, 
at the suggestion of Tony Benn, hurried organized a public debate, which took place at Church 
House, Westminster, on the afternoon of Thursday 15 January 1976. Principal speakers were 
BNFL's Con Allday and Peter Mummery for BNFL, opposed by Walt Patterson from FoE and 
Paul Smoker, from Half Life. As Conroy commen ed (1978: 5): 
"This was thefirst time the advocates of nuclear power in Britain had met their opponents 
head on in a publicforum of such importance... The debate itselfwas rather inconclusive as 
might have been expectedfrom such diametrically opposed views meetingfor thefirst 
time". 
New Scienti t was less complimentary, saying that "nothing could counter the poor showing of 
the anti-nuclear movement" with only Walt Patterson putting on "anything like a convincing 
show" (NS 1976a). While Patterson's questioning of the economics and technical basis of the 
reprocessing business, and lack of hostility to nuclear power won the audience's respect, 
Smoker's overtly political case was judged to have carried "little weight with the nuclear 
establishment and alienated some of the opponents of the BNFL contract"- presumably Walt 
Patterson (NS 1976a). As Boyle commented "To judge by the DEn decision which eventually 
followed the debate, the arguments of those in favour of the Windscale expansion must have 
been more persuasive than those of the opposition" (Boyle 1983: 20). Harold Bolter, in his 
insider account from within BNFL, has a more cynical comment on Benn's motivations for this 
set-piece debate, saying "In politics, little is believed to have happened unless it has taken place 
in London" (Bolter 1996: 69). He wrote that Paul Smoker accused BNFL and the Department 
of 'news management' in organizing the discussion, and Bolter comments "of course he was 
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right". Furthermore the debate "seemed to do the trick as far as Benn was concerned' for on 
12 March 1976 Benn announced that BNFL could take on further reprocessing work for 
overseas customers and "that this statement took most of the steam out of the debate" (Bolter 
1996: 69). 
This decision to press on with reprocessing was encouraged by the perceived "poor showing of 
the anti-nuclear lobby" at the Church House debate which encouraged the nuclear 
establishment and made them hopeful that they had "eliminated the possibility of repeat 
performancesfor other topics, such as thefast breeder reactor"(NS 1976a). 
4.1.1 The Windscale RaBy 
'flie first major event of the anti-Windscale protestors was a rally attended by over 600 people at 
Windscale on Saturday 24 April 1976, organized by FOE and Half Life. The FOE London office 
chartered a train - dubbed the 'Nuclear Excursion'- to take 420 people there and back and this 
train generated much publicity for FOE. As UC reported "Tom Burke, the pugnacious director 
ofLondon FOE, hopes these rallies willfinally kill off the 'soft Schweppes'image that many 
people still have of FOE' (Undercurrents 1976a). FOE however was against direct action 
preferring debate and discreet lobbying. As UC commen ed on the plans for this event "The 
plant however will not be picketed as originally planned. Cumbrian County Councilors are 
being lobbied discreetly to refuse planning permission... It is thought that direct action might be 
counter-productive" (Undercurrents 1976a). 
T'he next issue of UC carried a fall page report on the rally, but mentioned only FOE's 
participation and give prominence to Walt Patterson's contribution. As UC remarked "All in all 
FOE can be well pleased with the results of theirfirstforay into direct action on the nuclear 
issue. FOE received a fair amount ofpublicity and they took the issue out of the realms of 
rarified abstraction and bought it to the people" (Undercurrents 1976b). 
Again the New Scientist report was not so supportive, talking about the bland character of the 
discussion '", the minimal attendance by local people and the clear trade union support for 
nuclear power (NS 1976b). However UC was concerned about the emphasis most of protestors 
put on safety issues, which "in many ways is the issue on which nuclearpower is least 
vulnerable". 
Moreover it remarked nuclear's safety record "compares favourably with any comparable 
industr y, as the BNFL spokesmen were quick to point out". Once again UC felt the need to offer 
FOE advice saying "FOE needs to broaden the issue to include economics, social policy and the 
whole question of the impact of technology on society, before they can hope to turn what is at 
the moment a minor protest into a major movement' (Undercurrents 1976b). 
67 
4.1.1.1 BNFLIs role in FoE Rall 
However unknown to anti-nuclear activists, and the reason for FoFs hostility to 'direct action' 
was FoE being compromised by BNFL. According to Harold Bolter's recollections, he saw 
FoFs event as a public relations opportunity for BNFL and the chance to gain valuable 
publicity. He therefore "decided to negotiate with Tom Burke, Director FoE, and Walt 
Patterson... to see if we could agree how their day ofprotest should be organized and 
managed" (Bolter 1996: 176). Thus BNFL agreed to help FoE organize their visit to the site, 
both in its programme and facilities. BNFL agreed to provide speakers and equipment for a 
debate on the merits of reprocessing in order to keep the demonstrators occupied. As Bolter 
cynically admitted (1996: 176): 
"... if we refused to get involved in the event the demonstrators, finding themselves without 
anyone to argue with, would have time on their hands. They might then decide to vy to 
draw attention to their cause in other, more mischievous ways... I had therefore agreed with 
FoE that the interminable debate plannedfor the day ofprotest would take place on land 
owned by BNFL near the main entrance to Sellafield". 
FoE further agreed to BNFL's policing requests "The road in between this spot and the site's 
perimeterfence would be no man's land, which Tom Burke agreed his members would be told 
not to cross. Anyone who did could be treated as a potential troublemaker and arrested, with 
the support of FoE' (Bolter 1996: 176). BNFL then agreed to provide all the equipment, 
catering facilities, toilets and even a cr&che. Bolter wrote "I asked the Sellifleld management to 
provide a platform, microphones and loudspeakers for the debate, tip off caterers to set up food 
and drink marquees, as I wanted to keep the demonstrators in well-fed good humour. We even 
provided portable lavatories and a creche" (1996: 176). 
FoE supporters arriving were totally unaware of BNFL's role, just attributing the catering 
facilities to "some enterprising locals selling coffee and hot dogs" (Undercurrents 1976b). 
Finally Bolter had a leaflet prepared explaining reprocessing and "arrangedfor the leaflet to be 
left on the train taking supporters back to London". Bolter was well pleased with his efforts 
writing that "the day went off better than we could have hoped', saying that one TV 
commentator, Martyn Lewis, did a piece for IIN news saying he was unsure whether he had 
been at a pro-nuclear or anti-nuclear rally. Finally Bolter comments that "FOE muttered 
something about making the Easter demonstration at Sellafield an annual event, but they have 
not held one since"; overall he concluded "it was a bit of a damp squib" for FoE. The ease 
with which FoE was compromised by BNFL, is explained by Bolter because (1996: 176): 
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"... it was not in the interests of either FoE or BNFL for there to be any violence. Both 
organisations wanted to come out of the event with their reputations for reasonableness 
intact. Their leaders coveted respectabilityfor their views. Tom Burke and Walt Patterson 
believed that they could stop the reprocessing of overseasJuel, perhaps all reprocessing, by 
force of argument and assiduous political lobbying... and came close to doing so". 
The Windscale rally marks the beginning of RE ascendancy over ConSoc in the anti-nuclear 
campaign, and also the start of the mass movement. From then on the anti-nuclear campaign was 
to be seen by the environmental and mainstream press (and future historians) as a RE 
campaign. ConSoc gave little mention to this rally, just saying that six members of the ConSoc 
Energy Working Party had attended (CN 61). " 
4.1.1.2 Activists criticism of RE 
London RE 's handling of this rally was criticised by some local branches, which typified the 
autocratic relationship between the centre and local branches over organization and tactics. Tom 
Barrance of Cardiff RE wrote to Undercurrents saying (Barrance 1976): 
"There was little consultation with local groups over the decision to run a 'nuclear 
excursion' train... There was enthusiasm both among us and other FOE groups, for the 
proposed occupation of Torness power station site... however central FOE decided that 
there was too little press value in lying in front of bulldozers. Even direct action at the 
Windscale site was judged 'counterproductive'so, all the press saw were 600 or so bored 
and cold demonstrators listening to a succession of uninspired speakers". 
Barrance further complained about high cost of the train fare (E5+ equivalent to E20+ in 2003 
prices), the lack of local representation, apart from Half-Life, and the small response from local 
people. He concluded "Yhe rally appeared to fall seriously between the two stools of demo and 
debate. I would argue that the only way to get our point across without being outmaneuvered 
by BNFL etc is to use direct action: demonstrations, pickets, occupations - somehow the public 
must be aroused and informed" (Ban-ance 1976). Ibis call for direct action was consistently 
rejected by both FoE and ConSoc in favour of 'rational' debate and dialogue. Another letter in 
Undercurrents from Ken Barker, again from Cardiff welcomed Tom Barrance's comments and 
remarked on "the deafening silence both before and after the event' (Barker 1977). He 
complained about the lack of communication between FOE and other anti-nuclear groups, the 
poor response from local people, and the possibility of an occupation at Torness. He 
commented on the lack of any anti-nuclear campaign saying (Barker 1976): 
"Following the Windscale Excursion it seems that there has been very little discussion on a 
national anti-nuclear campaign. The F&E energy workshop held at nitsun (June 1976) 
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hardly mention the subject.. what is still lacking is sufficient consultation between anti- 
nuclear groups". 
He therefore proposed a meeting between active participants in FoE, ConSoc, Half Life, SERA, 
CND and other interested groups with the aim of forming "a co-ordinated national campaign 
to actively prevent the nuclear indust? y's proposals going ahead'. This call perhaps resulted in 
the founding of the 'Campaign Against Nuclear Energy based on Cardiff FoE, and the 
'Alternatives to Nuclear Technology' based on Oxford FoE which had close links to the Oxford 
based Political Ecology Research Group (PERG). All these three groups participated in NIN. 
4.1.2 CANTO demo 
A London based group was CANTO (Concerns Against Nuclear Technology Organisation) 
formed in late 1976 by a John Hanson. Its first attempt at a national demonstration on Saturday 
20 November 1976 was well attended by celebrities but poorly attended by activists (see CN 64). 
Boyle 1983 wrote (1983: 27): 
"The demonstration, though small in scale, succeeded in snatching a considerable amount 
of media attention mainly because of the fame of some of the participants: these included 
actress Diana Rigg, violinist Yehudi Menuhin, the Bishop of Kingston (Hugh Monteflore), 
television script writer Kit Pedler and Liberal Peer Lord Avebury". 
These people were not only famous but also long time activists. Lord Avebury was President of 
ConSoc from 1973-84, and a long time critic of nuclear power, while Yehudi Menuhin was 
President of ConSoc from 1969-70. Kit Pedler was not only a TV script writer but also an anti- 
nuclear activist who wrote for Undercurrents and was to appear as a witness for the Windscale 
Appeal during the Inquiry in 1977. The Bishop of Kingston (Hugh Monteflore) was active in 
the debate by the World Council of Churches on nuclear energy (Francis and Abrecht 1976), 
and was to chair public hearings into the fast breeder reactor in 1977 (Monteflore and Gosling 
1977). 
UC reported dismissively "A crowd variously estimated to be between 150 and 200 turned up in 
Trafalgar Square on November 20th to hear a lot offamous people (including Diana Rigg and 
Higo Montefiore) inveigh against the Windscale planning application"(Undercurrents 1977a). 
This lack of numbers could be because Czech Conroy, the FOE Energy Co-ordinator, had 
publicly dissociated FoE from CANTO in a letter to The Guardian the day before the demo. 
This was because Hanson had announced in pre-rally publicity that the event was organized with 
the participation of FoE (Morris 1976). This 'embarrassed and infuriated' FoE, particularly 
when the low turnout, of about 150 people instead of an expected 10,000 people, received 
nationwide TV coverage (Wynne 1982: 100). FoE's mistrust of Hanson caused FoE to distance 
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itself from the Windscale Appeal, of which CANTO was, in FoFs view a too dominant a 
member (see Section 4.2). This lack of interest and activity by activists is perhaps reflected in 
Undercurrents coverage of nuclear power during early 1977. At a time of extensive media 
coverage on the Windscale application Undercurrents No. 20 in early 1977 had no articles on 
the nuclear debate, and none out of the 20 letters published were on the anti-nuclear campaign. 
Again there no letters on this topic in the next issue of Undercurrent No. 21 in spring 1977. 
4.1.3 The National Energy Conference 
With no sign of the Windscale controversy dying down in the media, Tony Benn, now Minister 
for Energy, decided to hold another public debate on nuclear power, called the 'National 
Energy Conference' on 22 June 1976 again at Church House. ConSoc and FoE were invited to 
submit a joint paper, which was prepared by Walt Patterson and entitled 'Towards a National 
Energy Strategy' (ConSoc 1976b: 47). 11 Among the 470 members of the 'establishment' 
audience were ConSoc members Lord Avebury (President), John Davoll. (Director), and Beryl 
Kemp (representing the National Society of Women). While ConSoc and FoE were on the inside, 
there was a picket outside representing, according to Jane Pink " 'uninvited'groups to the 
Conference who were anti-nuclear and stressed that the development of alternatives and 
conservation now could mean many morejobs atfractional cost, safety and with increased 
prospects of export trade" (Pink 1976). Supporters of the picket included SERA (Stan 
Rosenthal spent the whole day there), Half Life, the Ecology Party, the Nuclear Reactor 
Vigilantes, London Greenpeace, the Young Liberals (Peter Hain is reported to have failed to 
make it at the last minute), CND, several local ConSoc groups, Dr. Schumacher, and Sir Kelvin 
Spencer 11 (Pink 1976). 
While FoE concentrated on developing its 'insider' status and scientific credibility at 'elite' 
meetings, activists at ConSoc concentrated on building a wide ranging movement. As Beryl 
Kemp reported in March 1976 "Action is being taken to coordinate the efforts of many anti- 
nuclear groups in the UK and plans are afootfor demonstrations, silent protests, marches. Later 
it is hoped to combine with European activities and world wide measures" (ConSoc 1976c). 
ConSoc participated in the formation of three umbrella groups, NIN (the Nuclear Information 
Network), the Windscale Appeal and Energy 2000. They also concentrated their efforts on their 
'Safe Energy' petition, and on publishing letters in leading papers. The Petition was modeled 
on the 'Clean Energy Petition' in the USA which had collected 400,000 signatures by July 
1976. The aim of ConSoc's petition was "to provide much needed evidence to the Energy 
Secretary that there is positive supportfor Safe Energy and opposition to Nuclear Power" 
(CN65 1977). The petition was launched in early 1977, distributed widely even to Women's 
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Institute branches, and had obtained 20,000 signatures by September 1977 with a target of 
30,000 by November and 50,000 by the New Year (Pink 1977). 
ConSoc's proposed participation at the Windscale Inquiry and its anti-nuclear policies were 
opposed by some ConSoc members. Just before the Inquiry opened, A. C. Mason in the Letters 
column of Conservation News No. 65 denied the existence of a pro-nuclear lobby" in the UK 
and said "wefollow the lead of FoE on their out and out opposition to nuclear energy which is 
motivated by their experience of the American scene" (Mason 1977). He was countered by three 
letters in the following issue (CN66) by Peter Dickson, D. C. B. Wbittet, and Beryl Kemp, and also 
by Robin Homes in CN 69. 
4.2 Windscale Appeal 
The decision to hold a public inquiry was announced by Shore on 7 March 1977, but anti- 
nuclear groups meeting later that month failed to agree on a unified presence at the Inquiry 
under the banner of 'Windscale Appeal' (WA). As the ConSoc 1977 Annual Report commented 
(ConSoc 1977: 4): 
"The decision meant that the groups who had registered objections to the application had 
to decide on a plan of campaign and to this end an initial meeting was held at 9 Poland 
Street, attended by FoE, ConSoc, TCPA, CANTO, Civic Trust, Lawyers Ecology Group and 
others. It was not determined at this meeting whether legal representation was essential nor 
was there any certainty at that stage of sufficient money being available to fight the case. 
Agreement seemed to have been reached that the objectors should band together under the 
title of Windscale Appeal to avoid any one group's taking precedence. However, FoE 
intended to confine their evidence to the necessityfor and the economics of the reprocessing 
plant itsetr, and also wished to be solely responsiblefor organizing the case". 
Nevertheless WA launched an appeal on 2 April for E30,000 to enable them to hire legal counsel 
and to defray other expenses involved in the expected three month long Inquiry. Some 
commentators, like The Guardian (15 April 1977), urged in an editorial that the issues were "so 
significant in their implications that the main opposition groups should befinancedfrom public 
funds". FoE estimated that it needed a total of ; E26,000: il 5,000 for legal costs and 
accommodation; E2,000 for solicitor's costs; E3,000 for witnesses, E3,000 for research staff, and 
0,000 for travel, telephone costs and other incidentals. (Guardia 20 May 1977, cited in Boyle 
1983: 37). Three weeks before the Inquiry it had raised less than a quarter of this, and FoE was 
eventually to spend E100,000 (Weston 1989: 54). 52 
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The announcement on 2 May by Sir James Goldsmith (brother of Edward Goldsmith, editor of 
The Ecologist that he and his business colleagues would contribute f. 25,000 to fund opposition 
groups at the Inquiry, created finther controversy. " It was not made clear to whom, when and 
how the money would be paid, nor whether this was a firm commitment or a fund matching 
exercise. The result was that 'intensive competitive lobbying' between groups and the 'souring 
of relationships' (Wynne 1982: 102). As the TCPA commented at the NIN postmortem in 
November 1977 co-operation between groups was "seriously damaged by the offer offunds and 
the attempt of various groups to get a great a share as possible" (NIN 1977b). The division of 
his donation was a cause of great bitterness amongst groups. FoE got E10,000, a similar amount 
went to the Windscale Appeal, with E2,000 to the TCPA (who expected a great deal more), 
E2,000 to NNC and E1,000 to PERG (Guardian 1978: 23). The Windscale Appeal represented a 
wide variety of local and national groups. It consisted of CANTO, ConSoc, Cornwall Nuclear 
Alarm, the editorial group of The Ecologist, the Ecology Party, London Greenpeace, the Irish 
Conservation Society, the Society for Environmental Improvement and Wexford Nuclear Safety 
Committee. Most of these groups were part of NIN. Its committee, established 'in an informal 
way', was dominated by CANTO, out of its five members two were from CANTO (John Hanson 
and Edward Dawson), while Irene Coates represented both CANTO and ConSoc (as Convenor, 
Land Use and Planning Working Party), with Beryl Kemp representing ConSoc and Julian Boles 
London Greenpeace (ConSoc 1977: 4). As explained earlier (in 4.1.2) the presence of John 
Hanson who FoE distrusted, and who was considered by Wynne as having an 'inability to co- 
operate' with other groups meant that the WA was ostrasticed by other objectors (Wynne 1982: 
102) 
ConSoc believed that the Inquiry would be broad enough for it to be represented alongside 
other groups with disparate views, besides costing less than acting alone, saying "(We) on the 
other hand, believed that the terms of the Inquiry would be wide enough to allow ConSoc to put 
forward its own arguments for alternative energy sources and no expansion of nuclear power" 
(ConSoc 1977: 4). Irene Coates was appointed by the WA to co-ordinate the case and attend the 
Inquiry, but her position was made impossible by internal conflict, and as Wynne commented 
"there was no clear executive to prepare a case and brief its QC' with "an approximately 
coherent case" (Wynne 1982: 100). Her triple membership of CANTO, ConSoc and the WA 
undoubtedly led to conflicts of interest, and as the 1977 Annual Report of ConSoc stated "It 
should be made clear that Irene Coates acted in this [the Inquiry]for the [WAI committee, 
rather than as a representative of the Conservation SocieV'(ConSoc 1977). As a result 
ConSoc had only limited influence in formulating the case and in the choice of witnesses. As the 
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1977 Annual Report remarked "even though the Conservation Society was byjar the largest of 
the constituent bodies of the Windscale Appeal, we gained little publicity and our name was 
seldom mentioned" (ConSoc 1977: 4). 
WA costs were about E20,000, of which only E250 came from ConSoc. David Widdicombe, QC, 
assisted by Alan Alesbury, was engaged to represent them for a fee of E6,000, which he waived 
(Breach 1977i). WA presented evidence on the supposed need for nuclear power, its costs and 
risks, the disposal of nuclear wastes, the constraints imposed by the Euratorn Treaty on the 
nuclear policies of the UV, and on the greater use of district heating. Its witnesses in order 
were: John Davoll, Robert Blackith (Irish Conservation Society), Prof. Ivan Tolstoy, Norman 
Jenkins, Colin Sweet, Irene Coates, Dr. Barry Shorthouse, Prof. Gordon Atherley, Dr. Kit Pedler, 
Dr. Charles Wakstein, and Edward Goldsmith. 
4.2.1.1 Windscale Appeal Fiasco 
The WA's evidence and witnesses were not well received by either the Inspector or the press, and 
ConSoc's reputation suffered compared to FoE which rose. As the 1978 Annual Report 
cornmented "(ConSoc) had only limited influence in formulating the case and choosing 
witnesses. By the end of the Inquiry, press comment on the proceedings had dwindled 
considerably, but reaction to the WA's performance was not very enthusiastic" (ConSoc 1978a: 
5). Ian Breach covering the Inquiry for New Scientist. said that WA's presentations had been 
disjointed and careless, though some of its witnesses had made able and credible submissions 
(Breach 1977i). Breach singled out the film presented by Charles Waksteiný', one of the WA 
witnesses, as a particular example of its "misjudgments ... that beggar explanation" (Breach 
1977i). FoE' s case in contrast received praise from Breach, and the Inquiry "marked a turning 
poine, for them. Reporting after the closing speech by its QC, Raymond Kidwell, Breach wrote 
"No longer can FoE be regarded as an enterprising but rather unavailing conservationist 
lobby. After its case and this submission here, it will be seen as an im ortant technical and 
political force" (Breach 1977k). His report was fall of praise for FoFs conduct during the 
Inquiry, from its astute appointment of Raymond Kidwell as its QC, and Oliver Thorold as his 
junior, to its selection of issues and witnesses. Breach, after examining who had the 'best' case 
against THORP, concluded that "On an overall balance ofform, content, style and timing, 
though, FoE emerges as the cardinal adversary in these hearings" (Breach 1977k). 
The Guardian in its book on the Windscale Inquiry ranked the protestors efforts. Some it said 
(implicitly referring to FoE) "had presented their evidence expertly, with speed and precision", 
while others "havefailed miserably to have any impact on the hearing, showing themselves to 
be clownish and misinformed'. The Windscale Appeal it remarked "should have been a 
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powerful voice at the inquiry. In fact the group has been weak and blundering" (Guardian 
1978: 88-89). Beryl Kemp, ConSoc representative on CANTO implicitly acknowledged this 
press when she wrote in ConSoc Newsletter in late 1977 "Some of the evidence presented by the 
objectors has, unfortunately, been more emotional and alarmist than factual and though it may 
have made the headlines it has probably not influenced the Inspector- indeed it has tended to 
irritate him and discredit the environmental case" (Kemp 1977). 
The only favourable publicity for ConSoc was by Ian Breach, the former Press Officer of 
ConSoc. He commented favourably on submissions by John Davoll and Barry Shorthouse 
(Breach 1977i), and included Davoll's evidence in full in his book Windscale Fallout in Chapter 
10 entitled 'A Conservationist's Case' (Breach 1978a). The WA only raised E14,000 towards its 
total cost of nearly E20,000. Of this over half came from Sir James Goldsmith, E2,000 from 
people for a Non-Nuclear Future, L1,000 from the Cheney Peace Settlement, but less than 
0,000 from member groups of the WA (ConSoc 1979). At the end of the Inquiry it owed its 
solicitors nearly E5,000, and ConSoc (as part of the WA) was threatened with legal action for 
recovery of this debt. Eventually ConSoc settled the debt, but not without much internal 
recrimination between Irene Coates and Council members and overall regret at the 'fiasco' of 
their involvement with the WA. 1' 
4.3 Windscale aftermath 
The Windscale Inspector's report by Justice Parker was presented to Peter Shore on 26 January 
1978. At first it appeared that the report would not be published, despite Parker's wishes, before 
the Cabinet had reached a decision, and this lack of public debate caused alarm (Bugler 1978b). 
Ian Breach in an editorial in the New Scientist said of Shore (Breach 1978b): 
"Technically, he is within his rights. Tactically, he is acting unwisely.. the environmentalist 
lobby is morally justified in demanding that the Parker Report ... be seen and considered by 
more than a handful of ministers, senior civil servants, and possibly some of those with a 
vestedpolitical interest in the application". 
There were appeals by MPs to Tony Benn, known for his views on open and responsive 
government, to exert his influence, and this together with lobbying from environmentalists 
ensured that the Report was finally published on 6 March 1978. Parker recommended that 
outline planning permission for THORP should be granted to BNFL 'without delay'. Shore, 
introducing the report to the House of Commons on 6 March, found the Report's conclusions 
"persuasive and hroadly acceptahle" and that he would normally have gone ahead to grant 
permission to BNFL (Breach 1978c: 635). However he wished to give the House of Commons 
the opportunity to debate 'this unique set of issues'. A Parliamentary debate was held on the 22 
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March, and after 6 hours of debate, the House voted by 186 votes to 56 in favour of THORP 
(Boyle 1983: 58). There was another debate on 15 May on a Special Development Order 
(Shore's procedural stratagem for allowing Parliamentary debatelý permitting THORP to go 
ahead, this was approved by 224 votes to 80 (Bugler 1978b). Parliamentary scrutiny was 
considered very lacking, with Wynne remarking that MPs were "ritual rubber-stamping, given 
the lack of timeforproper briefing" (Wynne 1978b: 351). 
4.3.1 Reaction to the Parker Report 
The contents of the Parker Report took most of the participants to the Inquiry by surprise. 
According to Michael Kenward - news editor of New Scientis - BNFL's opponents were 
staggered by the inspector's uncompromising acceptance of the case for expansion, while the 
company seemed equally amazed that its plans had come through almost unscathed. He quotes 
Walt Patterson as saying "I didn't realize howfundamentally Parker was inclined to reject our 
line" as during the Inquiry Patterson had the impression that Parker had understood the 
arguments on both sides (Kenward 1978). Ian Breach in the New Scientist- reflecting Patterson's 
views, wrote that there would be dismay and even anger from those who were expecting "a 
report that would, as near as realistically possible, reflect the detail and the character of their 
case ... the reportfails to do this and more seriously, misrepresents views and obfuscates or 
distorts the context in which those views were tended to the inquiry" (Breach 1978c). Breach 
singles out as evidence of misrepresentation the treatment of two principal witnesses, Brain 
Wynne and Peter Taylor, most of whose evidence is not cited. Another commentator, Jeremy 
Bugler called it more a polemic than a report and that seldom was there an "inquiry report that 
cared so littlefor the appearance of even-handedness" (Bugler 1978a). Parker, he wrote, by 
oversimplification of the issues, ended "up by muddying the water", and it would not be 
surprising if the anti-nuclear movement now changes its approach (Bugler 1978a). 
4.3.1.1 FoE reaction 
The Parker Report was a bitter blow to FoE, who had high hopes for their case based on what 
they saw as their intellectual rigour and the perceived respect given to their case by Justice 
Parker. As Lamb, the FoE biographer remarked "Thejudge seemed to have understood their 
arguments and Patterson was optimistic about the chances of a win" (Lamb 1996: 87). 
Patterson remarked much later (1985: 126): 
"Yhose like Friends of the Earth who had come awayfrom the inquiry itselffeeling that 
they had made a strong case, and that Parker had taken it on board, couldfind in the 
ninety-nine terse pages of the Parker Report no sign of their case whatever. Yheir 
arguments had not been refuted so much as simply ignored". 
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Commenting nearly two decades after the Inquiry, Patterson recollects that the "Windscale 
Report was the worst experience of my life, Parker kicked us in the balls" (Patterson 
1996). 
Patterson however still believes that the Inquiry would have been won by FoE, if other groups 
had not been involved and 'muddied the waters' with their evidence, allowing "Parker to 
discredit our evidence. " (Patterson 1998). As he commented in an earlier interview (Patterson 
1996): 
"I remain convinced that if it was just us versus BNFL at the Inquiry, it would not have 
gone ahead. But other environment groups got on the (anti-nuclear) bandwagon and 
presented a total mish-mash of arguments. Diere was a smoke-screen of amorphous 
arguments, Parker could pick and choose, and tarred us with the same brush as the lunatic 
fringe". 
Patterson believed that Parker understood their evidence but when it came to writing his report 
he 'lost his brains' and that "it was complete travesty of our case. It was a great shock when we 
lost... we were naive to believe our case would be considered on its merits. But we had to oppose 
it and to take part" (Patterson 1998). 
Czech Conroy, the leader of the FoE campaign was stunned by the treatment of their case. As he 
confided to Lamb (1996: 87): 
"I thought the odds were stacked against us at the beginning.. but we put together a very 
credible case. By the time that the inquiry ended. I reckoned our chances of victory at 
about fifty -fifty.. What really stunned me was the incredible one-sided nature of the report. 
We had really believed that our ideas would be accurately represented and objectively 
considered - even if the final judgement went against us". 
As Tom Burke, Director of FoE at that time, remembered (Burke 1996): 
"We believed we had a coherent case to put. We thought winning the argument would 
carry the day. This belief ended with the Parker Report. The Parker presentation of our case 
was a travesty, we were shafted. Wejelt a sense of betrayal and our confidence was 
shattered, it produced deep and lasting disillusionment". 
Mike Flood, another of the FoE staff involved with the anti-nuclear campaign from its early 
days, commented in 1996, that the Parker Report had "made me very angry, as our logical 
arguments were dismissed. We weren't expecting to win, but we had to take part as FoE had 
lobbiedfor an Inquiry" (Flood 1996). Flood believed that an important aspect of the Inquiry 
was that "We were gaining a play'orm for our views and our views were treated with respect, 
while their arguments were falling apart' and above all "FoE was very interested in getting the 
facts straight. " (Flood 1996). 
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The Parker Report was not only a dismissal of FoFs evidence but also, more severely, called 
into question their strategy of protest based on expertise. As Patterson wrote some years later, 
the Parker Report "shattered any illusions about the force of rational argument on nuclear 
issues... the report proved to be a numbing dismissal of every opposition argument, and could 
have been written without even holding the inquiry" (Patterson 1985: 151). Writing three years 
later in 1981, Bugler accused FoE of being politically naive at Windscale saying FoE failed "to 
realise that it was going before a hostile bench". As Bugler recollected (1981: 295): 
"I still havefresh in my mind the winded astonishment of the members of the Friends when 
they heard the news of the Parker Report. They were like men who had been asked to speak 
at a meetingfor a Worthy Cause andfound that while they were doing so, someone had 
picked their pockets". 
He contrasted their optimism with 'more wordly-wise environmentalists' who had "rumbled 
Parker even while he was taking evidence". Bugler put the failure of FoE down to its belief in 
working within the political system, saying "this naivete is accompanied by a commitment to 
politicking, ... by a march-them-up-the-hill belief in the political system and the trustworthiness 
of Nitehall" (Bugler 1981: 296). Robin Grove-White, who was active in the anti-nuclear 
campaign but in his terms only 'very peripheral' to the Windscale Inquiry, believes that the 
Inquiry was a turning point for FoE. Nearly two decades after the event he judged that "FoE 
had run a brilliant campaign and they were devastated by the result. They thought they had 
won the arguments. I knew FoE hadn't done as well as they thought they had... maybe I was 
wiser in the ways of the world' (Grove-White 1996). Grove-White was more experienced, and 
perhaps more cynical, about public inquiries, and thus was not surprised by the result. His 
longer experience, dating back to 1971 to the campaign against the proposed Shell oil terminal 
in Anglesey and from his work with CPRE, meant that he better understood the planning system. 
As he remarked in 1996 on the shock of Inquiry result and its impact on FoE "I was prepared 
for it but this was thefirst inquiryfor them. Several witnesses wrote to the Times saying their 
evidence was travestied in the Parker Report but I couldn't take it seriously, Ijust thought this 
man is a bigot" (Grove-White 1996). He concluded on FoE naivete, saying "FoE was 
flummoxed, they were innocent, they were full of terrific energy andfun, andjelt it was a bit of 
an adventure. It was quite an adjustment afterwards" (Grove-White 1996). 
FoE published in April 1978 a bitter critique called The Parker Inquir , det ng e . )P aili 
th 
inadequacy of the official report, which was presented to Shore the day before their demo (see 
4.3-2). They accusing Parker of being biased in favour of the nuclear industry's plans, and of 
being selective in his use of evidence. While the Inquiry had set "a landmark in nuclear policy 
78 
making", its "hasty and erratic judgements" had produced a "polarisation rather than a 
moderation of the debate" (NS 1976c). Thus FoE concluded the Report had made it more 
difficult to see how public confidence in the worth of participation in such lengthy and costly 
procedures can easily be restored or in Patterson's simple words "The Parker Report polarized 
the nuclear issue in the UK essentially beyond any hope of recovery" (1985: 151). 
4.3.1.2 ConSoc reaction 
ConSoc was not so disillusioned, not having such high hopes about their evidence and seeing the 
Windscale Inquiry as no more "than a rehearsalfor the now-promised Inquiry into thefirst 
commercialfast breeder reactor" (Coates 1978). As Beryl Kemp remarked "We lick our 
wounds and prepare for the Fast Reactor Inquiry" and that "It makes depressing reading for 
environmentalists because the Inspector hasfailed completely to understand the real issues at 
stake" and that Parker was "sceptical and dismissive of any optimistic claims by the objectors of 
the ability of conservation and alternative energy systems to meet the energy gap should it 
arise" (Kemp 1978: 9). 
The Parker Report however won approval from some members of ConSoc, lead by John 
Fremlin, for its lack of bias. In letter to Conservation News in the summer of 1978 he defended 
the impartiality and expertise of the two assessors 11 at the Inquiry, saying "It is the bias of 
ignorance that worries me. Well meaning ignorance is defenceless when faced with 
propaganda" (Fremlin 1978a). In the following issue (No. 70) in the autumn of 1977 there 
were two replies to Fremlin's letter from Mrs. H. M. Derrick and Beryl Kemp and also a 
rejoinder from Fremlin. Kemp defended her use of the word 'bias' meaning "leaning' (not 
prejudice)" while Fremlin compared the efforts of the nuclear lobby to that of the coal or oil 
lobby (Kemp 1978b). Fremlin, commenting on Ralph Nader's actions in stopping nuclear 
power stations in the USA, which had lead to more fossil fuel being sold, wrote "I don't suppose 
for a moment that Ralph Nader was himselCpaid by the oil companies or that anyone, or any 
organisation, in Britain has been paid by them. "y should they pay for propaganda when a 
whole lot of well-meaning people will do it for them forfree? " (original emphasis) (Fremlin 
1978b). 
There was a chorus of criticism in much of the mainstream press about the Parker Report, with 
many witnesses feeling that their evidence had been totally ignored. However despite the widely 
perceived faults in the Parker Report, the failure for the objectors to get their views across to Mr. 
Justice Parker was to some extent self-inflicted due to the often poor quality of their evidence. " 
As 'Me 'ruardian book commented "the objectors will probably all agree they could have 
performed better if they had kept their attack short, sharp, free from obscure meanderings, and 
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most important of all, not been so numerous" (Guardian 1978: 89). Ian Breach in a NS editorial 
in November 1977, after the end of the Inquiry, argued that the Inquiry format was partly to 
blame for the end result being 'unmanageably large and inchoate'. While many of the 
submissions were powerful and credibly articulated, their cases were "damaged by the rambling, 
shambling and repetitious format in which they found themselves" (Breach 19771). Writing 
some months after THORP had been approved Breach was less optimistic believing that the 
environmentalists had failed their first major test at Windscale (1978e: 260). However he was 
hopeful that their coherent arguments - largely put forward by FoE- had been sufficient to 
'frighten government'. Wynne was also positive about the outcome of the Inquiry saying that 
"despite the unambiguous repudiation handed out by Parker, objector groups enjoy greater 
credibility and influence than ever before" (Wynne 1978b: 351). Furthermore he believed that 
"the information it has exposed and expectations it has stimulated have percolated into the 
entrenched perspectives of the nuclear opposition and will, no doubt, provide fuel for further, if 
more refined, controversy". Thus the Inquiry has "promoted opposition rather than reassured 
and diminished it" (Wynne 1978b: 351). 
However Breach in his book on the Inquiry, Windscale Fallout - reviewed by Wynne (1978c)- 
was more pessimistic "The politics of nuclear power and reprocessing will increasingly be those 
of disillusion, anger, frustration and mistrust. We shall all be the losers" (I 978a: 18 1). The 
Inquiry also established FoE's leadership of the anti-nuclear movement with the media. As 
Martin Ince, a freelance journalist, remarked in Undercurrents "One thing that Parker's Inquiry 
proves is that nuclear opposition in Britain is Friends of the Earth" (Ince 1978). 
4.3.2 FoE Demo 
The Parker report dealt a severe blow to FoE's pride and anti-nuclear strategy based on 
lobbying and debate. In early 1978 they decided on a change in tactics and called for a mass 
demonstration in London for Sunday 19 March. As UC in its events column sarcastically 
remarked "FoE a group hitherto more notedfor its high level lobbying, is organising a meeting 
in London's Trafalgar Square" (Undercurrents 1978a). The meeting, now termed the 'Stop 
Windscale' march, was postponed until Saturday 29th April, following a two-month ban on 
marches in London (Undercurrents 1978b). This march was, according to UC, part of FoE's 
three pronged attack following the Windscale Inquiry. The first two activities, publication and 
lobbying were staple FoE tactics, it was the third which was novel. Firstly the book nat Choice 
Windscale by Czech Conroy published jointly with the Conservation Society in January 1978 
which contained a history of the anti-nuclear campaign (emphasizing FoE record) and a 
summary of the arguments against reprocessing. Secondly pushing through MPs and the press 
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for publication of the Parker report before any Government decisions. And thirdly "organizing 
the London demonstration as an indication of the strength ofpublic opinion" (Undercurrents 
1978b). 
The march on Saturday 29 April 1978 was well attended, and was by far the largest anti-nuclear 
power demonstration seen in Britain. Before the event UC expected 10,000 people to attend, and 
in the next issue they reported that a crowd of more than 10,000 "have voted with theirfeet in 
answer to Mr. Justice Parker's contemptuous dismissal of their case at the Windscale" 
(Undercurrents 1978c). According to the accounts in UC and Vole (1978b) it was the new, more 
militant, voices speaking out in support of non-violent civil disobedience that drew the crowd's 
approval not the message of continued conventional protest from Tom Burke of FoE and John 
Davoll of ConSoc. Undercurrents reported (1978c): 
"The mood of the demonstrators who packed Trafalgar Square was probably best captured 
by Arthur Scargill, the Yorkshire Miners president, who told the crowd "if it needs civil 
disobedience to stop nuclear power, then we shall have to have civil disobedience" words 
which were greeted by the loudest cheers of the afternoon (though the Master of Ceremonies 
for the day, FoE Director Tom Burke, was seen to shudder visibly as the words 'civil 
disobedience' were uttered". 
The crowd was urged to contemplate picketing and occupation of nuclear facilities if the 
Windscale expansion was sanctioned by Parliament and existing plans for nuclear-powered 
generation were continued (Breach 1978a: 189). Calls for direct action worried some 
commentators, with Kenward in an pre-demonstration editorial in New Scientist warning against 
the 'Eco fascism' of anti-nuclear extremists who "wanted to go to any length to bring a halt to 
nuclear power in Britain" (Kenward 1978). 
4.3.3 Call for direct action 
The call for a more radical approach than that adopted by FoE or ConSoc had been made for 
some time by local activists and by the movement press, such as Peace News and SC 
Energy Bulletin It was further reinforced by FoE's failure at Windscale and adverse comment 
about groups working 'within the system'. As Wynne remarked in a review of future anti- 
nuclear tactics "Disillusioned with the rough treatment meted out by Parker, FoE and others are 
beset by considerable internal conflicts as to whether the streets are not a better politicalforum 
than the committee room" (Wynne 1978b: 351). Furthermore he commented that "FoE's 
members have been highly critical of their leadership's moderate line and its attention to lasting 
credibility with the establishment". There were fears that participation in the widely expected 
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Fast Breeder (CFR-1) Inquiry would lead to a similar defeat. In an article in the New Statesman 
in March 1978 Jeremy Bugler wrote (1978a: 310): 
"... until now the anti-nuclear forces in Britain have shown themselves willing to protest 
'within the system. In sharp contrast to French and German opponents, they have argued 
that society can be persuadedfrom nuclear power. But Parker does not offer dialogue... it 
will not be surprising if the anti-nuclear movement here now changes its approach". 
Dave Elliott, active in SERA and in mobilLzing trade unions for the anti-nuclear campaign, 
agreed saying "The case for more effective, direct action through civil disobedience has never 
been stronger" (Elliott 1978b). In an article in Undercurrents in the summer of 1978, assessing 
the pros and cons of participating in the expected CFR-1 Inquiry, he wrote that participating in 
an Inquiry did have tactical advantages, it terms of gaining publicity for counter arguments. 
However Elliott commented "It seems likely thatjust as at Windscale wider arguments will be 
listened to, but sidestepped ... no amount of technical argumentation seems 
likely to influence the 
official decision makers" (Elliott 1978b). He thus proposed an intermediate strategy, combining 
. 
/ul grass roots organizing in the community as a limited participation in Inquiries with "care 
whole". He believed 'direct action' would not stop the construction of reactors, but their value 
was that they "are mainly ýpublic relations' activities, aimed at demonstrating the strength and 
commitment of the movement, and thereby putting pressure on the decision makers" (Elliott 
1978b). 
In response to Elliott's article David Pearce, who was conducting the Windscale Assessment and 
Review Project (see Breach 1978d), wrote to Undercurrents entering "a briefplea for giving the 
establishment one more chance" with the proposed fast breeder (CDFR-1) Inquiry, due to take 
place in 1979 (Pearce 1978). He argued that a inquiry was an important means of soliciting 
information, "and that much can be done with this information which may be surprising in 
terms of the results it yields". Pearce's worry was that if this inquiry was boycotted "an 
opportunity for generating valuable information through a quasi-adversial process is missed', 
and the 'don't knows' in the public would not be able to be informed (Pearce 1978). " 
In a major review in July 1978 of anti-nuclear tactics post Windscale, Ian Breach commented 
"the existing environmentalist movementfaces its most dijficult period, in Britain, over the 
coming debate on fast-breeder development. If they lose their case against the FBR, their 
chance of widening and popularising their concerns will dwindle. Knowing this the government 
couldpull the rugftom beneath theirfeet" (Breach 1978e: 260). Breach urged the centre-left 
environmentalists to build a much broader based movement, including the "unemployed, the 
deskilled, the homeless, the agedpoor, racial minorities and others" through working with such 
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groups as "Age Concern, the Lucas Aerospace Combine Shop Stewards' Committee, the 
Claimants Union and the Conservation SocieV' (Breach 1978e: 260). Elliott too was in favour 
of a broad based movement writing "The task now is to start to build a broad, but politically 
aware, anti-nuclear movement, which steers between co-option and manipulation by 
meaningless government inquiries on the one hand, and over zealous, adventuristic, direct 
action on the other" (Elliott 1978b). While Breach and Elliott, and many other activists 
pondered on how to build a broad based anti-nuclear movement, Wynne was wondering about 
the opposite "It may be that movements with political interests 'extraneous' to the nuclear 
debate will now exploit the gap between leadership and members to raise wider issues and to 
recruit anti-nuclear protestors to their politics" (Wynne 1978b: 351). 
This 'broad-based' strategy was to be put to the test over the next year at the Torness site in 
Scotland. Here a peaceful 'occupation' of the site in early May 1978 by several thousand 
people was followed later in the year by 'direct action' in the form of physical attempts to 
obstruct building work and the squatting of a cottage on the site scheduled for demolition (for 
details see Welsh 2000). The election of the Thatcher government in 1979, and its commitment 
to nuclear power, further diminished the appeal of the measured FoE approach to activists. As 
an impassioned editorial in the New Scientist - most probably written by Ian Breach- said 
"environmentalist appeal to their version of good sense, to rationality, to good husbandry on 
planet earth, and so on arefalling on deaf ears: those with access to the levers ofpower are not 
always swayed by rational debate" (NS 1979). The editorial therefore welcomed the creation of 
the Anti-Nuclear Campaign (ANC) "that could become more in uentia and more decisive i . 
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British politics than any other since the suffragettes". However this (anti-FoE) view was 
challenged in another New Scientist editorial warning of the rejection of sensible criticism in 
favour of 'guerilla' activity, and that there was "plenty of room for technically informed critics 
who may not be winning the war, but are winning some battles" (Kenward 1979). 
4.3.3.1 Greenpeace: the winners 
The main beneficiaries of this more militant mood was not the existing anti-nuclear movement, 
nor established environmental groups but Greenpeace. This new organization was from the late 
1970s able to win vast publicity and thousands of members by "its uncompromising emotive 
appeal to popular sentiment, combined with non-violent guerilla tactics" (Lamb 1996: 87). As 
Harold Bolter comments on the anti-nuclear opposition post Windscale Inquiry (Bolter 
1996: 178): 
...... FoE anti-nuclear campaigners lost heart. Many of their natural supporters began to 
lookfor something more telling than the reasoned arguments against nuclear power and 
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reprocessing provided by Tom Burke and Walt Patterson. They were ready for action - and 
Greenpeace stepped in and gave them what they wanted Argument was quickly replaced by 
anger and aggression". 
This anger and aggression was to be harnessed by new organizations such as the Anti-Nuclear 
Campaign which from 1979 was to protest against both nuclear weapons and nuclear reactors, 
thus directly linking the peace and the environment movements. Thus I consider the year 1979 
to be the end of the 1970s anti-nuclear campaign and of the time period covered by this thesis. 
In the following three chapters I examine the anti-nuclear power movement in greater detail, 
seeking to establish the background or 'identity' of these protesters, their motives and their 
influences. 
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5. The Environmental Universe: Boundaries and Explanations 
The second part of this thesis - Chapters 5 to 7- analyses the events in the first Part, seeking to 
explain who were these anti-nuclear, activists and why they chose to protest about nuclear power. 
As Walt Patterson so aptly put, it in his first account of the British anti-nuclear movement, 
" "at is an 'environmentalist'. and what is it about nuclear power which arouses 
'environmental' attention and concern? " (Patterson 1979: 158). It is the aim of Chapters 5-7 to 
discuss these questions in greater depth, than he was able to, by looking at recent academic work 
on the anti-nuclear power movement. This chapter, drawing on the experiences of two activists 
Joe Weston (1989) and Derek Wall (1999), explores the ideas and concepts behind the academic 
analysis of the anti-nuclear and environmental movements. It first discusses what is an 
'environmentalist' and what triggers people to become one by looking at the cause of the 
tgreen commitment' (Hay 2002). Next it outlines theoretical work on 'social movements' and 
the role of 'movement intellectuals'. It then asks why do people become activists and join 
groups; is it for men some kind of 'ethical hobby'? It notes the neglect of the important role of 
women activists in most historical accounts. In the final section it examines the nature and 
background of the 1970s 'environment movement' and illustrates how existing activists are 
recruited into new groups, such as Friends of the Earth (FoE), and how these new groups 
establish their identity through new styles of protest or 'repertoires of action', in this case the 
Schweppes bottle dump in 1971. 
5.1.1 What is an 'environmentalist'? 
An 'environmentalist' is commonly understood to be someone concerned about the 
'environment' but that term is open to much dispute. One dictionary defines 'environment' as 
"A combination of the various physical and biological elements that effect the life of an 
organism" but goes on to remark that although it is common to refer to 'the' environment, 
there are in fact many environments, all capable of change in time and place (Kemp 1998: 127). 
Another dictionary says it "includes social, cultural, and (for humans) economic and political 
considerations" (Allaby 1994: 138). Put simply, it may be considered as the interaction of 
human beings with their 'surroundings'. Its meaning has evolved away from one which 
assumed that human beings were separate from nature, though surrounded by it, towards one 
which assumes that human beings are a part of nature and that human society is dependent on 
physical and biological processes for its continued existence (Silverton and Sarre 1990: 3). 
The term 'environmentalist' and 'ecologist', meaning someone who was concerned about and 
worked for the protection of their environment, only came into usage about 1970, reflecting the 
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use of these words by government and magazines in their titles. " These two terms had 
previously been restricted to academic psychology and biology respectively. People initially 
called themselves 'eco-activists' (as in the title of Allaby's 1971 book) but by the early 1970s 
most popular paperbacks used the word 'environment', or 'environmental' in their titles, and 
hence the usage of the terms 'environmentalists ' or 'environment movement'. 
What is interesting to note is the change in language, and perception of this opposition, by the 
media that occurred in the early 1970s. For example in 1970 The Times in the article on the 
success of the opposition to the planned Stourport reactor talked in traditional terms of the 
'countryside lobby' and 'rural conservationists' but a few days later it referred to 'an important 
environmental victory' (Times 1970). This seems to indicate that some writers for The Times 
realized that opposition went beyond traditional concerns with countryside matters to embrace a 
new set of concerns, as yet unarticulated, labeled 'environmental'. This term 'environmental' 
was very recent, certainly given publicity with the founding of the Department of the 
Environment in 1970. If there were activists they generally called themselves 'ecologists' rather 
than 'environmentalists'. 
By the 1980s the term 'environmentalist' had swept all previous rival terms aside, like ecologist 
or conservationist, and established its meaning as "One who holds that damage to the natural 
environment resultingfrom human activity is so severe as to present a challenge to the survival 
of many habitats and ultimately perhaps to the continuance of life on earth, and can be 
addressed only by major reforms of the way people live and industries function" (Allaby 1994: 
138). 
5.2 The Environmental Impulse 
Why do only a minority of people who say (according to opinion polls) they care about the 
environment, become activists? Why do most remain passive? What is it that galvanizes certain 
people to do something? These questions are the staple of most academics who seek to explain 
the rise of the environmental movement, and the explanations vary according to the discipline of 
the writer. Political analysts talk about it in terms of 'opportunity structures' in political 
discourse (Kitschelt 1986; Tarrow 1994; Wall 1999: 116), and sociologists ascribe it to the rise 
of 'new social movements' due to changes in society (Della Porter and Diani 1999; Doherty et 
al 2000: 9-15). One widely subscribed view is that a change in values away from 'materialist 
towards 'post material' ones in the 1960s explained people's interest in ecological issues 
(Inglehart 1977; 1990; Cotgrove 1982) and was the cause of anti-nuclear attitudes (Wellock 
1998). Others ascribe it to the reality of worsening post-war environmental conditions, 
particularly air and water pollution caused by new technologies (Commoner 1966). 
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5.2.1 Value based 
The argument for a change in values as a cause of environmental participation rest on the idea 
that as people get richer they can afford to do something about a polluted environment. The 
rich it is claimed have different desires and aspirations from the poor, who it is argued are 
willing to put up with (and generally ignore) pollution and a low quality environment for the 
sake of jobs and prospects of material possessions, a view which is being challenged by the 
&environmental justice' movement. " 
This material view is endorsed however by Samuel Hays, the veteran US environmental historian, 
when he wrote "At root environmental affairs in modern life are a comhination of changes in 
values and environmental circumstanci? ' (Hays 2000: 24). These new values, he argues, come 
from increasing post-war affluence and the willingness to pay for a clean environment. However 
the cause of these values is experiencing concrete examples of environmental degradation in 
every day life, like pollution, the destruction of natural resources, and over crowding. 
Thus there can be seen an element of material (or vested) self interest in this campaign to 'clean 
up the environment', which attracted criticism from the Left during the 1960s and 1970s. This 
concern for environmental issues as class based was articulated famously by Anthony Crosland 
in a speech in 1970. Speaking of sections of the conservation lobby he said "Their approach is 
hostile to growth and indifferent to the needs of ordinary people. It has a manifest class bias 
and rej7ects a set of middle- and upper-class value judgements Lfor which] preservation of the 
status quo is the sole consideration" (quoted in Lowe and Goyder 1983: 10). 
That most members of environmental groups (in the 1970s) were middle class is incontestable 
(Lowe and Goyder 1983: 10-11), and sociologists in the 1970s saw environmental activism as 
the product of the emergence of a 'new class' which attempts, via environmental protest, to gain 
improved social status and greater economic power (Gouldner 1979; Kitschelt 1985: 278). 
However 'new class' explanations have been criticised as neither 'new' nor economically 
motivated (Martell 1994: 130). This idea of a 'new class', based on middle-class professionals 
working in the service sectors and remote from production, has been used to explain opposition 
to nuclear power (Cotgrove 1982). 
Undoubtedly many of those involved in anti-nuclear protest were members of the 'new class' 
but, as it has been pointed out, better educated social factions find it easier to become active than 
do other elements of a population (Steinmetz 1994: 183). Also 'new class' professionals 
because of their media skills can become influential people in movements, and such people can 
play a 'leadership role' in a wide range of social movements: new, radical, reactionary or 
otherwise (Bagguley 1992: 27). 
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5.2.2 Attitudes to nature 
The key driver to environmental participation may be attitudes towards the protection of nature. 
Lowe attributes the Victorian concern for wildlife protection as stemming from two powerful 
'intellectual currents' "the strong enthusiasm for natural history, and the crusade against 
cruelty to animal" (Lowe 1983: 329). It was then that the first animal protection and nature 
preservation groups emerged: the Society for the Protection of Animals in 1824 and the 
Commons Preservation Society -in 1865. Underlying te founding of all the groups devoted to 
the protection of 'nature' was a fundamental dispute about the future direction of society which 
rested on attitudes to nature versus culture (see Figure 5.1). In Western thought this grew into 
polarities such as countryside versus city or wilderness versus civilization (Weart 1988: 354). 
The contrast between wilderness and civilization implied a contrast between wild and controlled 
things, and in personal terms nature was often associated with intimacy rather than formality, 
with instinctive, 'natural' impulses rather than self-control and planning and, in brief, with 
feelings as opposed to logic. 
Figure 5.1 Scheme of ideas, common in modem thinking, distinguishing nature from culture. 
Either extreme could be seen as good, bad or a mixture. In the lower left of the diagram we 
would find the old view of wilderness as a thorny forest full of wolves and demons, in the upper 
left an unspoiled fruitful Arcadia; in the upper right, an orderly utopian White City; and in the 
lower right, a robotic slave state. The traditional arrow of 'progress' or economic growth is 
shown as an ideology of replacing lawless wilderness with beneficent civilization.. Opposition to 
this view of 'progress' was at the core of antinuclear ideology. 
Source: Weart 1988: 355. 
These patterns of association have become so pervasive in Western thought that, as Weart 
remarked, most people took it for granted "Nature was to culture as wilderness was to 
civilization, wild to seý'-controlled, victim to authority, feelings to logic, andjemale to male, not 
to mention liberty to order, jreedom to security, Dionysian to Apollonian, organic to 
mechanical, 'soft' to 'hard' and so forth indefinitely" (Weart 1988: 355). These associations 
carried a scale of values, generally nature and culture were seen as equally capable of good or 
bad, and the ideal state was envisaged as the harmony of human activity (or civilization) with the 
natural environment. However another way of thinking, that of mastery and control of nature, 
88 
has also been long dominant with man's duty to transform the useless disorder of desert and 
forest into an organized landscape. By the 19th century this idea of 'progress' was universally 
identified with the growth of science, industry, and social order, but was increasingly criticised 
by intellectuals who began to praise untouched wilderness along with spontaneity and freedom. 
This association of nature with feelings and emotions, rather than intellect is implicit in the ideas 
of Peter Hay, a green philosopher, who believes that environmental participation, or what he calls 
a 'green commitment' is not derived from a theoretical, or even rational perspective. He argues 
that this 'green commitment', or what he calls the 'ecological impulse', is due to an instinctive 
ecological compassion often caused by 'some trigger or impulse'. He wrote "the wellsprings of 
a green commitment- at both the activist and more passive levels of identification- are not, in the 
first instance, theoretical, nor even intellectual. 77iey are, rather, ýpre-rational '" (Hay 2002: 
2). Hay describes this 'pre-rational impulse' as a "deep-felt consternation at the scale of 
natural destruction wrought ... upon the increasingly embattled lifeforms with which we share the 
planet" (Hay 2002: 3). 
This instinctual and deep-felt horror at the destruction of nature as a cause of 'green 
commitment' is also expressed by other writers, such as Holmes Rolston who wrote about "the 
maelstrom of killing and insensitivity to forms of life" (Rolstron 1985: 720). 'Mus to Hay "the 
obliteration of once-ahundant life seems to be the most potent greening agent' (Hay 2002: 4). 
This observation of the importance of the massacre of wildlife to participation is borne out by 
the historical record on the founding of conservation groups specifically devoted to the 
preservation of fauna and flora. One of the earliest campaigns was against the shooting of 
seabirds at Flamborough Head which lead to the passing of the Sea Birds Preservation Act of 
1869 (Sheail 1976: 22-24). " 
The environmental movement has always been campaign led, a popular response to an assault 
upon people's lives, as through pollution, or the destruction of nature, and the early campaigns 
against nuclear power stations reflected this. In the 1950s and 1960s this opposition was labeled, 
by the press and inquiry inspectors, as concerned with inherently class based and distinctive 
&amenity' issues. According to Welsh this labeling rcflected the fact that 'amenity' was a 
familiar category of dissent and "In the prevailing discourses of the day 'amenity' had a similar 
connotation to NIABY in more recent times" (Welsh 2000: 70). For instance at Bradwell in 
1956, the main opposition group, the BDPPA, nominally reflected two sets of organized local 
interests centred around the oyster industry and local sailing enthusiasts. But it also acted as a 
focus around "which a much more diverse and less clearly focused range of objections 
coalesced". many from outside the local area (Welsh 2000: 73). 
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These objections, often based on ethical and moral principles, were seldom articulated at 
Inquiries. One person who was prepared to do so was Max Nicholson, the Director General of 
Nature Conservancy, an organization set up by the Government in 1949 to protect wildlife sites. 
In his evidence to the Dungeness Inquiry in 1958, Nicholson argued for the primacy of nature 
conservation over short term economic interests, and said there was an inherent conflict in 
national goals: "we wanted economic development and a higher standard of living but we also 
wanted to leave something of our inheritance to our children" (rimes 1958c). 
These ethical goals and objections against nuclear power were developed in the 1960s by Fritz 
Schumacher, who concluded in his book Small is Beautiful (1973a: 135): 
"No degree ofprosperity couldjustify the accumulation of large amounts of highly toxic 
substances which nobody knows how to make 'safe'and which remain an incalculable 
danger to the whole of creationfor historical or even geological ages. To do such a thing is 
a transgression against life itsetC, a transgression infinitely more serious than any crime ever 
perpetrated by man. Yhe idea that civilisation could sustain itsetron the basis of such a 
transgression is an ethical, spiritual and metaphysical monstrosiV'. 
Schumacher's ideals were to inspire a generation of anti-nuclear activists and his book as a 
critique of industrialism was to have an enormous impact on the emerging environmental 
movement (Veldman 1988: 296-299). This movement had many strands, from conservative to 
revolutionary, and as a journalist remarked in 1973 (New Statesman 1973: 148): 
"Yhe main strength of the movement is in fact in its diversity. It is the people who react 
spontaneously to protest some specific exploitation of their own areas or disruption of their 
lives who areforcing the political establishment to take environmentalism seriously, and 
continuing to challenge ideas which until recently were taken for granted: the dominance 
of man over nature, and the inexorable progress of technoloe. 
5.2.3 Triggers 
Samuel Hays believes that an important factor in the growth of the environmental movement was 
people experiencing areas of outstanding natural beauty like in National Parks, which was due to 
post war growth in leisure opportunities and motoring holidays. Hays believed that more people 
become engaged with political action through this tourism than by reading Henry Thoreau or 
John Muir - although these may come later as people search for wider meaning and explanation 
(Hays 2000: 24). 
Hays views are echoed by Adam Rome in his study of the impact of post war US suburban 
sprawl. He argues that the desire to preserve wilderness areas, like Echo Park in the early 1950s, 
'was the tip of an iceberg' and that far more influential to people was the environmental 
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consequences of suburban development (Rome 2001: 8). He wrote "Again and again, the 
destruction of nearby open spaces robbed children of beloved places to play- and the losses hit 
home more vitally than the threats to far off sites like Echo Park ever could" (Rome 2001: 8). 
The conservationist W. M. Adams similarly argues that the sense of lost nature, and feelings of 
helplessness in the face of vast forces for change, are powerful stimuli for conservation (1996: 
78). He believed that concern at change in particular places, or the destruction of particular 
individual creatures, can prove radicalizing and gives an example for his childhood. 
He wrote "I can recall one particular event in my childhood that stands outfor its effect on my 
attitudes to nature, and to the ways people used and abused it' which was the cutting down of 
row of flowering red chestnut trees next to his home to make way for new houses (Adams 1996: 
78). He remarked that "to me this was a symbol, a worked example, of humanity at its most 
outrageous: greedy, seyish, thoughtless and uncaring. In time this experience, and doubtless 
many others now lost to mind, turned mefrom being simply someone who like birds and bugs 
into a conservationise, (Adams 1996: 78). 
Similar experiences were found by Derek Wall in his interviews with Earth First! activists, with 
many of them saying that they had been influenced into green activism by their childhood 
experiences of the destruction of the countryside. As Wall observed "transgression of a place 
cherished in a childhood memo? y" may latter fuel activism (1999: 99), while W. H. Adams 
remarked that "people who care about nature can often identify similar moments when their 
feelings crystallised, and they begin to understand the effects of industrialised society on wildlife 
and the countryside" (Adams 1996: 79. 
Thus action, the environmental movement, often comes from the reality of environmental 
destruction and appreciation of scenic wilderness not conversion through the reading of 
conservation texts, though as Hay points out it may be "subsequently justified via recourse to an 
intellectually generated system of ideas" (Hay 2002: 2). 
5.3 Social movements and intellectuals 
Little can be done about environmental destruction by the lone individual. Most people realize 
that to be effective they have to band together to form campaigning groups which can then 
combine to form a mass movement. As Mazur remarked "The options usually available to 
someone who wants to express his concerns are limited: either waste one's efforts on solitary 
protest with little chance of success orjoin a currently-running protest movement and pool 
resources with other sympathetic souls" (Mazur 1981: 96). 
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5.3.1 Social movements 
There is a great deal of research and academic debate on the significance of 'social movements' 
and in particularly on the nature of new social movements (NSM), of which the anti-nuclear 
power and environmental movements are considered to be part. Environmental movements are 
defi. ned in a recent Encyclopedia as "loose, non-institutionalized networks of informal 
interactions that may include, as well as individuals and groups who have no organizational 
affiliation, organisations of varying degrees offormality ... and are engaged in collective action 
motivated by shared concern about environmental issues" (Barry and Frankland 2001: 176). 
The emphasis is on networking, participation and collective action by a wide range of 
organizations, groups and individuals. 
A social movement has four typical characteristics, according to Doherty et al (2000: 10): 
1. It is based upon informal networks. These may include more formal organizations, such as 
pressure groups, but are also broader than them. 
2. Those involved must share a set of beliefs and collective identity. This defines whom or what 
they see as allies and opponents, what their goals are and how they are to be reached. 
3. Social movements are involved in collective challenges and may threaten their opponents 
with sanctions. 
4. Social movements use protest and cultural practices, which may or may not be 
confrontational. 
Research into social movements by political sociologists focuses on the cultural and sociological 
dimensions of collective action, and tries to relate this to structural changes in society. In 
contrast, political scientists describe social movements as interest or pressure groups, and focus 
on the instrumental assessment of groups' involvement in policy making. Most early literature 
on the anti-nuclear campaign has taken the latter approach, concentrating on those groups and 
individuals whose contribution has an impact on the UK nuclear policy debate (Williams 1980; 
Patterson 1985) while more recent literature assesses the success of the international anti-nuclear 
movement in terms of policy influence (Joppke 1993; Flam 1994). Such a perspective gives 
emphasis to those groups (such as FoE) and individuals (such as Walt Patterson), with the 
required expertise and 'respectability', that can take part in national policy debate conducted in 
the national media and in parliamentary and judicial inquiries. In contrast a political sociology 
approach, as adopted by Ian Welsh (2000), concentrates on the actions of local anti-nuclear 
groups in developing a movement culture and mobilizing support. In this type of approach a 
historical perspective is required which trace a 'trajectory' by which "embedded social, cultural 
and political relations" shape society (Welsh 2000: 32). This political sociology approach 
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places emphasis on the creation of activist identity, and new forms of movement organization 
and expression. These include investigation onto the "celebratory, carnivalesque elements in 
movement action" and the rejection of "hierarchical, authoritarian models of social 
organisation" in favour of "decentralised consensus decision making, non-sexist practices and 
non-violence" (Welsh 2000: 224). 
This thesis is not a work of political sociology, and thus cannot judge to what extent the 1970s 
anti-nuclear power campaign was what Mellucci (198 1) would have called a 'social movement'. 
I will, however, call it a 'movement' because this is a term contemporary activists used to 
describe it. The label 'movement' was also a popular description given to many other social and 
cultural activities often involving a small number of people, such as the 'Communes 
Movement'. This thesis also re ects the abstruse theories and impenetrable language of much j 
political sociology, but hopes to be mindful of its insights into the role of culture and 
information in shaping the 1970s anti-nuclear power movement. Also social movements, in 
wanting radical changes in society are unafraid of asking utopian questions. As Eyerman and 
Jamison comment, social movements as bearers of new ideas "bring societies back to the big 
questions of what is man? what is nature? what is history? " (Eyerman and Jamison 1990: 165). 
5.3.2 Movement intellectuals 
This thesis is concerned with the interplay of ideas and action, with how some ideas can create a 
social movement. Crucial to this creation is the role of some people, termed 'movement 
inteHectuals' who can not only communicate previously obscure ideas to a mass audience, but 
also build a movement -a mass of supporters willing to act- where none existed before 
(Eyerman 1983). In sociology intellectuals are viewed as those who are professionany engaged 
in the production of ideas or the manipulation of symbols - or in new class terms as 'producers 
of culture'. To environmental historians, such as Samuel Hays they are those people who write, 
read, absorb and are preoccupied with ideas, and who are part "of a network of writers, 
publishers and book reviewers who sustain mutual ways of thinking" (2000: 215). 
Eyerman and Jamison believed a necessary condition for the formation of a social movement is 
the generation of movement intellectuals who "articulate the collective identity that is 
. 
fundamental to the making of a social movement" (Eyerman and Jamison 1990: 118). They 
distinguish between the role of movement and establishment intellectuals in the formation of 
social movements, with the latter crucial in laying the groundwork for the formation of the 
movement. As Eyerman and Jamison commented (1990: 102): 
"The environmental movement emerged in large measurefrom the activity of established 
intellectuals, thus seemingly giving support to traditional accounts of the role of intellectuals in 
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social movements. It was out of the writings of ecologists and conservationists andperhaps 
especially popular science writers that the cognitive identity of environmental activism first came 
to he articulated They were, for the most part, persons who were already socially legitimated 
intellectuals, either through their academic positions (Barry Commoner, Paul Ehrlich, Rene 
Duhos, George Borgstrom) or through their popular writings (Rachel Carson, Lewis Mumford, 
Vance Packard). " 
However it would be a mistake to claim that these establishment intellectuals created the 
environmental movement, for this is done by movement intellectuals in its early phases through 
more or less traditional means of mobilization: by creating its own organizations and its own 
networks in order to create a sense of collectivity. The movement intellectual articulates this new 
collective identity through speeches, tracts, articles and books and central to this process of self- 
formation is the constitution of an 'Other' against which the budding movement will interact 
(Touraine 1981). As Eyerman and Jamison comment (1990: 101): 
"The Other is not merely an intellectual construction, but is almost always a real social 
actor, an authority, the government, an institution, the state, or a conglomerate of 
individuals, the 'technocrats' with whom the movement must strategically interact. 
With the anti-nuclear power campaign this 'Other' was the controlling nuclear institutions, in the 
UK, the Atomic Energy Authority (AEA), and in the USA the Atomic Energy Commission 
(AEC), and more generally what Robert Jungk (1979) called the 'nuclear state'. As the 
movement develops the roles of movement intellectuals expands, from facilitator and ideologue 
to mass media communicator and fmally to counterexpert. These counterexperts are often 
professionals based in existing institutions, who critical of the decisions and standards of the 
government experts, challenge them on behalf of an emerging 'public interest'. The 
counterexperts opposed not merely the state and its environmental bureaucracies, but also "the 
elitist conceptualizations of knowledge epitomized by state expert" and symbolized a democratic 
ideal, and a sharing of knowledge (Eyerman and Jamison 1990: 104). It is this type of 
movement intellectuals, with the credentials and skills gathered in the institutions of the 
established society, who play a crucial role at the public inquiry, where the ideologue is at a 
disadvantage due to lack of expertise. Thus Walt Patterson, with his technical training in nuclear 
physics, fared well at the Windscale Inquiry whilst ideologues like Edward Goldsmith and 
Charles Wakstein received adverse criticism (Breach 1977i; Guardian 1978: 88-89). 
As the movement matures it becomes increasingly professional and organizationally based, 
often employing the ex students, who had taken an active part in earlier campaigning, and been 
the spokesmen for the campaign. Later after the movement has dissolved, or incorporated into 
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institutions, they take influential positions in universit)r departments, in law and journalism, and 
in professional organizations. They make history and then they (mostly men) write about it, and 
their accounts and analysis of their movement days form the basis of this (and many other) 
theses. 
5.3.3 Why an activist? 
Why do individuals join groups? Joe Weston in his analysis of RE supporters -based on survey 
work by Cotgrove (1982)- found that a large percentage were at college during the 1960s and 
were influenced by the events of that decade (Weston 1989: 18). Describing the influences on 
the political beliefs of 'ten fictional Supporters' Weston mentions the influence of rock music, 
television images of war, famine and environmental disasters, and certain books which helped 
steer them towards green politics. Weston mentions Rachel Carson's Silent Spring, Ehrlichs's 
The Population Bomb, and Rene Dubos' So Human an Animal which, he believed may "have 
first 'turned them on' to the problems of the environment' (Weston 1989: 18). 
5.3.4 FoE Groups 
Of course not all 1960s student who got 'turned on' to environmental issues joined FoE or 
other groups. Many who joined a group remain passive members, paying only a subscription 
and taking little part in activities; only a minority became activists. Motivation for activism was 
very varied, as Weston reported for his Oxford FoE group, which was "a mixture of individuals 
who had come togetherfor a diverse set of reasons and who were able to work together on 
specific events" (Weston 1989: 162). He found that there was never any discussion of the 
reasons for the campaigns or the events, there was no attempt to draw up a constitution or 
explanation of why the group believed in what they were doing. He stated "They all believed 
that it was wrong to continue to kill whales, to dump nuclear waste and to destroy wildlife sites. 
But simply because they shared those beliefs does not mean that they necessarily shared 
anything else" (Weston 1989: 162). However it was the belief in (or enjoyment of) activism not 
environmentalism that bought them together "Some were natural campaigners who couldfind 
andjustijy a campaign for almost anything. Others just wanted to be part of the general 'b=' 
that surrounded such activity and of course still others did believe in green or ecological 
politics" (Weston 1989: 162). 
Derek Wall in his interviews with Earth First! activists found a wide variety of reasons for 
Participating "Accident, firiendship, personal conviction, pleasure and political calculation were 
just some of thefactors cited as in/luential" (Wall 1999: 97). However the one common feature, 
he found, was that either a long standing green commitment, often of a passive nature, or 
activism outside the green movement. Wall argues that people become activists by being 
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recruited by their friends to participate in activities and that "Friendship networks may ease 
individuals into activism at low cost or risk even if apathetic" (Wall 1999: 96). Wall believed 
that activism is a way of life, and that new recruits are introduced to it by their fiiends through 
gradual involvement in 'direct action', moving over time from the fiinges to the centre. As he 
comments "Few individualsjump onto bulldozers... whenfirst involved., repertoires have to be 
learnt. Activism, even in its most seriousform, is a method ofperformance that must be 
developed and improvised" (Wall 1999: 96). 
Over time as people become more experienced they may find direct action "exciting or even 
enjoyable". and this, together with new friendship links, intensifies the peer pressure to become 
full time activists. Wall points out that full time activism depends on personal availability, and 
can only be '! for the small minority ofpolitically concerned who lack work andfamily 
commitments" (1999: 97). These people are likely to be young and free, either unemployed or 
students, or more rarely self-employed. However participation in groups is essentially a social 
process with many cultural overtones; the availability of free time and a grudge is not sufficient 
for successful involvement. As Wall comments, 'the protestor' requires a cycle of gradual 
involvement and strengthening of network ties; and direct action "may be like a ritual that eases 
the o en traumatic and anxiety-inducing passage from one identity to another" (Wall 1999: Ot 
105). 
Whilst being a direct action activist can be a full time occupation, involving a change in lifestyle, 
most campaign groups - like FoE or ConSoc- cater to those with a conventional career seeking 
an ethical and exciting hobby. As Weston remarked on participating members of his Oxford 
FoE group (Weston 1989: 162): 
"For the most part though their involvement.. was like any spare time activity taken on by 
people everywhere. It was a sort of ethical hobby taken up by people who want to belong to 
a group, and who, at the same time, like to confi-ont authority. Being part of an active, 
successful, campaigning, as opposed to life-style, FOE group is almost a middle class 
version offootball hooliganism". 
5.3.5 Women Activists 
Weston's account of environmental activism as a sort of 'ethical hobby' or a 'middle class 
version of football hooliganism, perhaps reflects the dominance by men of the leadership and 
written accounts of environmental groups. This neglect of women activists in the UK reflects the 
4sexism' of British protest movements in the 1970s. Women did the mundane work - the 
newsletter typing, the leaflet distribution, the petition gathering, the organizing of people to 
attend demos - while men did the more glamorous and high profile tasks - the writing of articles, 
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speaking at conferences and giving interviews. There was a view that men were the activists, 
women the supporters. " But beyond this simple 'sexism' there was in the anti-nuclear campaign 
an implicit assumption that only those with technical knowledge -preferably a Ph. D. in nuclear 
physics- could speak competently and credibly about scientific issues. There were some 
exceptions, notably Alice Stewart (Stewart and Sutcliffe 2000) and Rosalie Bertell (1985), both 
academics working on the health effects of radiation. But then health aspect were perhaps 
viewed by men, patronizingly, as acceptable concerns for women. When it came to the strategic 
technical and policy issues, in general it was held that only those with expertise and rationality 
should take part in public debates, otherwise there was the risk of being labeled 'emotional' and 
'lunatic' and your views discredited, an opinion explicitly expressed by Walt Patterson in his 
interviews and books. 
This view that men expressed 'facts' while women expressed 'emotions' permeated scientific 
thinking, even amongst the radical scientists who opposed nuclear power, such as those that 
wrote for Undercurrents. a magazine supposedly imbued with radical views on society. The 
views of women activists were ignored and their activities marginalized in favour of long 
'scientific' articles by men. Only in autumn 1978 did Undercurrents _give space 
to women 
writers, in its 'Special Issue on Women and Energy'. The only article on nuclear power was by 
Irene Coates, a member of the Windscale Appeal and participant at the Inquiry. The 
introduction to her article (written by the women editors, presumably) fully expresses the 
prevailing views about women and emotions (Coates 1978b): 
"We have heard the arguments for and against Windscale, most of them written by men. It 
is hardfor a woman, faced with herfeelings about nuclear energy to be listened to 
seriously. A feeling response to the environment is as valid a starting pointfor protest and 
political change as an argument based on intellect or economic analysis. It is time that 
such responses are given the credibility they merit". 
This neglect of women's views was despite their forming a substantial part of the anti-nuclear 
power movement. According to opinion polls, women in all countries, in all time periods, were 
consistently more anti-nuclear than men (Weart 1988: 367). This phenomenon, Weart believes, 
was connected with a tendency, when any technology was mentioned, for women to think in 
terms of safety, the environment and their children, whereas men would think more in terms of 
the benefits and perils of scientific progress. Also women diverged from men far more on 
nuclear reactors than on any other technology. 
Given this anti-nuclear attitude it is not surprising that many of the activists in the early to mid 
1970s against nuclear power in Britain were women - Betty Gazard at Stourport, and Jane Pink, 
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Beryl Kemp and Irene Coates from ConSoc. This grass roots leadership by women is also 
reflected in the United States, where roughly one third of local opposition groups were led by 
women (Mazur 1975: 67 note 37). Also in the United States women activists had a much higher 
profile in campaigns with activists Rose Gaffney, Jean Korturn and Hazel Mitchell playing 
significant roles in the first Californian campaign against nuclear power at Bodega Bay in the 
early 1960s (Wellock 1998). Later in California came the group 'Another Mother for Peace', 
formed in 1967 by 15 Beverly Hills women, which mobilized young mothers in the early 1970s 
to campaign against the genetic hazards of radiation (Wellock 1998: 154). Then the 1970s anti- 
nuclear campaigns produced well known women activists, like Anna Gyorgy who went on to 
write the seminal anti nuclear movement guide book No Nukes: everyone's guide to nuclear 
power (1979), Sheryl Crown, active in the Clamshell Alliance, who wrote Hell no, we won't glow 
(1979), and Helen Caldicott who wrote Nuclear Madness: "at you can do (1980). " 
5.4 The environmental movement 
Women also played a large part in early environmental activism, a role that is being increasingly 
acknowledged in reference works by environmental historians, such as by Carolyn Merchant 
(2002). However there is seldom a straight forward continuity of views, and it is historically 
inaccurate to imagine that Victorian activists - male or female- shared the same motivations and 
beliefs as 1970s environmentalists or 1980s greens. Though some may have been pacifist, 
anarchist or vegetarian, others held views which we would today denounce as highly sexist, 
racialist and elitist. Thus Peter Coates remarked that Derek Wall's attempt (in Green History) to 
identify a green lineage can only be done by excluding people with 'right-wing associations', 
such as Octavia Hill, the founder of the National Trust. As Coates remarked "For many eco- 
socialist, the British National Trust is tarnished by its close ties with the aristocracy and its 
preoccupation with preserving and restoring the elite landscape of the country estate" (Coates 
1998: 163). 
It was however an influential minority of intellectuals and upper-class Victorians that 
'emphatically rejected the imperative to improve' (Lowe and Goyder 1983: 19). Instead they 
established the first groups devoted to nature conservation, the preservation of buildings, the 
protection of animals and landscape, and combating pollution. There was considerable mutual 
co-operation and support between the different societies, and overlap in memberýhip and 
leadership. Wildlife and historic preservationists often employed the same terminology, such as 
frequent references to the relics of the past and the relics of nature, or to ancient monuments 
and natural monuments - in much the same way, as Lowe and Goyder remarked, the term 
sconservation' has been stretched "to cover wildlife protection, building preservation and the 
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husbanding of resources" (1983: 18). The emphasis, as the titles of the organizations suggest, 
was on preservation and protection of old England against the corruption of 'progress' and the 
evils of the industrial city. As Lowe and Goyder remarked "Victorian preservationism, was 
distinctly a gentlemanly avocation pursued by cultured people well removedftom, and indeed 
averse to, the base pursuits of trade and manufacture" (Lowe and Goyder 1983: 20). It was 
also, in its provision of free open spaces in cities and the countryside, a response by social 
reformers, such as Octavia Hill, to head off the challenge by the industrial working class over 
access to the sporting estates of the landed aristocracy, which was to culminate in the mass 
trespass on Kinder Scout in 1932. Overall in the first half of the 20th century the emphasis was 
on 'conservation' right up to the founding of the Conservation Society in 1966. 
5.4.1 Group formation 
Societies and groups are being started all the time; few however will last for decades or even a 
century as has the National Trust (see Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1: Date of Founding of Major 'Environmental 'Groups illustrating change in 
terminology. 
Society for the Protection of Animals 1824. 
Commons Preservation Society 1865. 
Association for the Protection of Birds 1870. 
Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings 1877. 
The Selbourne Society for the Protection of Birds, Plants and 
Pleasant Places 1885. 
Society for the Protection of Birds 1889. 
National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beautyl894. 
Society for the Preservation of the Wild Fauna of the Empire 1903. 
British Empire Naturalist Association 1905, then renamed British Naturalist Association. 
Society for the Promotion of Nature Reserves 1912; then renamed 
Society for the Promotion of Nature Conservation. 
British Ecological Society 1913 
Council for the Preservation of 
kural England 1926. 
International Union for the Protection of Nature (IUPN) 1948, then renamed International 
Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) 1956. 
Conservation Corps 1959, in 1970 renamed Ile British Trust for Conservation Volunteers. 
World Wildlife Fund 1961. 
Natural Environment Research Council 1965. 
Conservation Society 1966. 
Committee for Environmental Co-ordination (CoEnCo) 1969. 
Friends of the Earth UK 1970. 
Greenpeace (London) 1970. 
Your Environme 1969. 
The- Ecologist 1970. 
Socialist Environment Resources Association (SERA)1973. 
Ecology Party 1975 (Previously called People Party1973). 
Society for Environmental Improvement (SEI) 1974. 
The Lawyers Ecology Group. 
Political Ecology Research Group 1976. 
Liberal Ecology group; Conservative Ecology group 1977. (Vancouver) Greenpeace UK 1977. 
Green Alliance 1978. 
Sources: Vernon 1981 Table 1; also Wallis 1972 Section 24: Directory; Shcail 1976; Lowe 1983; Mercer 1995. 
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The founding of groups is generally in response to public awareness and favourable media 
attention to an issue: groups brave enough to campaign on an obscure (or unpopular) 
issue 
attract few supporters and little funding. Lowe and Goyder divide national groups 
into two 
categories: 'emphasis' and 'promotional' groups. The former are groups "whose aims 
do not 
conflict in any clear cut way with widely held social goals or values", while the latter are 
groups "that promote causes involving social or political reform" (Lowe and Goyder 1983: 
35). Of the 77 groups they surveyed in the late 1970s, 48 were emphasis groups (like the 
National Trust) while 28 were promotional (like the Conservation Society or FoE). They 
remark that promotional groups are much younger (with a mean age of 8 years) than the 
emphasis groups (mean age 43 years), saying "a tendencyfor groups to evolve from a 
promotional to an emphasis role, or tofade away if their reforming efforts seem no longer 
relevane' (Lowe and Goyder 1983: 35). Promotional groups are also much smaller, perhaps 
because they are so much younger, seldom having a membership of 10,000 compared to 
memberships of over 100,000 for long established groups like the National Trust or RSPB. " 
Most groups will remain very small scale and obscure, generally run by a committed enthusiast 
attracting few supporters and then fade away - the archetypal 'one man band'. Some are only 
designed for a short life span, such as local campaigns to oppose an unwelcome development, 
these will include the classic 'NDMY' protests. Finally there will be a few societies which are 
initially successful attracting thousands of members and became nationally well known, but then 
enter a period of long decline as the public loses interest in them and their members drift away 
to more dynamic groups. These societies are basically unable to adapt either organizationally or 
intellectually to changing circumstances and public interests. A prime example of this type of 
society was the Conservation Society (ConSoc) founded in 1966 to campaign on population 
issues which peaked in 1973 and then entered a long period of decline before being wound up 
in 1987 (Herring 2001). As Lowe and Goyder remarked (1983: 36): 
" ... many groups which challenge established values never become established. Some 
simply cease to exist. This is a particular tendency with single-cause promotional groups. 
Sometimes it is demonstratively clear that they are redundant, having decisively succeeded 
orfailed to achieve their original objects, and it is possible therefore for all concerned to 
agree to call it a day". 
One notable example of a failure was 'The Anti-Concorde Project', basically a 'one-man band' 
led by Richard Wiggs which achieved substantial publicity and support from environmental 
groups, including FoE. " Whilst most groups pack up in a few years if they do not achieve some 
success, a few groups persevere for decades generally in obscurity often braving periods of 
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media ridicule and hostility, with even sympathetic observers doubting their value. Lowe and 
Goyder commented "Only a few groups soldier on with little prospect of success. Examples 
include the Soil Association... and animal rights and anti-vivisection group" (Lowe and 
Goyder 1983: 36). In fact, these three groups have done particular well since the early 1980s, 
with the Soil Association being able to benefit since the late 1980s from public fears over food 
safety, together with high profile support from conservation figures like Prince Charles. Animal 
rights campaigners have through dedicated, persistent and sometime violent direct action 
achieved major changes in farm welfare standards, often in the face of hostility from the media 
and prosecution from the police. These sorts of uncompromising activists are "people who in 
their life and work styles are singularly committed to the particular values expressed, [which] 
helps to explain their tenacity in theface of adversity" (Lowe and Goyder 1983: 36). 
5.4.2 The new environmental movement 
The media attention on environmental problems in the 1960s, on issues like the killing of 
African wildlife, the threats of over-population and the destruction of British towns lead to the 
formation of such societies as World Wildlife Fund (latter called World Wide Fund for Nature or 
WWF) in 1961, the Conservation Society in 1966, and the Victorian Society (1958) and 
hundreds of civic amenity groups. As one perplexed journalist commented there was then a 
sudden burst of new enthusiasm for protection of the earth's ecosystems, what he called a 
'! fragmented crusade of maddening complexity but endless energy" which was simple in 
comparison with trying to describe what it stood for, as ""at makes the environment movement 
so difficult to pin down is that its intellectual origins are as diverse as the motives of the people 
who have taken it up" (New Statesman 1973: 146). 
Media attention and public interest also caused existing organizations, who were not founded for 
environmental reasons like the Boy Scouts, the Church of England and the National Union of 
Students, to become interested and set up specific groups to cater for their members' interest. 
Environmental interest can also be more opportunistic: to show concern in order to recruit new 
members and, for business organization, to create a favourable impression amongst the public - 
what is now labeled 'greenwash' (Greer and Bruno 1996). As Lowe and Goyder point out, 
throughout the 1960s an increasing range of organizations attended the three 'Countryside in 
1970' conferences, from 90 for the first one in 1963 rising to 335 by the last one in 1970 
(1983: 9). However only a small proportion, perhaps 10%, of the increase in numbers attending 
the conferences from 1963 to 1970 was due to the formation of new environmental groups: in 
the decade of 1966-1975 less than 25 national groups were formed (Lowe and Goyder 1983: 
16). Thus the vast majority of the increase in numbers was due to existing organizations and 
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businesses claiming a new interest or concern about conservation. Similarly there was a big 
increase in the number of local amenity societies during the 1960s with 300 of them in 1960 
rising to over 700 in 1969 and 1250 in 1975, with membership rising from less than 50,000 in 
1960 to about 150,000 in 1969, and 300,000 in 1975 (Lowe and Goyder 1983: 89). 6' They 
estimate (for 1979-80) there to be about two million members of national groups with another 
one million in local groups (1983: 37). However only a small proportion of these millions were 
to be active in the 1970s environmental movement, and an even smaller proportion in the anti- 
nuclear power campaign. 
To the young eco-activists in the early 1970s there was a very clear distinction between the old 
conservation groups and the new groups. This new eco-action movement was very selective in 
the groups it wished to associate with, and only those older groups whose work reflected the new 
ecological values were included. This becomes apparent in a survey of the groups listed in the 
alternative and environmental press for the years 1968-74. " These mentions, in the listing 
columns, reflect the writer's view of what constitutes the environmental movement. Sometimes 
the juxtaposition of groups is strange: The Conservation Corps with the League against Cruel 
Sports (Count1y Bizarre No. 3), or the Dwarfs and the Environmental Consortium ft No. 7). 
There are 81 mentions of 33 groups in the listing column, with by far the most frequent being 
the Dwarfs (13), followed by FoE (7), ConSoc (6), and Soil Association and Conservation Corps 
(5). The large number of mentions of the Dwarfs, mainly in the alternative press, reflects its 
tendency to have listing columns and their more frequent publication. " 
Groups mentioned can be divided into 6 categories: 
New groups (22) FoE (7), ConSoc (6), BSSRS (2), SERA (2), ITDG (1), Transport 
2000 (1). 
Eco-Parties (21): Dwarfs (13), Diggers (3), People Party (3), Provos (1), Movement 
for Survival (1). 
Traditional (16) Conservation Corps (5), Environmental Consortium (3), RSPB (2), 
CPRE (1), Nature Conservancy (1), National Trust (1), NSCA (1), 
TCPA (1), WWF (1). 
Local (8): PEST (4), Greenpeace (London) (2), Action for Survival (1), Earth 
First (1). 
Organic (7): Soil Association (5), Henry Doubleday Research Association (2). 
Animal welfare (7): RSPCA (3), People's Dispensary for Sick Animals (2), BUAV(1), 
League against Cruel Sports (1). 
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It is interesting to compare this listing with that contained in The Environmental Handbook 
(Barr 1971) published by FoE. All the ones above in the 'Traditional' and 'Organic' category 
are mentioned, including FoE and ConSoc in the 'New groups', but none in the 'Animal 
Welfare'. There is also another listing of over 130 groups in the book by Wallis (1972), of these 
10 are new groups, 6 are Organic, and 6 are Animal Welfare, there are also 2 groups concerned 
with birth control and abortion, reflecting conservationist preoccupation with population issues. 
The most respectable (or least hippie) environmental magazine, The Ecologist listed just 
traditional groups plus BSSRS (in the December1970 issue), whilst the alternative press always 
mentioned the Dwarfs and some of the 'New groups' and 'Animal welfare' ones, but hardly 
ever the 'Traditional' ones. It was Country Bizarre, the first rural underground magazine, that 
acted as a bridge between the old and new groups, mentioning the Conservation Corps, RSPB 
and WWF alongside FoE and ConSoc, besides the RSPCA and the League against Cruel Sports. 
Resurgence magazine was also a bridge between the 'New groups' and the 'Organic' 
agriculture groups of the Soil Association and the Henry Doubleday Research Association 
(HDRA). The reason for the popularity of the Conservation Corps (founded in 1959) probably 
reflected its appeal to young students, with many student eco-action groups acting under the 
name of the Conservation Corps (see pp. 302-8 in Barr 1971). 
5.4.3 Pre-FoE Eco-Action 
In the early 1970s the venues for young eco-activists were somewhat limited: for the outdoor 
types there was the hard physical work of the Conservation Corps, for hippies the anarchist 
festivals of the Dwarfs, and for the serious (and dull) the local branch meeting of the 
Conservation Society. It was the good fortune of FoE that it is was able to harness the energies 
and distinctive style of local groups that sprang up after its widely publicized bottle dump in 
May 1971. 
However these local FoE groups did not consist just of new activists, they drew on the expertise 
and experience of activists who had been involved in environmental campaigning far longer 
than FoE's full time staff, who were ex students. Also many were not content to follow FoE's 
centralized approach to campaigning, and wanted a more 'life style' lead approach to bringing 
about social change (Weston 1989: 39). 
The multiplicity of small groups from a wide variety of cultural and political positions 
campaigning on environmental issues in the early 1970s is explored by Derek Wall in his 
history of the anti-roads movement in Britain. He wrote that in the second week of February 
1972 there was the start of a month of action by Manchester Non-Violent Action Group to 
promote free public transport, whilst the Dwarves along with the Young Liberals, held an anti-car 
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march along the route of the M12 (1999: 29). 
In 1971 Victor Anderson, organized a 'reclaim the streets' action that attempted to block 
Oxford Street in London, with a second action in the spring of 1973 held in Piccadilly Circus, 
with the aim of demanding free public transport and car-free streets. These events were launched 
by'Commitment', a Young Liberals group, with Peace New (17 December 1971), procl * ing 
the first event to be "the greatest street party London had ever see" (Wall 1999: 29). Victor 
Anderson recalled in interview with Derek Wall (1999: 29): 
"These actions drew upon emerging networks of green activists and counter-culturalists; we 
had links with people like the Dwarves, [and] a magazine called Street Farmff. I mean, we 
didn't have a lot to do with them but that was all part of what was going on, the Peace 
News thing.. and then there was local independent environmental action groups who 
organized part of the demonstration ... Yhere was PEST - Planet 
Earth Survival Team- 
somewhere in north London. There were people responding to the issues, setting things up 
on their own. This is before Friends of the Earth". 
Ile diversity of groups was acknowledged by contemporary observers. Roy Gregory, 
commenting on the enormous range of interests and attitudes "united by broad desire to 
maintain or improve quality of environment", remarked "it is not easy to accept that the Oxford 
Street action committee, the Dwarves, the Street Farmers, and groupsfirmly embedded in the 
hippy world are part and parcel of a movement which also includes bodies like the Civic Trust, 
the CPRE and the National Trust" (Kimber and Richardson 1974: 224). 
It was precisely this combination of 'the hippy world', traditional organizations like the RSPB 
and the RSPCA, and newer ones like the Conservation Corps and ConSoc that formed the 
universe of the early eco-activist. These new groups, having a large branch network, were often 
the first society for young people interested in environmental issues. However young people 
tended to drift away from ConSoc because of its staid image and methods, to more radical 
groups such as the Young Liberals, and later FoE (Herring 2001: 395). Nevertheless ConSoc 
played an important role in the development of the emerging environmental movement of the 
1970s and as Wall commented "77ie society acted as a particularly significant bridge between 
middle-class conservation groups such as the civic societies and more radical green 
campaigners like the Dwarves" (Wall 1999: 3 1). 
5.4.4 FoE UK formation 
Ile use of friendship networks (or what sociologists call 'social networks') to recruit activists to 
work on environmental projects is well illustrated by the setting up of a national branch of FoE 
in Britain in 1970. FoE had been started by David Brower in 1969, when he quit the Sierra Club 
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in California which resisted his attempts to adopt a more radical and confrontational approach to 
what he saw as 'an emerging ecological crisis' (Weston 1989: 33; Wellock 1998: 68-71). ' 
Brower realized that any action to halt a global problem would have to be tackled at an 
international level and in 1970 he traveled to Europe to 'spread the word' and encourage the 
formation of branches of FoE in France, Sweden and Britain. 
He started in France with help from two Americans, Amory Lovins, a physics student, and Edwin 
Mathews, a Paris-based lawyer. Their efforts lead to the founding of Les Amis de la Terre in 
France by Brice Lalonde -then a young economist but latter to serve as Minister of the 
Environment in 1991-92 under the Presidency of Francois Mitterand (Lamb 1996: 35). 
While on holiday in Ireland in August 1970, Mathews met Barclay Inglis, a retired Scottish 
businessman, and talked about the possibility of forming a British FoE group and Inglis decided 
to organize a special dinner in London to recruit potential activists. The dinner at the exclusive 
Travelers' Club in The Strand was attended by Brower and 14 guests invited by Inglis, amongst 
them Graham Searle and Jonathan Holliman (Lamb 1996: 35). 
Searle was Vice-President of the National Union of Students (NUS) and chairman of the NUS 
Committee on the Environment and had given a speech at the 'Countryside in 1970' 
conference, whilst Jonathan Holliman was a young writer and campaigner then working for the 
International Youth Federation for the Environment. 
A decision was made to form FoE UK, not as a charity but as a company limited by guarantee 
and owned by its seven original members. This was to allow it to campaign for political change 
in order to protect the environment, something that was not allowed for under the Charities Act. 
As Weston commented (1989: 34): 
"... FOE was designed to be a small, highly specialised, pressure group which could 
concentrate its efforts on forcing changes to the policies of national government. Unlike the 
conservationist groups, FOE did not seek or particularly want thousands of members. it 
wanted to be small. centralised and dynamic". 
To this aim the seven members of the company placed the running of the organization into the 
hands of three people, Barclay Inglis as Chairman, Richard Sandbrook as Company Secretary, 
and Graham Searle as the organization's first Director (Weston 1989: 34). 1 In October 1970 
the new company, Friends of the Earth UK Ltd., with its three full time staff, Searle, Holliman 
and Janet Whelan, moved into an office provided by Ballantine Books at 8 King Street, London, 
and in order to raise funds started work on British editions of the American environmental 
paperbacks, like Yhe Environmental Handbook (Barr 1971) and The Consumers Guide to the 
Protection of the Environment (Holliman 1971). 
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5.4.5 FoEls bottle dump: gesture as theatre. 
There was much discussion within FoE during early 1971 over the subject of the initial 
campaign that it should run. It was narrowed down to three issues: opposition to aspects of the 
fur trade, to the proposal by Rio Tinto Zinc (RTZ) to mine in Snowdonia National Park, and to 
the decision by Cadbury-Schweppes to switch from returnable to non-returnable bottles (Pearce 
1991: 50). But it was rather by luck than design that FoE's first action, the return of bottles to 
Cadbury-Schweppes' offices on Saturday 8 May 1971, achieved phenomenal publicity and 
launched FoE onto the public's attention. As Weston remarked "The bottle dump event was 
really a media coup for FOE. That style ofpolitical activity had not been seen in Britain before 
and was, until then more associated with the American system ofpressure group politics" 
(Weston 1989: 35). 
This style of action, protest as theatre, was typical of Californian counter cultural activities 
pioneered by the San Francisco group 'The Diggers', which had been used by Ecology Action, 
the first hippie environmental group founded in Berkeley in January 1968 (Allaby 1971: 63). A 
similar group was founded in Boston in 1969, and amongst their activities (according to their 
November 1969 newsletter) "was a recycling project in which they would t? y to persuade 
beverage companies to re-use the glass and metals in their bottles and cans" and their 
'Garbage Group' "was planning a 'dump-in, possibly on the steps of the State House" 
(Allaby 1971: 65). 
The strong influence of American student politics on the activities of FoE in the UK is 
acknowledged by Philip Lowe and Jane Goyder (1983) in their analysis of FoE's style and 
strategy. They stated "Friends of the Earth's roots are American, not British" and note that this 
new breed of environmentalism was radical not only in its broad field of concern but also in its 
campaigning methods also (Lowe and Goyder 1983: 127). They commented (1983: 127): 
"FoE's approach was more open, media-orientated and confrontational, again betraying 
its American origins. It also incorporated notions ofparticipatory democracy andforms of 
direct political protest, such as boycotts, sit-ins, marches and demonstrations, borrowed 
from the student movement". 
Eco-activists need plenty of free time and few commitments and thus it is not surprising that 
students were attracted to RE in the early 1970s. Also there was disillusionment with the other 
great causes of the 1960s: student protest which had degenerated into violent street 
demonstrations and often harsh reprisals from the police (especially in the United States) and 
the counterculture with its unintellectual diet of 'sex, drugs and rock and roll'. Thus a --- 
movement that combined the intellectualism of student politics with hippie style and humour 
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proved very popular with non-Marxist students, especially Young Liberals. As Walt Patterson 
remarked "FoE's Schweppes 'demo'gave the word a novel slant., instead of a bitter, even ugly 
confrontation, it was witty and engagine' (Patterson 1984: 143). Or as Graham Searle, said in a 
1974 interview "I hope that one of the things we've added [to the environmental movement] is 
a bit of humour" (Rivers 1974: 125). 
The result of FoE's first bottle demo was extensive media publicity and with it, growing 
membership and influence that was to make it the leading environmental group in Britain by the 
mid 1970s. However in terms of numbers it remained smaller than ConSoc until the late 1970s: 
having only 1,000 members (termed 'supporters') by end of 1971, just 5,000 in 1976 and 
16,000 by 1979 (Lamb 1996: 206). As the 1970s progressed FoE, by harnessing and 
expanding its local groups, became a national organization. Its local groups, with a winning 
combination of action, hippy style and moderate politics, attracted young activists from existing 
groups, like ConSoc and the Dwarves, both of which went into decline and have now been 
largely forgotten. 
5.4.6 Early anti-nuclear activism 
Early anti-nuclear activism reflected the style and tactics of existing conservation groups, mainly 
middle class and middle-aged. The earliest protests, such as at Bradwell, involved letter writing 
and conventional political lobbying. The only demonstration was at Trawsfynydd, and that was 
by locals in favour of the nuclear plant! The protest at Stourport in 1970 again followed 
conventional patterns of lobbying in the press and of government, but this time there was the 
founding of a group, the Anti-Powerport Station, to oppose the plant. Their rhetoric was also 
more militant, with calls for a register of objectors and of 'militant anti-nuclear power station 
rallies' with further talk of raising money to employ a barrister to state their case at a public 
inquiry (KT&NS 5 June 1970: 10 & 13). 
In the early 1970s unlike the US, France or Germany there was no mass anti-nuclear campaign 
in Britain. Partly this was because no new stations were being proposed, and partly that there was 
little public discussion of nuclear affairs. Interestingly Peter Bunyard claims that one of the first 
anti-nuclear demonstrations in Britain was organized by foreigners at the annual CND march, to 
the general incomprehension of British anti-nuclear bomb protestors. (Bunyard 1981: 181). 
The first national campaign was started by ConSoc in 1974, but its conventional approach 
attracted little support from young environmentalists, such as with FoE. By late 1975 Beryl 
Kemp, its organizer, reported that she was becoming disillusioned with lack of progress with the 
&constitutional' approach and wanted to use a new form of action, that seemed so successful 
overseas, 'non-violent resistance action' (ConSoc 1976a: 15). 
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However it was not the tactics that were wrong, but the lack of appeal of an anti-nuclear power 
campaign run by ConSoc. The campaign was not able to attract many followers until movement 
intellectuals, such as those around the magazine Undercurrents were able to articulate a 
collective identity and establish an 'Other' against which a movement could interact. It was this 
that the Undercurrents collective did with their first issue on nuclear power (No. 9) in early 
1975. This publicity for an anti-nuclear campaign from the leading radical environmental 
magazine was then harnessed by FoE, who were able to launch their anti-nuclear campaign in 
May 1975. This was a typical piece of FoE street theatre for the media: a birthday party and 
cake with candles, to mark the 10th anniversary of the commencement of work on the still 
unfuiished Dungeness B nuclear power station. ' The birthday party attracted little public 
attention but a phrase FoE used in their tabloid style paper Nuclear Times published at the same 
time was unwittingly, like FoFs initial bottle dump in 1971, to achieve intense media coverage 
and launch anti-nuclear concern to the top of the environmental agenda. The next chapter seeks 
to explain what it was about nuclear power that roused such concern and opposition. 
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6. Anti-nuclear explanation: from image to action 
Why was there an anti-nuclear power movement: why not an anti-asbestos movement or a 
c=paign against some other industrial process that produced greater environmental damage 
and had a far worse health and safety record, like coal mining? " This chapter attempts to give 
an explanation for the rise in anti-nuclear power (or popularly called 'anti-nuke') protest. 
The potential implications of new technologies are often explored by science fiction writers and 
this was very much the case with nuclear power. Indeed, in some ways it will be argued that they 
set the tone for the public responses that occured later, arguably to a much greater extent and 
earlier than other media. This chapter first looks at the portrayal of 'atomic' energy in science 
fiction (SF) novels, which started with H. G. Wells'l 913 novel, The World Set Free. This sets the 
tone for the ambiguous vision, for both science fiction and the public, of atomic energy as a 
possible source of both immense destruction and abundant salvation. The second section looks 
at how this ambiguity was recorded in opinion polls, which reflected longstanding anxieties over 
radiation. The third section examines the 'anti-nuclear impulse', the emotional forces that cause 
people to become anti-nuke. In this analysis it draws heavily on the work of Spencer Weart 
(1988) who uses the term 'nuclear fear' to explain opposition to nuclear power, and how this 
fear was heavily influenced by images of the nuclear bomb in popular culture. It then gives 
personal explanations for being 'anti-nuke', starting with the ethical and conservationist 
concerns of Schumacher during the 1950s and 1960s; then reasons given by leading 1970's 
anti-nuclear activists in the UK in interviews with the author. The final section looks at the 
growth of anti-nuke groups in the US, drawing on sociological work which explains activist 
recruitment in terms of 'friendship networks'. It illustrates the explanations and reasons given in 
the Chapter through examining the rise of anti-nuke opposition in the United States from the 
late 1960s with the recruitment of anti-nuclear activists from the anti-war movement. 
6.1 SF visions 
Writers such as Paul Boyer (1985) and Spencer Weart (1988) believe that SF has been a 
powerful force in shaping societal attitudes to the atomic bomb. In this section I argue that, 
given the close links between the bomb and nuclear reactors, SF has also been influential in 
shaping attitudes to nuclear power. The two were first linked by Frederick Soddy, a leading 
nuclear physicist in the early 1900s, who gave us the twin visions of atomic energy as both a 
source of abundant energy and of immense destruction, both of which drew on early literary 
images of a scientific future. Soddy's 1909 book The Interpretation of Radium had a powerful 
impact on H. G. Wells who dedicated his 1913 novel, Yhe World Set Free, to Soddy's book. 
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Wells in The World Set Free predicted that in the 1930s, scientists would release atomic energy, 
and that by the 1950s this knowledge, in the form of what he called 'atomic bombs', would lead 
to a devastating worldwide nuclear war, with hundreds of cities left in ruins. The quintessential 
image of the atomic bomb, the mushroom cloud was absent, but Chris Morgan, a SF 
commentator, wrote that the essence of the bomb, its name and the terror it conveys are 
definitely foreshadowed (1980: 72). " The atomic bomb (or a weapon of similar destructive 
power) soon became a staple of SF, which reflected the vigour of two of the 20th Century's 
favourite nightmares - the fear that the human race has an unlimited capacity for self- 
destruction and the dangers of uncontrolled scientific experimentation. However others saw 
optimism in Yhe World Set Free, as the novel ends with the formation of a world government, 
which sets the world free from war, insecurity and the straggle for existence. As Spencer Weart 
commented "At the story's end citkens could travel where they chose in atom-powered aircars, 
building atom-powered garden cities in deserts and arctic wastes, enjoy liberty andfree love. 
Wells had neatlyfitted togetherfiragmentary notions about science and atomic energy to craft 
the first full-scale scientific legend of atomic Armageddon and millennium" (Weart 1988: 26). 
Alvin Weinberg was one youthful scientist who was deeply influenced by the atomic visions of 
Wells, to whom he later paid tribute. In 1966 Weinberg predicted a glorious future for nuclear 
power saying that "if nuclear energy does not, as H. G. Wells put it, create 'A World Set Free ', it 
will nevertheless affect much of the economy of the coming generation" (quoted in Hilgartner et 
al 1982: 188). Wells' imagery of atomic-powered cities was evident in the plans in the 1960s by 
scientists at Oak Ridge, the 'City of the Atom' in Tennessee, to develop the 'nuplex' (a nuclear 
complex). This was to be a town centred on reactors which could be located anywhere in the 
world regardless of geography or climate. Alvin Weinberg proudly explained in 1971 in 
Foreign Affairs that this was precisely the dream of a world set free that he had learned from 
H. G. Wells (Weart 1988: 303). 
However public ambiguity about atomic energy was reflected in inter-war SF novels: for some it 
was a means to disaster, but to others it was a means of salvation. 770ne early eco-catastrophe 
novel, Nordenholts Million by J. J. Connington in 1923 had disaster only averted by the heroic 
development of an atomic energy machine. The treatment of atomic energy by SF writers 
before the 1940s was in the long tradition that the civilization of the future could not progress 
technologically without being in possession of a plentiful and efficient source of power. The 
discovery of 'atomic energy' in the early 1900s gave SF writers a new source of unlimited 
power which could be used in their stories. As Stapleford comments atomic energy was 'clearly 
magic in disguise', ranking along with other imaginary powers sources as 'vril' (used in Bulwer 
110 
Lytton, 1871, The Coming Race) and 'apergy' (in Percy Greg, 1880, Across the Zodiac). By the 
1920s 'atomic energy' had become the power system which would provide limitless energy and 
bring utopia. An typical example of such banality is John Sagar (1921) by 'Nedram' where an 
inventor gains control of atomic energy, becomes self-proclaimed 'Master of the World' and 
sets about creating an utopia for all (Morgan 1980: 123). In the late 1920s atomic energy was 
vigourously promoted by Hugo Gernsback in his magazine Amazing Stories. He predicted its 
use in the near future, and referred to the coming era of high technology as 'The Atom- 
Electronic Age' or 'The Age of Power-Freedom'. 
6.1.1 Atomic power 
However in the 1930s SF stories dealing with atomic power became much more realistic, 
primarily due to the influence of John W. Campbell, the editor of Astounding Science-Fiction 
(ASF). This magazine was widely read by science and engineering graduates and prided itself 
on its scientific accuracy. Campbell, who had thought deeply about the realities of atomic 
energy, had published a number of stories since 1930 -nen the Atoms Failed (1930) and 
Atomic Power (1934)- and in editorials from June 1938 had declared the reality of atomic 
fission (Weart 1988: 82). The announcement of the achievement of atomic fission by Niels Bohr 
in January 1939, was followed by widespread press coverage and speculation on its uses, and 
enhanced credibility for Campbell. In September he published Robert Heinlein's first atomic 
energy story Blowups Happen, with an editorial announcing that this story was based on the 
latest discoveries (Weart 1988: 82). This is perhaps the first SF story on the possibility of an 
accident at a nuclear power plant, and is noteworthy in the way it deals with the psychological 
stress involved in working at a nuclear power plant when one mistake might causes widespread 
devastation. This theme of the potential for a disastrous accident was again explored in Nerves 
by Lester del Rey, published in ASF in 1942. 
After the dropping of the atomic bomb in 1945 SF writers were acknowledged as prophets 
proven right, and many managed to become professional writers. Some, like Ray Bradbury and 
Robert Heinlein, prospered as the mass circulation magazines Colli and Ile Saturda 
Evening Post began to publish SF. Others became writers of popular science and academic 
consultants, but most had an ambivalent position on atomic energy because of the Bomb, and as 
Albert Berger remarked many SF writers "were both disappointed in andjearful of the ways in 
which the government proposed to handle its 'ultimate weapon '" (Berger 1976: 143). A few 
maintained their optimism, with Theodore Sturgeon writing in_A_SF in December 1945 that "he 
celebrated the possibilities of nuclear powerfor changing the world" (Berger 1976: 143). n 
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In the immediate post war era while science journalists were producing exalted prophecies of the 
bright promise of atomic energy, SF writers were almost invariably producing bleak and 
pessimistic stories on its social consequences. But as Paul Boyer remarked "These two responses 
that seemed so contradictory - the terror of atomic war and the vision of an atomic utopia- were 
in fact completely interwoven" (Boyer 1985: 109). The Bomb in fact ended the SF vision of 
atomic energy as the route to utopia, it was now the road to dystopia. As the initial flush of 
enthusiasm by science journalists for atomic energy faded by the late 1940s under criticism 
from economists and scientists, the cultural climate turned deeply pessimistic and inward 
looking. Thus at the dawn of nuclear power there were deeply conflicting images of atomic 
energy, and of the future direction of society. The optimists believed that the atomic bomb 
could be controlled and "atomic energy made a great blessing to mankind", while the 
pessimists, the SF writers "were offering a countervision almost unrelieved in its bleakness and 
despair" (Boyer 1985: 265). 
6.2 Public opinion 
The post war ambiguity of SF writers about atomic energy was reflected in public opinion. 
There have been polls on nuclear power in most nations, and at most times since 1945, and 
Weart's analysis of them is that there are five groups of roughly equal size (Weart 1988: 365): 
"The first group were strong advocates, confident in the ability of experts to keep reactors 
safe and impressed by the benefits of economic growth. Directly denying all that and about 
equally numerous were the convinced opponents, atfirst silent but increasingly vocal. In 
between were those who leaned one way or another, a group whojavoured reactors even 
while harbouring some misgivings about their safety, and a group who frankly feared 
reactors but were not convinced they should be banned. Both these middle groups would 
usually go along with whatever the authorities decided". 
Finally the last group consisted of people with no position, and often no interest, in the whole 
question. Thus only about 20% of the public could be called nuclear supporters, with the 
majority of about 60% either against of fearful, with the remainder as 'don't know'. It was the 
two middle groups who were the 'swing' voters, usually going along with whatever the 
authorities decided. When the authorities were confident they joined the strong advocates, when 
the authorities were divided over safety issues they hesitated and adopted a 'wait-and-see' 
attitude. 'Mus public confidence and trust in nuclear authorities was crucial in winning their 
support, and when this began to crumble in the early 1970s support fell away. 
However overall the anti-nuclear campaign produced only modest shifts in opinion rather than 
major swings, as Weart remarked "negative attitudes, like positive ones, had been present 
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everywherefor many decades" (Weart 1988: 366). Advocates and opponents of nuclear power 
were spread quite evenly throughout most social groups, with the education making little 
difference to their views. Weart remarked that "studies showed that the way people felt about 
nuclear power was mostly independent of how much they knew about it. (In fact, most people 
had only rudimentary knowledge mbced with various bits of misinformation). He concluded that 
"when a person took a nuclear stance it was notfrom some special knowledge or lack of it, but 
as a total approach to socieV'(Weart 1988: 366). The only factor, according to the polls, 
associated with anti-nuclear opinion was sex: women in all countries, in all time periods, were 
consistently more anti-nuclear than men (Weart 1988: 367). Weart's explanation for this 
divergence in opinion lies in the symbolism of nuclear technology for women, and that "it had 
become most specifically associated with aggressive masculine image? y: weapons, mysteriously 
powerful machines, domination of nature, contamination verging on rape. On no other 
technological issue was the sexual imagery so thoroughly developed and, from a woman's 
standpoint, so viscerally disturbing" (Weart 1988: 367). 
Public attitudes to nuclear power can also be surmised from analysis of the titles of articles 
published in popular magazines. An analysis by Weart of Readers Guide to Periodical 
Literature, revealed that in 1950 well under 10% of the titles had suggested that there was 
anything to worry about. Anxiety began rising in the 1950s, paused during a period of 
disinterest in nuclear power during the mid 1960s and rose steadily thereafter reaching a plateau 
of about 25% in the early 1970s, before rising from 1975 to over a third by 1980, and surging 
upwards in the early 1980s to reach 90% by 1986 (Readings from Figure 2 in Weart 1988: 
387). In contrast the optimistic articles peaked at nearly 50% in the mid 1950s under the 
influence of the 'Atoms for Peace' rhetoric, then began a steady decline from the early 1960s 
reaching less than 10% by 1970 and stabilizing there. The crossover point from optimism to 
pessimism is the late 1960s, the start of the anti-nuclear power movement in the United States, 
also the time of minimal interest by periodicals in nuclear power issues. A similar result was 
obtained by Harold Kohn in his analysis of books on nuclear energy in the Ohio State library; 
of the 77 books published up till 1965, only 5 were anti-nuclear with 22 pro and 50 neutral 
(Kohn 1984: 50). However between 1965 and 1980 of the 83 books published, 45 were anti- 
nuclear with only 18 pro and 20 neutral. 
6.2.1 Anxieties over radiation 
The numbers involved in the anti-nuclear power protest were small in the US and most 
European countries until the early 1970s, but they did have an impact on public opinion despite 
strong support for nuclear from government, business, the trade unions, most professional 
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organizations and political parties. That the small anti-nuclear power movement could shift 
public opinion was a source of puzzlement to early nuclear commentators, who believed that 
nuclear energy enjoyed high public support until the early 1970s, and that support fell away 
due to a 'pervasive value shift' (Cotgrove 1982). Ian Welsh, in his sociological study of the LTK 
nuclear movement, challenged this view that "there was a past golden age ofpublic acceptance 
or at least public quiescence" and that "the public acceptance of nuclear power only became 
problematic in the early 1970s" (Welsh 2000: 2). Welsh argues instead that there was a 
profound, but concealed, public ambiguity over nuclear technology amongst the public and 
"this ambivalence and more committed public opposition is based in social, cultural and moral 
attributes as well as scientific and technical ones" (Welsh 2000: 3 1). There have always been 
expressions of unease about nuclear reactors but until the 1970s this was dismissed as 'unreal'. 
For instance a small group of parliamentary backbenchers in 1956 raised a series of issues, 
including reactor safety, the adequacy of plans for nuclear waste disposal, and the dangers of 
low-level radiation but in response the Government was 'perplexed' at the expression of 
"anxieties which it is not usual to hear" (Welsh 2000: 63). At the Bradwell in early 1956 the 
local MP reported that that the safety issue had been "worrying local residents more than 
anything" (Luckin 1990: 174) while at the Inquiry the everyday fears and suspicions of the 
objectors were dismissed as 'unreal' by the Inspector. As Welsh commented "The concerns of 
the objectors which had been expressed in such impassioned terms were thus defined away as 
being real only within the confines of the Inquiry. Subjected to the rigours of the 'real world' 
they would dissolve away into 'unreality"' (Welsh 2000: 79). 
At the next Inquiry at Hunterston in early 1957 fears about safety, due to the hazards of 
radiation, were also raised. Welsh comments that the Bradwell and Hunterston inquiries (2000: 
89): 
"... make it quite clear that public apprehension over reactor safety and radiation hazards 
existed during this period. It is also clear that the adequacy and legitimacy of the inquiry 
system was strongly questioned. Yhe broad similarity of issues at these inquiries indicates 
that these were generalised anxieties and not merely expressions arisingfrom particular 
instances ". 
These anxieties of the public persisted throughout the 1960s and at Stourport in 1970 the CEGB 
were still dismissing fears of radioactive dangers. Moreover its refusal to acknowledge resident's 
fears on nuclear safety and the dangers of radioactivity, made it impossible for it to shake off is 
reputation as an unresponsive and aloof organization. Furthermore its inability to provide a 
convincing answer to the frequently asked question (dating back at least to the first nuclear 
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Inquiry at Bradwell in 1956) of why, if nuclear power stations were so safe, were they built in 
remote areas? And why were there such detailed emergency measures in the event of any release 
of radioactivity? 
During the campaign at Stourport letter writers raises the issue of nuclear safety, with one 
mentioning the Windscale accident of 1957. This theme of fear about nuclear safety dominated 
the campaign, despite reassurances from experts engaged by the County Council. Cllr. Eric 
Higgs, the secretary of the APS, the anti nuclear power station committee, was stated as saying 
"We are objecting because we do not want this in Stourport. There will always be an element of 
fear, and we don't want to live with it' (KT&NS 5 June 1970). This fear of radiation was a 
dominant theme. Cllr Betty Gazard, a prime mover behind the campaign, said "None of us know 
how much we shall receive, or if we shall receive any or if it will do us any harm" (KT&NS 5 
June 1970). 
So what was the roots of these anxieties and fears? 
6.3 Weart's 'Nuclear fear' 
Spencer Weart uses the term 'nuclear fear' to explain opposition to nuclear power, and in his 
opinion this fear was heavily influenced by images of the nuclear bomb in popular culture. The 
bomb had become a very powerful symbol of mass destruction, the apocalypse, and a world 
ruined by radiation. It had also become associated with myths of 'technology out of control', of 
'mad and bad' scientists experimenting with things 'best left unknown', and of control of 
nature and mankind by a remote elite. Atomic energy had become the cliche of every SF horror 
stories: of mutant insects caused by radiation, of death rays created by the evil scientist bent on 
world control, of the crazed military officer launching a surprise nuclear strike, or of 
bureaucratic utilities ignoring nuclear safety problems. The emerging environmental movement 
was able to (perhaps unexpectedly) capitalize on these highly emotional images when it got 
involved in local campaigns against the building of nuclear power plants. Weart comments 
"Nuclearfear was by no means the onlyform of imagery; let alone the only socialforce, behind 
the environmental movement. But nuclearfear took a special place. It raised emotions earlier 
and on a more visceral level than any other issue. And it served as a banner that could rally 
everyone around"(Weart 1988: 325). 
This nuclear fear was recognized by early analysts of the US anti-nuclear movement. For 
instance Ebbin and Kasper (1974) argued that the concerns that induced opposition to a nuclear 
power station was based on more than simply environmental issues. They remarked "Fear of 
things nuclear or atomic is not uncommon among the population in general and intervenor 
groups in particular. fear of nuclear accidents, fear of radiation exposure, fear ofpropinquity 
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to nuclear plants, fear of long range unknowns, fear of technological error and commitment to 
a technology imperfectly understood" (Ebbin and Kasper 1974: 17). They remarked that this 
fear had an evident historical foundation, as most adult Americans were first made aware of 
nuclear power with the dropping of the atomic bomb. The image of the mushroom shaped 
cloud, they concluded, "remains clear andfiIghtening in the minds of the American public" 
(Ebbin and Kasper 1974: 17). 
6.3.1 The WHO Study Group 
This nuclear fear was recognized early on by the nuclear authorities, and in 1957 the World 
Health Organisation (WHO) set up a Study Group on 'Mental Health Aspects of the Peaceful 
Uses of Atomic Energy', and an account of its workings is given by one of its members, Ritchie 
Calder, then a science journalist. " Calder wrote that the Study group sought to change the 
'irrational and deplorable' fear of science meddling with things which would be better left 
alone, or in other words to "seek to enthrone reason and rebut the New Superstition"(Calder 
1962: 23). The WHO Study Group made clear that by 'mental' it meant 'emotional' and 
Calder wrote that to it (Calder 1962: 23): 
...... certain disturbingfeatures became plain. One was the universal disquiet about atomic 
energy, in terms not only of its potentialities for destruction in a nuclear war but of its 
peacetime implications .... civilized man tends to cower, like the Neanderthalforefathers, in 
the dark cave of his emotions. We are back in the 'childhood of mankind' Man's anxiety 
about his own search for knowledge and power is reflected almost universally in myth and 
legend and still lurks in our own nature today". 
These myths and legends, such as those of Pandora and Faust, were renewed in SF films and 
novels of the 1950s, about the radiation from the atomic bomb creating mutated creatures that 
would wreck destruction on mankind (as in the highly popularl954 film Theml on giant killer 
ants). The WHO Study group sought to explain this fear "that trespassing in the Unknown will 
invite a kind of cosmic revenge on mankind' in psychological terms as the tendency to relapse 
into more primitive forms of thought and feeling known as 'regression'. As Calder reported 
"The psychologists also have an explanation for the universal fear of Yallout' and atomic 
waste. These are associated with feeding and excretion. The danger to food is generally the most 
disquieting concern aboutfallout or the risks of a nuclear mishap and, so the psychologists say, 
there is a symbolic association between atomic waste and body waste" (Calderl962: 24). This 
fear of contamination of food was used by opponents of nuclear bomb testing in the late 1950s, 
when they campaigned on the issue of radioactive strontium-90 in milk. This radioactive fallout 
threat to milk was also used in 1963 by campaigners against a nuclear plant at Bodega Bay, an 
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issue that particularly appealed to women (Wellock 1998: 47). Such campaigns exploited deep 
seated myths of milk as the most sacred of food, and as Weart observed since the time of 
witchcraft trials, accusations of obscene attacks on milk have been a powerful weapons against 
enemies (1988: 214). " Weart also agrees on the psychological importance of atomic wastes 
being viewed as excrement suggesting that, on every level of human thought, radioactive wastes - 
in association with weapons- were seen as 'Jilthy insults against the proper order of things" 
(Weart 1988: 298). 
6.3.2 Linking bombs and nukes 
The linkage in the public mind between atomic bombs and power had always been strong, and 
anti-nuclear power campaigning could be seen as a substitute for the failed earlier attempts to 
rid the world of nuclear weapons. The hostility to nuclear weapons sought an easier outlet: what 
psychologists would call 'displacement', a hostility that shrinks away from what is too 
threatening, directing itself onto some other target instead (Weart 1988: 212). This can be 
considered as a rational response to an insoluble problem, just as the 1950s campaign by Linus 
Pauling's and others against atomic fallout, hid their primary goal of reducing the likelihood of 
the use of atomic bombs. 
Similarly in the 1970s, David Lilienthal, a veteran of the attempt to control the arms race, 
remarked that people were attacking reactors as a 'surrogate for bombs' (1980: 22-23). Weart 
comments that the fear and hostility previously directed towards bombs was now directed onto 
nuclear power, and this displacement became clear to him when one person remarked to him "I 
can't do anything about the bomb, hut I can do something about reactors" (Weart 1988: 323). 
Initially in the 1970s the anti-bomb (or peace) movement and the anti-nuclear power movement 
were distinct, due to style, tactics and differing constituencies. The peace movement argued that 
the problems of nuclear power were simply trivial compared to the dangers of nuclear war, while 
the anti-nuclear movement was reluctant to compromise its 'political neutrality' by 
campaigning on an issue that had strong pacifist and left links (Nelkin 1981). In the UK most 
campaigners did not link nuclear power to nuclear weapons until the early 1980s when 
hundreds of local groups networked in the Anti-Nuclear Campaign (ANC) joined together with 
a revigorated CND to oppose both nuclear weapons and nuclear power (Webb 1980). 
6.3.3 Mastery of Nature 
The nuclear power reactor, to both supporters and opponents of technological progress, stood as 
a 'fiull symbolic representation of attempts by the forces of order to master nature" (Weart 
1988: 369). Weart goes on to explain that (1988: 369): 
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"Ais symbolism can explain better than anything else why nuclear reactors were singled 
out, far more than any other technology, for utopian hopes on the one hand, fear and 
hostility on the other. In term of hierarchical control by a technical elite, reactors were not 
obviously worse than, for example the telecommunications industry; in ter7ns ofprospective 
hazards to our daily lives, reactors were not obviously worse than, for example, the 
chemicals industry. What reactors did offer that nothing else could match was a unitary 
image tying together everything involved in the battle between 'nature' and 'culture' ". 
Environmentalists were at the heart of this battle against the mastery of 'nature', and thus the 
nuclear reactor became the prime symbol of this largely idealistic battle. Also reactors, as large 
objects which people could see as 'blots on the landscape', served as a very convenient concrete 
reality, in this ideological dispute about the direction and control of society. Thus the anti- 
nuclear power campaign was able to link local rural 'NMY' protests about the construction of 
large industrial projects with urban romanticism about the destruction of nature by 
technological elites. 
6.4 Why anti-nuke? 
What converts the individual to protest about nuclear power, rather than a myriad of other 
worthwhile issues? Sometimes it comes as an almost religious conversion, the sudden association 
of nuclear reactors with nuclear weapons, as a life threatening technology. One example is the 
case of David Pesonen, a leader of the group opposing the building of a reactor at Bodega Bay 
in California, who had at first only opposed the reactor as an industrial object desecrating the 
shore. According to Sheldon Novick a chronicler of the fight against nuclear power in 
California, he was reflecting on the fight when he underwent a remarkable experience "It was a 
beautiful evening, a touch offog, " Pesonen recalled. "I had a feeling of the enormousness of 
what we werefighting, that it was antilife. " It struck him that nuclear power was "the ultimate 
brutality, short of nuclear weapons" (Novick 1976: 241). From then afterwards he became a 
vigorous campaigner against all reactors, based on what Wellock calls 'moral environmentalism' 
(Wellock 1998: 48). Other times it is an aesthetic protest at the mutilation of the landscape, 
drawing on moral outrage over the degradation of the countryside dating back to childhood 
days. " One such case is that of Langdon Winner, who in the final chapter of his book The 
Whale and the Reactor, musing on the cultuml and political significance of the Diablo Canyon 
nuclear power plant, wrote "To put the matter bluntly, in that place, on that beach, against 
those rocks, mountains, sands and seas the power plant at Diablo Canyon is simply a hideous 
mistake. It is out ofplace, out ofproportion, out of reason. It stands as a permanent insult to its 
natural and cultural surroundings" (Winner 1986: 176). 
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6.4.1 Schumacher's Ethical critique 
The most articulate voice against nuclear power in Britain was Fritz Schumacher, who had long 
been opposed to nuclear power on ethical grounds. In a 1955 essay Economics in a Buddhist 
Countr3P, he called it 'violence against nature' and described "Atomic energy for ýPeaceful 
purposes' on a scale calculated to replace coal and oil, is a prospect even more appalling than 
the Atomic or Hydrogen bomb" (quoted in Wood 1984: 304). His longstanding views on 
nuclear energy found a forum at the National Society for Clean Air conference in October 1967 
where he argued that "of all the changes introduced by man into the household of nature, 
large scale nuclearfission is undoubtedly the most dangerous and profound. As a result 
ionizing radiation has become the most serious threat to man's survival on earth" (Schumacher 
1967a). " Furthermore highly controversially he said that nuclear stations "represent an 
incredible, incomparable, and unique hazardfor human life [that] does not enter any 
calculations and is never mentioned" (Times 1967). 
Schumacher identified nuclear waste disposal as a key problem (Times 1967; slightly different 
text in Schumacher 1973a: 126-7): 
"No place on earth could be shown to be safe from radioactive waste products ... The most 
massive wastes are of course the radioactive reactors themselves .. No one discusses the 
humanly vital point that they have to be left standing where they are, perhaps for thousands 
ofyears, an active menace to life silently leaking radioactivity into air, water and soil. No 
one has considered the number and location of these satanic mills which will relentlessly 
accumulate in the crowded islands so that after a generation or two there will be no 
habitation outside their 'sphere of influence'of one or more of them". 
As Geoffrey Kirk, his assistant at the NCB, remarked "The response to his lecture was immediate 
and angry. Qjficialdom was outraged He was accused of having spoken irresponsibly and of 
being guilty of special pleading. There was a public rebuke by the Ministry of Power, Richard 
Marsh" (Kirk 1982: xiii). In a letter to The Times on 25 October 1967 he defended his speech, 
and stressed that economic consideration should not have primacy over environmental ones. He 
wrote (Schumacher 1967b): 
"I ventured to suggest that economic considerations must not automatically be accepted as 
decisive in such a case... there is no need to hurry to change from conventional power 
stations to nuclear stations. 
I am not alone in taking the view that - in the absence of necessity - even a small amount of 
genetic damage cannot be justified or excused by economic considerations. " 
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Schumacher was a supporter of the conservationist arguments on the need to conserve natural 
resources and to respect nature (see Conford 2001: 212). This conservation position was 
expressed in 1962 when he stated (Schumacher 1962; reprinted in Kirk 1982: 10): 
"Even with renewable primary products, man is not wholly in control of the productive 
process as he is in afactory butfirst mustfit his actions into the rhythm of the seasons and 
the often mysterious requirements of organic life. His responsibility cannot be confined to 
making ends meet and maintaining his man-made assets: he must also 'conserve' the 
natural conditions which make primary production possible. Thus he has to conserve soil 
fertility, to conserve forests, to conserve fish populations, and so on". 
His use of words, 'organic life' and 'rhythm of the seasons' are, perhaps, the influence of Soil 
Association which he joined in the early 1950s. According to his daughter, Barbara Wood, he 
was strongly influenced by their ideas on organic agriculture, and 'wholeness' and health in the 
broadest sense and "His eyes were opened to a whole new way of thinking" (Wood 1984: 221, 
237). He eventually became their President in 1970. Thus in his 1967 speech he used their 
language and philosophy of conservation ethics when he said (Schumacher 1967a): 
"In the blind pursuit of immediate moneta? y gains modern man has not only divorced 
himset(from nature by an excessive and hurtful degree of urbanisation, he has also 
abandoned the idea of living in harmony with the myriadforms ofpIant and animal life on 
which his own survival depends; he has developed chemical substances which are unknown 
to nature.. The religion of economics... promotes an idolatry of rapid change... Die burden 
ofproof is placed on those who take the 'ecological viewpoint"'. 
The publication of his book Small is Beautiful in 1973 bought him much publicity for his 
ethical views and he concludes his chapter on nuclear energy with a restatement of his 1967 
position on the need for the supremacy of ethical over economic values (1973a: 135): 
"No degree of prosperity couldjustify the accumulation of large amounts of highly toxic 
substances which nobody knows how to make 'safe'and which remain an incalculable 
danger to the whole of creation for historical or even geological ages. To do such a thing is 
a transgression against life itseý(, a transgression infinitely more serious than any crime ever 
perpetrated by man. The idea that civilisation could sustain itseýron the basis of such a 
transgression is an ethical, spiritual and metaphysical monstrosity". 
Schumachers ideas that nuclear power was a 'transgression against life itself chimed in with 
popular concerns about the effect of radiation on future generations. During the Stourport 
campaign a local headmaster, Mr. Baylis, said "There are some people in Stourport who have 
not been consulted - the children. If we hand this down to the children of Stourport as a 
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heritage, we shall have done them a great deal of harm" (KT&NS 5 June 1970). This concern 
was also articulated in 1972 by Jon Tinker, in a talk on BBC radio, who described the problem 
of radioactive waste and said there was no safe way of disposing of it. He vividly warned that 
"This devils broth can never be released, for it contains more radioactivity than a dozen H- 
bombs... nat sort of environmental legacy is thatfor our children and grand-children? " 
(Tinker 1972: 5). This moral issue of intergcnerational equity featured in the anti-nuclear 
arguments made by Beryl Kemp, leader of the ConSoc campaign, who stated in letter to the 
newsletter "The moral issue has been the basis of the campaign which Jane Pink and I (and our 
supporters) have run for the last year or more. Even if the risks were acceptable to us, we 
consider that we have no right to endangerfuture generations in order to preserve our own high 
living standards" (Kemp 1976a). 
This ethical approach again featured in a 'letter of concern' which appeared in The Guardian 
on 7 January 1975, with 43 signatories, including those of E. F. Schumacher, Bishop Hugh 
Monteflore, and Peter Hain. The letter stated "Our nuclear power programme represents a 
Faustian bargain in which we arejeopardising the safety offuture generations and their 
environmentfor our own short-term energy benefits.. We consider it is immoral and unwise to 
pursue a technology which will leave such a dangerous legacy to posterity" (Bryce Smith et al 
1975). 
6.4.2 Against the 'Other' 
However by the mid 1970s, many leading anti-nuclear intellectuals opposed nuclear power not 
on environmental or ethical grounds, but because it was promoted by arrogant and secretive 
institutions: the 'Other' (see section 5.3.2). Peter Chapman, in an interview with the author in 
1998, remarked "What got me was the stupidity and arrogance of the industry. It was the 
people not the technology I was opposed to. It was the scientific stupidity of their claims it was 
safe, that there was no problems, like waste disposal. They had no basis for such claims. Gofman 
really impressed me, his claims that there was no such thing as a safe level of radiation" 
(Chapman 1998). 
Gerald Leach, an observer of the nuclear scene in the 1970s, attributes the motivation behind 
Many Of the anti-nukes to dislike of large scale institutions, and the threat of the 'nuclear state'. 
Nuclear power, be believed, invited attack as it was "an attractive targetfor anti-authoritarians" 
being arrogant, secretive, and insensitive (Leach 1996). This was true for Robin Grove-White, an 
early environmental activist, who was motivated by his dislike of the 'nuclear state' and its threat 
to civil liberties. What irked him was the "CEGB arrogance of assuming they could do whatever 
they liked. " (Grove-White 1996). Another anti-nuke campaigner, Brian Wynne, became 
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involved because he had no confidence in the CEGB's energy projections or forecasting 
methods: he believed that they had 'no intellectual substance' and were 'anti-democratic' 
(Wynne 1996). 
The most vocal and widely publicized criticism of the nuclear industry came from Walt 
Patterson. It centred more on a critique of the electricity supply industry (principally the CEGB) 
as a powerful, monolithic, and undemocratic institution than on environmental issues of nuclear 
power (Patterson 1977). According to Patterson, political opposition to the CEGB, coalesced in 
the anti-nuclear movement because nuclear power was 'a big, easy and unifying target' 
(Patterson 1996). He believed that nuclear power was vulnerable because it was 'big, arrogant, 
and powerful', and could be overthrown in a 'David versus Goliath struggle'. 
In an interview with the author he said "The nuclear industry was its own worst enemy. In the 
1950s and 1960s there was boundless enthusiasm for it, the public swallowed every extravagant 
claim they made, which all proved wrong. Nuclear was given a start no other technology has 
enjoyed" (Patterson 1996). He believed that nuclear power had built itself up with myths: of 
Man confronting and overcoming Nature, of exploring the deepest secrets of nature, and of 
nuclear physics as so esoteric and fall of powerful secrets that it was fit only for the Weinberg 
idea of an elite 'nuclear priesthood'. Patterson aimed to debunk this mysticism with his book 
Nuclear Power (1976) and explained (Patterson 1996): 
"The nuclear establishment couldn't be trusted Up till then it was taken as law that only 
they could understand nuclear power. My book; Nuclear Power, dispelled the aura of 
mystery, it had a big impact. I arguedfrom the onset that there was nothing complex about 
nuclear, no more that TV, you didn't have to understand how it worked to have opinions on 
its use. This changed the tenor of the debate. It demysti ed the per they were then seen ex ts, 
as overstating and misstating their case". 8" 
Finally Gerald Foley, a more detached observer of the nuclear scene in the 1970s, laid the blame 
on nuclear's unpopularity to its delusion caused by dreams of nuclear grandeur. In an interview 
with the author in 1996 he cornmented "I was most unimpressed by the whole nuclear 
establishment. 71ey were not malevolent bu1just seýrserving as others are, they were well 
meaning but had delusions" (Foley 1996). 
11us there was a divergence in concerns between local people (and old style conservationists) 
opposed to nuclear power and the new movement intellectuals. For instance at a rally in 1976 at 
Barrow residents demanded reassurances about possible hazards associated with the transport of 
radioactive materials through the town, while RE expressed more concern about more remote 
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issues of plutonium security, proliferation implications, and the economic validity of the 
reprocessing industry (Patterson 1976a). 
6.5 Recruiting anti-nuke activists 
Why do people become anti-nuclear power activists? How are they recruited? Do they start off 
as environmentalists, and then become anti-nukes? Why do only a small minority of those with 
an anti-nuclear attitude decide to protest. These questions are a subject of much fascination to 
academics and there are diverse theories on 'new social movements' and 'activist identity' used 
to explain why people become activists. But as Wall comments these theories that imply that 
"identity grows from a single factor such as class or upbringing or whatever, are inadequate", 
and that they fail to "indicate why the majority of surveyed individuali- who, due to such traits, 
can be thus classified as potential activists fail to become involved' (Wall 1999: 96). An 
alternative approach on activist recruitment stresses the importance of 'fiiendship networks' that 
encourage uncommitted or disinterested individuals to participate in protest activities. Douglas 
McAdam gives the following example (1986: 68-9): 
"Imagine .. the case of a college student who is urged by hisfiriends to attend a large 'anti- 
nuke' rally on campus. In deciding whether to attend, the potential recruit is likely to weigh 
the risks of disappointing or losing the respect of hisfriends against the personal risks of 
participation. Given the relatively low cost and risks associated with the rally, this 
hypothetical recruit is likely to attend, even if he isfairly apathetic about the issues in 
question". 
The use of social networks to recruit activists to a particular cause was found by Alan Mazur 
who notes that "several studies of recent social-protest movements indicate that recruitment 
often occurs along pre-existing social links, and that people frequently join in an organizational 
block rather than as isolated individuaLk" (Mazurl981: 58). In his interviews in 1973 with 30 
leaders of the Consolidated National Intervenors, the coalition that had opposed the AEC in the 
hearings over the ECCS (emergency core cooling systems), Mazur found that two-thirds had 
been in environmental groups (1975: 68). These leaders were usually mature, middle-class 
liberals who initially had no specific dislike of nuclear power. Their concerns had developed 
largely through their participation in local environmental groups against the building of a large 
industrial plant - the nuclear power station -in an area of high scenic value, such as the 
Californian coastline. Mazur wrote (1981: 58): 
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"Haýf of these environmentalists explicitly reported that their concerns had been influenced 
by other anti-nuclear people with whom they had come into personal contact. A few non- 
environmentalists were introduced into antinuclear groups through filends... Only a few 
respondents formed their anti-nuclear alignment completely independently of important 
social influences". 
Mazur even found that the opinion of academics on nuclear issues is related to the social 
networks which exist within the academic science community. He concluded "The political 
judgement of scientists are shaped by their social milieus, just as those of laymen" (Mazur 
1981: 81). A large proportion of the one fifth of the population that polls showed were always 
hostile to nuclear power were opposed to the degradation of the environment and corporate 
control of society. Mazur noted that the left orientation of the opponents of nuclear power 
plants could be observed as early as 1956, and "that liberals were more likely than conservatives 
to find the anti-nuclear issue appealing, and were more likely to be recruited by the early liberal 
activists" (Mazur 1981: 47). There is a long tradition within the left, encouraged by its ideology 
of collective rather than individual action, of individuals banding together to form campaigning 
groups which can combine to form a mass movement. As Mazur remarked "The options 
usually available to someone who wants to express his concerns are limited: either waste one's 
efforts on solita? y protest with little chance of success orjoin a currently-running protest 
movement and pool resources with other sympathetic souls" (Mazur 1981: 96). 
6.5.1 The anti-nuke movement in the US 
The anti-nuclear movement in the US arose partly due to policy decisions made by the nuclear 
industry, which alienated some of its traditional supporters, but mostly due to external changes 
in society that turned passive acceptance of nuclear into open hostility for a significant minority 
of the population. The policy decisions made by the nuclear industry were typical of any 
maturing technological industry as bureaucrats take over from scientists, and as the profit motive 
replaces early idealism. As the industry matured and more reactors came on line, the emphasis 
was now on regulation rather than research, on every day safety rather than hypothetical 
accidents, and on consensus rather than critical inquiry. Nuclear scientists were no longer in 
control of a technology they had created, and those scientists who fell foul of the bureaucratic 
line were often eased out of the industry, to sometimes become embittered and highly vocal 
critics, such as John Gofman and Arthur Tamplin (Weart 1988: 316). However the nuclear 
industry has since its birth always had its critics, often ex members of staff, but their criticism 
rarely reached the public. Why did the public suddenly want to listen to nuclear critics from the 
late 1960s? 
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6.5.2 The Critics speak out 
Activists in the small anti-nuclear minority in public opinion may have taken the opportunity of 
the absence of nuclear power articles in magazines, in the mid to late 1960s, as an opportunity to 
speak out, as previously their voices would have been drowned out by nuclear optimists. Also 
after a dearth of nuclear articles, magazines may have welcomed a new opinion, a fresh 
approach to the hackneyed subject of the wonderful benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy which filled pages of magazines in the late 1950s. Particularly at a time of national 
debate over nuclear weapons centering around the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) programme. 
Ernest Sternglass used a novel approach, in his controversial article 'The Death of All Children' 
in the mass circulation magazine Esqui in September 1969, of linking the dangers of radiation 
from nuclear weapons tests to high rates of infant mortality. He achieved wide publicity for his 
radiation statistics claims, even though they were rapidly discredited by nuclear scientists who 
were disgusted by his attacks and who were encouraged by the AEC to refute him. As a 
contemporary article about him remarked "Indeedfor a man who is so widely regarded as 
wrong, Sternglass has achieved surprising exposure on the nation's airwaves and in the mass 
media" (Boffey 1969: 195). 11 However as Weart commented (1988: 313): 
"While the experts were dismissing Sternglass, ordinary citizens who read his statements or 
saw him on television could not be so sure. He was a physics professor, just like others who 
were arguing plausibly against the ABM. He was also a good performer, making his points 
clearly and persuasively. When he and an AEC expert each had a few minutes to present 
opposing views on a television show, it was impossible to tell who was right'. 
Philip Boffey (1969) in his profile on Sternglass asked how he could achieve such wide 
exposure for his views when so many scientists believe he is wrong. Part of the answer, Boffey 
wrote, probably lies in the fact that Sternglass made good press copy - he had a startling theory 
that relates to important public issue. Furthermore Sternglass "is in tune with a number of deep 
public moods - the revulsion against the military, the desire to end contamination of the 
environment, and the tendency to disbelieve the rosy reports emanatingfrom government 
agencies" (Boffey 1969: 199). Scepticism about the impartiality of government agencies was 
further reinforced by the AEC's treatment of two of its employees, John Gofman and Arthur 
Tamplin, at its Livermore Laboratory in California. Gofinan, as an expert on the radiological 
impact of biologically absorbed plutonium and the leader of a health research program, had 
been asked to review Sternglaps' Esquire article, and had enlisted the aid of Tamplin. But 
Tamplin's report, defended internally by Gofinan, did not please the AEC, even though it did 
reduce the number of infant deaths a hundred fold from 400,000 to 4,000, but the AEC '! found 
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the number still too high for its public image" (Bertell 1985: 23 1). As Weart commented "Like 
any bureaucracy, the AEC disliked doubters within its own ranks, and the pairfound themselves 
increasingly unwelcome at Livermore" (Weart 1988: 315). 11 However Gofinan was a natural 
rebel who despised government authority in general, and was happy to fight against the 
bureaucrats of the AEC over the impact of low level radiation from nuclear reactors. 
Challenging the claims that reactors were 'absolutely safe' Gofman and Taxnplin toured the 
nation, giving talks and interviews to warn against materials routinely emitted by reactors, and to 
promote their 1970 book "Population Control" through Nuclear Pollution (Weart 1988: 315). 
Gofman and Tamplin built upon the worries that Sternglass had originally provoked, and 
received generally favourable media coverage especially on TV. On one TV documentary 
'Powers that Be', broadcast on 18 May 1971 in Los Angeles, Weart remarked "Viewers were left 
with the thought that, as narrator Jack Lemmon put it, "nuclear power is not only dirty and 
undependable ... it's about as safe as a closeýýl of cobras" 
(Weart 1988: 315). Against such 
anti nuclear propaganda the AEC was steadily losing 'the battle of images'. It was also losing 
the scientific debate over threshold doses of radiation and in 1971 the AEC were forced to 
reduce the maximum permitted dose that a reactor could emit. 
6.5.3 Anti-war radicals turn anti-nuke 
The criticism of the AEC must be seen in the context of radical student protest against the 
Vietnam War and anything that smacked of the 'military-industrial complex'. It was an easy 
step to move from protesting about bombs and missiles to reactors, and as public interest in the 
ABM proposals faded away in late 1969, groups such as the Union of Concerned Scientists 
(UCS) and the Scientists' Institute for Public Information looked around for a new issue. They 
found it in local protest to the siting of nuclear power plants. Ile UCS was originally a group of 
Boston based scientists and students, who had come together in 1969 against the ABM and the 
military uses of academic research, and who wanted to affect 'an ideological change in society' 
through more democratic control of science and technology (Downey 1986). After the A13M 
protest faded away membership declined but some were drawn into controversy over a proposed 
nuclear site near Boston. One such member was Daniel Ford, then an economics graduate 
student at Harvard, who got involved in research over the safety of emergency core cooling 
systems (ECCS). In July 1971 the UCS published a report exposing the inadequacies of, and the 
internal dissent, over the ECCS, which attracted widespread media coverage (Wcart 1988: 319). 
Hoping to answer this new public criticism, the AEC opened public hearings on ECCS in 
January 1972 that were planned to -last just six weeks but extended, with interruptions, well over 
a year. Robert Gillette, in a series of four articles in Science traced the roots of the safety issue 
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"to problems of the management of the nuclear safety program, and to an intense discord that 
has developed between the AEC and its national laboratories" (Gillette 1972: 771). This 
discord and the adverse publicity it received over its stifling of internal dissent and its scornful 
dismissal of external critics fatally weakened the AEC's authority and credibility. Its behaviour 
only reinforced people's suspicions about it being a powerful and arrogant bureaucracy or what 
Peter Metzger (1972) called an 'atomic establishment'. Even the industry trade journal, 
Nucleonics Week, noted that the hearings "have opened up a Pandora's box of scientific doubts 
and bureaucratic heavyhandedness". " 
Daniel Ford wrote of this era that "The Vietnam war protests had prompted widespread attacks 
on 'Establishment' endeavours" and "The legal challenges to the nuclear power program were 
being raised by individual citizen activists, local and national government organisations, 
ýpublic interest' law firms, and ad-hoc groups opposed to the siting of nuclear power stations in 
their locality" (Ford 1982: 116). One example of a 'public-interest' group was the Scientists' 
Institute for Public Information, in St. Louis led by Barry Commoner which in 1971 brought a 
lawsuit against AEC's breeder reactor program. Their critique was summarized in the first 
methodically argued and widely read anti-nuke book, The Careless Atom, published in 1969 by 
a Commoner protege, Sheldon Novick. Most other organizations that opposed reactors similarly 
drew much of their strength from individuals and groups who had first fought the AEC over 
weapons (Nelkin 1981). This crossover from weapons to reactors was common, and as Weart 
remembers "In the coffeehouses where students gathered in the early 1970s, bulletin board 
posters opposing the Vietnam War and the ABM were covered over with notices of meetings to 
protest reactors" (Weart 1988: 321). " This mobilization of activist groups is shown by the 
formation of the Consolidated Nuclear Intervenors, a coalition of more than sixty 
"environmental groups fighting against the nuclear reactor program on safety issues", who 
challenged the AEC, during the ECCS hearings, using the technical evidence of Ilenry Kendall 
and Daniel Ford (Berger 1977: 47). 
The growing anti-nuclear movement was also greatly helped by the willingness of usually pro- 
nuclear papers, such as the New York Times to give space to stories questioning the competence 
and credibility of the AEC. This was done using the Freedom of Information Act to force the 
AEC to disclose secret documents, which were then passed onto friendly journalists. David 
Burnham, a New York Time , reporter who covered the UCS campaign on the ECCS, 
remembered two decades later(Weart 1988: 378 nlO): 
"Henry Kendall and Dan Ford came up with a brilliant way of using the media in their 
nuclear safety work They knew that a reporter.. could not directly challenge the assertions 
127 
of organized physicists or engineers that the nation's nuclear power program was a dream 
come true. But a reporter could write about the administrative problems of the nuclear 
program, providing there was documentary evidence". 
Thus the anti-nuclear critics saw the weak point of the nuclear program as its administrative, not 
its technical, record and knew this would appealed to the 'muckraking' tradition of US 
journalism. As Daniel Ford put it "Having regarded the nuclear program uncritically for two 
decades, the news media detected the scent of a potential scandal, which in the normal course of 
events it would be likely to dramatise and to build into an even bigger controversy" (Ford 
1982: 134). As David Burnham remarked (Weart 1988: 378 nlO): 
"Diese documents gave me- as a reporterfor the New York Time the hook that was 
required to persuade the editors that there might be a problem with nuclear energy. Since 
the 11mu had always been a true-blue believer in science, technology, and progress, Henry 
and Dan's achievement- finding the evidence that Persuaded the paper to print stories 
questioning nuclear power - was a prodigious feat". "' 
By the early 1970s the AEC was worried by the increasingly successful tactics of the vocal 
minority who were opposing nuclear-plant construction, and the negative tone of much nuclear 
power coverage in the mass media. The fiasco for the AEC of the ECCS hearing during 1972 
deepened its crisis of confidence, and encouraged its internal critics to speak out. As Cohn 
remarked "The long public airing of the ECCS controversy helped legitimize the private doubts 
of many technocrats within the AEC and nuclear industry and helped induce a flow of leaked 
documents and protest resignations" (Cohn 1997: 379). The credibility of the AEC continued 
to decline with calls by its critics for its dismemberment. This was achieved in 1974, when 
Congress split the promotion and regulation of nuclear technology into two agencies, and also 
stripped the powerful Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of its unique powers. Ibis was a major 
victory for the anti-nukes and as Weart commented "Nuclear energy lost its strongest 
institutional supporters" (Weart 1988: 346). 
This success for the anti-nuke movement also attracted professional activists, those who saw the 
opportunity for their organizations to take advantage of an increasingly popular issue. " 
Typical of this was Ralph Nader, a crusader against the hidden evils of industry and government 
and in 1970 more concerned with air pollution from oil and coal than hazards from nuclear 
power (Weart 1988: 326). But by late 1972, after the publicity over the warnings on radiation by 
Gofman and Taniplin and the AEC machinations at the ECCS hearings, he had become 
convinced that in nuclear power the public faced another official 'cover-up' of hazards. So he 
convened a national conference in late 1974 that bought together more than a thousand anti- 
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nuke campaigners, which according to a journalist attending "had the grim flavour and 
messianic fervor of the movement to end the war in Vietnam" (Olson 1975). 
6.5.4 UK imports US expertise 
Anti-nuclear arguments in the United States were rapidly transmitted to Britain by the media, 
and used in British debates over the safety of nuclear power. The work of Gofman and Tamplin 
was used by consultants working for Worcestershire County Council in its opposition to a 
proposed reactor at Stourport in 1970, though they were keen to distance themselves from the 
claims of Sternglass (see section 2.4.7). The consultants state (Leslie & Shaw 1970: Volume 3: 
4): 
"Gofman & Tamplin are responsible people.. and should not to be confused with Prof 
Sternglass, who recently got a lot ofpublicityfor his views that bomb tests had killed 
hundreds of thousands of children. Our colleagues are unanimous that the-statistics will not 
bear the interpretations which Sternglass is trying to put on them". 
The influence of American anti-nuclear works was also evident in remarks by another consultant 
to the Council when he said, most probably referring to Sternglass' claim (Spiersl970a): 
"I believe Windscale-type accidents are unlikely or impossible with the present closed 
circuit type of reactor, but I imagine some kind of accidental escape is conceivable and I 
imagine the Council to be concerned about this, particularly in view of the recently renewed 
press and TV discussions on radiation dangers". " 
The work of Gofinan and Tamplin on safety was quoted heavily in a BBC TV documentary 'A 
Question of Survival' broadcast on 14 December 1971. This broadcast, later criticised in the 
technical press, is one of the key events to which Pocock attributes the start in 1972 of "well 
organized and well publicized opposition to plans for the expansion of nuclear power in Great 
Britain" (Pocock 1977: 227). 
Pocock is certainly wrong here, an effective opposition did not emerge until 1975; but by 1972 
movement intellectuals, such as Walt Patterson and Peter Bunyard, had since 1970 been 
articulating and publicizing reasons for opposition to nuclear power in their magazines Y= 
Environment and The Ecologist. Patterson was in a unique position to do, as he had rcported on 
the 1972 ECCS hearings, so was able to import all the US debate. 
Opposition to nuclear power amongst movement intellectuals was fuelled not so much as by 
$nuclear fear', than by the growing realization that nuclear power was not going to be the 
utopian energy source - the answcr to the world's energy problems - that pro-nuclear 
intellectuals like Alvin Weinberg had promoted. Thus John Davoll, in his views on nuclear 
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power, not only highlighted the problems of the rapidly growing stockpile of long-lived, 
indestructible and highly toxic radioactive wastes but also wrote that (ConSoc 1975: 15): 
"detailed proposals for a world nuclear economy, by Alvin Weinberg and others ... only 
undermine forcibly how completely it commits humanity to maintaining a complex and 
hazardous system... Nor does nuclear power, on careful examination, show promise of 
being cheap or being able to mitigate the impending confrontation between rich and poor 
countries". 
This rejection of nuclear power as a utopian energy source is covered in the next chapter. 
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-perfect energy 
source 7. Energy Utopianism: the search for a 
One person's utopia is, as many commentators have pointed out, another person's hell. The 
same dichotomy is also true for new energy technologies which tend to be launched on the basis 
of zealous commitments and grand projections of changing society. This chapter thus looks at 
the tendency of promoters of new energy technologies to attach utopian attributes to them, a 
characteristic Basalla (1982) has termed 'energy utopianism'. The first section examines the 
nature and dangers of this utopianism, outlining the views of Basalla on the dangers of energy 
myths, Luckin (1990) on electricity 'triumphalism' in the interwar period, and the early 
criticism of 'clectro-proganda' by Carey & Qurk (1970). It then explores the notion of 
'techno-arcadia', the interwar idea that electricity could revitalize the countryside and how this 
resulted in rural opposition to 'the march of the pylons' in Britain in the 1920s. The second 
section examines the myths surrounding atomic power dating back to the early 20th century, 
a nd how vision of an atomic utopia reached a peak in the US in the early 1940s, before being 
dimished by the realities of the atomic bomb in 1945, but with a resurgence from the mid 1950s 
with the propaganda of 'Atoms for Peace. It concludes with comments from Cohn (1997) and 
others on why the nuclear dream failed. The third section looks at longstanding hopes of 
utopias powered by the sun (or what is now termed 'renewable energy'), particularly strong pre 
WWI. However post WW2 hopes for solar were dashed by government backing for atomic 
energy, and solar energy was only revitialized by the AT (alternative technology) movement 
from the late 1960s. 
7.1 Energy and Society 
The tendency to attach utopian attributes to new technologies has been widespread particularly 
in American society. One American writer on technology, Langdon Winner, remarked that it is a 
recurring fantasy in industrial society that a new technology will end people's alienation from 
the current centralized political and technological system. Winner wrote (1986: 96): 
"Dreams of instant liberation from centralized social control have accompanied virtually 
every important new technological system introduced during the past century and a hatC 
The emancipation proposed by decentralist philosophers as a deliberate goal requiring 
long, arduous social struggle has been upheld by technological optimists as a condition to 
be realized simply by adopting a new gadget". 
Winner talks about a great tradition of optimistic tcchnophilia and remarked (1986: 106): 
"It is not uncommon for the advent of a new technology to provide an occasion forflights 
of utopian fancy. During the last two centuries thefactory system, railroads, telephone, 
131 
electricity, automobile, airplane, radio, television and nuclear power have all figured 
prominently in the belief that a new and glorious age was about to begin". 
This belief in the liberating power of new technologies was common amongst intellectuals and 
writers in the 1930s. Lewis Mumford believed that there could be a return to nature by way of 
modem technology, and in his 1938 book, The Culture of Cities, according to his biographers 
the Hughes he "waxes lyrically about the liberating qualities of electric power lines, aluminum, 
radios, automobiles, superhighways and planes" (Hughes and Hughes 1990: 108). This 
technological utopianism, is beyond the scope of this thesis but is discussed in great detail by 
Howard Segal (1985) who examines the historical phenomenon of an uncritical faith in 
technology's ability to solve all problems, and David Nye (1994; 1998) who provides a cultural 
history of American relationships with technology and energy use. 
It is therefore no surprise that supporters of new energy technologies, fi-om. the steam engine to 
the solar cell, have since the mid 19th century proclaimed that these technologies could act as a 
motive force for desired social change and as a means of returning to a 'cherished naturalistic 
bliss'. The discovery of electricity, in particular, gave birth to ideas of a new bond between 
nature and society, termed 'the rhetoric of the electrical sublime' and was appropriated by late 
Victorian writers, such as reformers (as in Howard's Garden Cities of Tomorrow), by 
revolutionaries (as in Kropotkin's Fields, Factories and Workshops) and in utopian science 
fiction (as in Bellamy's Looking Backward). These ideas and images for new energy 
technologies were examined by George Basalla (1980; 1982), who termed it 'energy 
utopianism'. For electricity they were termed 'electricity triumphalism' by Bill Luckin (1990) 
in Britain and the 'mythos of the Electronic Revolution' by James Carey and John Quirk in the 
US (1970). 
7.1.1 Basalla's Energy utoplanism 
In his 1982 essay 'Some Persistent Energy Myths' Basalla reviewed the history of the 
introduction of a new source of energy into society over the last two centuries and concluded 
there was a recurrent energy myth. Ile stated (Basallal982: 27): 
a ... any newly discovered source of energy is assumed to be withoutfaults, infinitely 
abundant, and to have the potential to affect utopian change in society. 77jese myths persist 
until a new energy source is developed to the point that its drawbacks become apparent 
and the failure to establish a utopian society must be reluctantly admitted'. 
Social commentators, he believed, do not seem to learn from previous mistakes by over- 
enthusiasts, for the next source is not handled in a more restrained fashion. Basalla commented 
(1982: 28): 
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"Instead, the recently discarded energy myths are resurrected and bestowed upon the 
newcomer. And so the cycle continues, with only the myths remaining unaltered while various 
sources of energy enter and leave the public spotlight: coal, hydropower, nuclear power and 
solar energy". 
Basalla noted that these fantasies attached to energy use and production are shared by a wide 
section of society: technologists, capitalists, and the general public alike. Finally he concluded 
that "Energy myths are particularly dangerous because they blind us to the realities of new 
energy sources by promising a golden land of the future and ignoring the real problems of 
today" (Basalla 1982: 28). 
Energy utopianism is strongly linked to social utopianism, the desire to create new forms of 
society based on using the latest technology to liberate people from work or to create mass 
wealth. Some SF writers saw the discovery and development of new energy sources as a means to 
power a 'utopian' society, or as often with 'atomic energy' the means by which society was 
destroyed. However most sf writers saw atomic energy as just a new source of unlimited power. 
As Brian Stapleford points it was not until the 1960s that SF (and most other writers) considered 
the possibility of energy shortages, before that the problem was of a society coping with 
unlimited energy resources (Clute and Nicholls 1999: 953-5). For further details of the 
treatment of atomic power by sf writers see section 6.1. 
7.1.2 Electro-propaganda 
In the early 20th century the provision of electricity, particularly to rural areas, was seen as a key 
component of modernization and industrialization of society. This desire for electrification was 
perhaps most intense in the Soviet Union after the 1917 revolution, and Lenin enthusiastically 
declared in December 1920 at the Eight All-Russia Congress of Soviets that (Lenin 1920): 
"Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country.. only when the 
country has been electrified, and industry, agriculture and transport have been placed on the 
technical basis of modern large-scale industry, only then shall we befully victorious". 
Lenin's view on the transforming merits of electrification found similar support in the United 
States. For instance, Joseph K. Hart, a professor of education, extolled in 1924 the liberation that 
electricity would bring (Hart 1924 11): 
"Centralization has claimed everythingfor a century: the results are apparent on every 
hand. But the reign of steam approached its end. - a new stage in the Industrial revolution 
comes on. Electric power, breaking away from its servitude to steam, is becoming 
independent. Electricity is a decentralizing form ofpower: it runs out over distributing lines 
133 
and subdivides to all the minutiae of life and need Working with it, men feel the thrill of 
control andfreedom once again". 
These ideas were supported by Lewis Mumford, who together with other conservationists such as 
Gifford Pinchot, formed the Regional Planning Association of America around the goals of 
public electricity power and community planning which were adopted by the US Government 
during the 1930s, with the creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and the Rural 
Electrification Administration. This intense admiration and enthusiasm for electrification as the 
harbinger of modernization was widespread in all western countries, especially those that saw the 
state as the leading agent for social change through widespread planning. Bill Luckin, writing on 
the construction of the National Grid in Britain in the inter-war years, develops the concept of 
'triumphalism', a progressive ideology that would overcome traditionalist thinking on technical 
change. He remarked that 'triumphalism' (Luckin 1990: 2): 
44 ... was grounded in the scientific premise that economy, society and culture would be rapidly 
and radically transformed by the new source of energy. Forged by electrical engineers, 
contractors, salesmen, journalists and technocrats, this progressivist ideology was buttresses by 
powerful state bureaucracies". 
This rhetoric or 'electro-propaganda' from the technical press, like Electrical Revie , promoted 
the image of the forthcoming 'golden age of electricity' to consumers, based on its association 
with 'progress', with a modem, middle-class lifestyle based on health, leisure and domestic 
appliances. As Luckin commented (1990: 20): 
"Electrical triumphalism was more than a generalised and at time a quasi-religious 
rhetoric, growing out of and molded by a deep defensive reaction to the existing 
technological order. It must be seen as the shaper and bearer of images which made up the 
ýublicface'of electricity and which persuaded large numbers of the uncommitted to invest, 
symbolically as much as economically, in the )ruture' rather than the ýast ' ". 
7.1.3 Critics 
There were few critics of the 'electro-propaganda' in the post war years and perhaps the first 
were James Carey and John Quirk who examined the notion of electricity as a liberating force in 
two essays in-The American Schola in 1970. In the first they reviewed the futurist ethos 
presented by modem intellectuals, such as Marshall McLuhan and Buckminstcr Fuller, that 
"identifies electricity and electrical power, electronics and cybernetics, with a new birth of 
community, decentralization, ecological balance and social harmony" (Carey and Quirk 1970: 
220). 11ey then identified Harold Innis, the Canadian economist, as the first to produce a 
systematic critique of the notion that electricity would replace centralization in economics and 
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politics with decentralization, democracy and a cultural revival. In fact Innis argued the trend of 
new technologies was towards increased territorial expansion, spatial control, commercialism and 
. perialism - what we would today called 'globalization'. As Carey and Quirk remarked (1970: 
241): 
"He recognized that the speed and distance of electronic communication enlarged the possible 
scale of social organizations and greatly enhanced the possibilities of centralisation and 
imperialism in matters of culture and politics". 
Innis argued against technological determinism, and that to achieve a technology's potential 
requires sympathetic institutions, and a culture that could effectively support alternative styles of 
life. He thus recommended the maintenance of alternative traditions of life and thought, 
traditions attuned to the demands of history and the need for stability and continuity (Carey and 
Quirk 1970: 399). Carey and Quirk concluded that the task of intellectuals was to 
demythologize the rhetoric of the electrical sublime, and that they should address themselves 
directly to questions of control of technology: not of centralism versus decentralism but 
democratization and "the reconciliation of immense power and wealth with the ideals of liberty 
and equality" (Carey and Quirk1970: 424). 
As Winner pointed out the earlier enthusiasts for large-scale electricity projects failed to notice 
that large dams and power plants would be controlled by electric utilities, firms or government 
agencies destined to have enormous power (Winner 1986: 95). This issue of the control of 
technology would be taken up by the anti-nuclear movement, with critics such as Patterson and 
Lovins, challenging the autocratic decision making of big centralized utilities, like the CEGB. 
Instead they proposed small decentralized energy sources, based on solar energy, with the thesis 
that it was decentralization of generation that was crucial to democracy and community not 
decentralization of use. 
7.1.4 Techno-arcadia 
Electrification was promoted in the intcr-war years not only as progress for urban areas, but also 
as the saviour of the countryside, then suffering from a prolonged agricultural depression. 7bis 
new form of energy it was argued could revitalize agriculture and rural life, and thus preserve 
the English tradition and way of life. Thus progrcssivcs argued that electricity could be the 
saviour of the traditional way of lifcl As Luckin remarked (1990: 83): 
"Triumphalists came to stress 'natural'connections between farming, the revival of the 'organic' 
village community, and the newfor? n of energy as a stimulant to rural craj2s and industries". 
This dream of a techno-acadia, longstanding in English and American utopian thought, would 
allow the decentralization of society and a dynamic, participatory and humanized economy of 
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villages in which craft would be revolutionized and made more widely available. In this arcadia, 
the ravages of industrialism and the machine were to be ameliorated in a clean and communal 
agrarian environment, itself renovated and revitalized by electricity. In return the countryside 
would learn to love the high voltage electricity pylons straddling the countryside with E. P. 
Bennett, a Chicago architect, quoted in 1925 as saying there was "something irresistibly fine in 
the aspect of great airy structures stalking the hills" (Levy 1997: 578). Not all could share the 
modernist's aesthetic tastes but at least they could see them as an essential part of rural life. " 
This dream of techno-archadia was promoted by the ecological planners Patrick Geddes and 
Lewis Mumford, his American disciple, who saw the potential for decentralized cities through 
the use of hydroelectricity. Mumford's interest in decentralization and regionalisel meant that 
he, according to the utopian historian Krishan Kumar "grasped thefact that theflexibility and 
adaptability of electric communication and electric power.. had laid the foundations for a more 
decentralised urban development in small units, responsive to direct human contact and 
enjoying both urban and rural advantages" (Kumar 1987: 485). 
Mumford supported the 'village indpstry' concept of Henry Ford, the car manufacturer, who 
publicly stated that they could be as efficient and profitable as large scale urban centres (and 
privately believed that they were less conducive to labour unions and strikes). Ford believed that 
"bigger no longer means automatically better, the flexibility of the power unit, the closer 
adoption of means to ends, and nicer timing of operation, are the new marks of efficient 
industry" (quoted in Hughes 1990: 107). 
While the countryside welcomed the benefits of electrification in first half of the 20th century 
there were objections by conservationists based on aesthetic grounds: the damage to the 
landscape from pylons and dams. 
7.1.5 Opposition to pylons 
The first opposition in Britain was in urban areas where City Councils since the 1890s had 
opposed the proliferation of local distribution poles and wanted them placed undcrground. But 
there was not public opposition until the proposed construction of the National Grid from 1926. 
Even the 'triumphalists' realized that this plan for 4,000 miles of high voltage pylons crossing 
rural areas would attract some hostility from those affected by the thesc 'new and alien physical 
structures' without yet benefiting from electricity supply. As Luckin remarked "The natural 
landscape and 'amenity, farming land and property rights- all would be threatened by the 
'march of the pylons' and the building of massive and polluting 'super-stations ," 
(Luckinl990: 94). Conservationists were quick to realize the dangers of the infant National 
Grid, and the countryside defender, Clough Williams-Ellis, wrote in 1928 "Clearly the 
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electrification of England will not be accomplished without severe shocks to amenity... Plat is 
this magic network going to cost us? " (quoted in Girling 1996). 
However the triumphalists were certain that the long term economic benefits of the National 
Grid would outweigh the social costs, "and that the 'community' must be willing to pay high 
short term costs to achieve so majestic a scientific and cultural transformation" (Luckin 1990: 
95). Rural conservationists were however not convinced and protest groups established 
themselves in the late 1920s and early 1930s in the South Downs, the Lake District, the New 
]Forest and London. The strong opposition in Sussex lead to a two day public inquiry in 
September 1929 with much national media attention and debate, and lobbying of Ministers. The 
National Grid plan was however approved, which led to strong feelings of bitterness in rural 
Sussex at the lack of government attention to local opinion. The approval was seen as an 
unqualified defeat for the anti-pylon campaign, and lead to congratulatory articles in the 
electrical press at how powerful landowners and articulate intellectuals had been outmaneuvered 
(Luckin 1990: 100). Subsequently from the early 1930s attitudes to pylons among 
conservationists and the 'aesthetes' began to change, towards greater acceptance that pylons 
were part of 'man-made nature. ' 
7.1.6 Opposition to dams 
Britain had limited hydro-electric capacity, except in Scotland where the first scheme was 
completed in 1896 by the British Aluminum Company at Foyers near Loch Ness (Luckin 1990: 
118). But progress at developing Scotland's hydro potential was slow in the interwar years 
dogged by conflict over private ownership from Scottish nationalists and its aesthetic and 
landscape effects from conservationists. It was only with the creation of the North Scotland 
Hydro-Electric Board in 1943, dedicated to providing social benefits and economic 
regeneration of the Highlands, that there was substantial dam building. 
Worldwide from the 1930 there was great publicity for dam projects with its engineers obtaining 
a heroic status. As Basalla commented hydro-clectricity was "seen as a perfect, almost magical 
form of enere'which would "lead to the decentralisation of society and to the establishment 
of a utopian socieV' (Basalla 1982: 3 1). This euphoria reached its peak during the New Deal 
era in the United States with the TVA intended to serve as a showcase for the positive linkage of 
electricity, decentralization and citizen participation in reclamation of the landscape. Naturally it 
failed to live up to its utopian expectations, and to Carey and Quirk it demonstrated the ': folly of 
identifying technical projects with the creation of democratic community" (1970: 237). 
In the post colonial era in the 1950s leaders of the newly independent nations in Africa saw dam 
building as symbols of modernity and independence, the most famous case being President 
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Nasser and the Aswam dam in Egypt. Dams served political purposes, and as John McNeill, the 
environmental historian, remarked (2000: 157): 
"Communists, democrats, colonialists and anticolonialists all saw some appeal in big 
dams. Governments like the image they suggested: an energetic, determined state capable 
of taming rivers for the social good Dams helped to legitimate governments andpopularize 
leaders, something the United States needed more than ever in the depression year, and 
something Stalin, Nehru, Nasser, Nkrumah, and others all sought". 
The TVA was promoted post-war to other countries as a model of dam building for social 
democracy under the rhetoric rubric of 'Universal Electrification', and more discretely as a 
weapon in the Cold War, an idea later implemented by nuclear power under the 'Atoms for 
Peace' program. However there was increasing opposition post-war by conservationists in the 
United States and Germany to the building of massive dams that would alter landscapes and 
adversely effect downstream ecosystems. The building of large dams became a focal point of 
national environmental protest because they were highly visible and disruptive projects (Rudig 
and Lowe 1986: 279). In the US, the Sierra Club's campaign from 1950 to 1955 against the 
building of a dam at Echo Park, in Dinosaur National Monument, was successful and marked a 
return by that organization to national campaigning after an absence of over three decades 
following its damaging and divisive campaign against the Hetch Hetchy dam in the early years 
of the century. 
The Hetch Hetchy dam controversy has assumed mythic status amongst many commentators, a 
battle lost to the utilitarians but the war won by conservationist to protect national parks. As 
Neuzil and Kovarik remarked (1996: 125): 
"Retch Retchy's effect on the conservation movement divides scholars andpoliticians. 
Many take a lost-the-battle, won-the- war view. On the winning side: No part of a national 
park has since been appropriatedfor such a project'. 
The battle was a key mobilization point for conservationists around the country, but the Sierra 
Club, despite John Muir's efforts, was split on the issue, which involved for Californians many 
complex political and social issues over water rights, the public control of utilities, and the role 
of national parks. " Muir, who died in 1914, soon after the battle was lost, was seen by many as a 
martyr for the conservationist's cause, and a victory did come with the creation of the National 
Parks Service in 1916. However the Sierra Club did not fare well, there being a significant 
minority opposed to Muir's position- a Sierra Club poll of its members in 1910 voted 589 to 
161 for Muir's position -and eventually about 50 members resigned (Neuzil and Kovarik 1996: 
125 n4). As Stewart Udall comments in his memoirs the Sierra Club after the death of Muir 
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"became little more than a regional hiking club, preoccupied with the resources in its own 
backyard" (Udall 1988: 206). It was only rejuvenated in the 1950s with the appointment of 
David Brower, as its first executive director, who led, together with the Wilderness Society, a five 
year campaign to save Dinosaur National Monument (see Gottlieb 1993: 41-3). 
The significance of the conservationist's victory at Echo Park was well appreciated by one of its 
leading opponents, Congressman Wayne Aspinall of Colorado when he declared "If we let them 
[the conservationists] knock out Echo Park dam, we hand them a tool they'll use for the next 
hundred years" (quoted in Brooks 1980: 248). As Paul Brooks commented, the 'tool' was 
nothing less than public awareness that the national parks and monuments had been created for 
the use and enjoyment of all people, and were thus inviolate (Brooks 1980: 248). By the early 
1960s most conservationists supported nuclear power as a preferred alternative to dam building. 
As John Wills commented (2001: 453): 
"The American conservationist lobby vilified hydroelectric projects as concrete behemoths 
threatening large-scale disruptions of river ecosystems, while welcoming talk of ecologically 
benign, setr-contained atomic energy facilities. However supportfor the peaceful atom 
wavered when atomic developers chose sites of specific interest to the conservation lobby". 
In the early 1960s the siting of nuclear power plants and their potential impact on scenic 
resources caused controversy for the Sierra Club. " The first site proposed by the Pacific Gas 
and Electric (PG&E) utility on the Californian coast was at Bodega Bay, which was eventually 
abandoned as unsuitable after the discovery of the San Andreas Fault beneath it; the site was 
turned into a nature reserve (Wellock 1998: 17-61; Wills 2001: 465). Some of the Sierra Club's 
executive then worked closely with PG&E to find an acceptable site, eventually deciding to 
support PG&E's choice of the Nipomo Dunes. David Brower and others protested the club 
endorsement of Nipomo Dunes site, questioned its decision making protest and whether the club 
should participate in such deals. A bitter organizational conflict ensued which almost split the 
club, led to the firing of Brower and a shakc-out of the club's leaders (Wellock 1998: 68-69; 
Gottlieb 1993: 46; 334: n68). " Ile Nipomo Dunes was abandoned in favour of a site of Diablo 
Canyon, where a reactor was built. 
There was similar opposition in Britain to the use of remote coastal sites for nuclear power 
stations, particular by Max Nicholson at the Dungeness Inquiry in 1958 (see section 2.2.4). Also 
the post-war building of hydroelectric plants in Wales did not go unopposed by conservation 
groups such as the CPRE. The opposition was on amenity and landscape grounds, particularly 
over developments in Snowdonia National Park. " Ilowevcr by 1971 the CEGB, through its 
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attention to environmental impacts, had much less opposition with its next large pumped storage 
scheme at Dinorwig (Sheail 1991: 203-6). 
7.2 The Nuclear Age 
The atomic utopia began, according to Basalla (1982: 33-5), with the promotion of atomic 
energy by Frederick Soddy in his 1909 book The Interpretation of Radium. Soddy was a 
leading nuclear physicists as well as popular author and public lecturer, and Basalla believed he 
began the process of mythicizing atomic energy as an inexhaustible supply of power, which 
could be used to transform society, and heralding the possibility of an atomic utopia. But as 
Brian Easlea, a historian of science, points out Soddy also gave us the image of atomic dystopia, 
with Soddy warning us that a single mistake might not mean the smiling Garden of Eden but 
extremely disastrous consequences for mankind, perhaps a return to conditions of the Stone 
Age or even worse (Easlea 1983: 50). 
Soddy's views on atomic energy had a great impact on the public, and inspired H. G. Wells to 
write his famous science fiction novel The World Set Free, (subtitled A Story ofMankind) 
published in 1914. Wells explicitly dedicated his book to Soddy's 71e Interpretation of Radium, 
and gave the world the first vision of what he called the 'atomic bomb'. As Basalla remarked 
Soddy's scientific work and his prophetic statements were seized upon by H. G. Wells, who then 
"explored the pessimistic strain in Soddy's thought by writing a novel, 771e World Set Free 
(1914), in which the atom wasfirst used in a devastating world war" (Basalla 1982: 33). This 
world war is dated forl956 and presents a very bleak picture of the horrors of atomic warfare 
with hundreds of cities destroyed. Later in the book the atom is used for peaceful purposes and 
it concludes with a cultural renaissance spawned by atomic power. This novel was highly 
influential in giving us conflicting images of atomic power, which were utilized by future 
science fiction writers. As Basalla concluded "21e Morld Set Free might well stand as a symbol 
of the ambiguous response of Western men and women to atomic power. The choice was utopia 
or oblivion, The Garden of Eden or Armageddo" (Basalla 1982: 33). 
While other authors do not dispute the impact of Soddy's 1909 book and Wells' 1914 novel, 
they see the roots of nuclear euphoria (and ambiguity) dating back fiirthcr to the discovery of 
X-rays and radium at the end of the 19th century. The discovery of the phenomenon of 
radioactivity in 1896 due to X-ray emissions from radium, led to a 'radium craze' amongst the 
public beginning in 1903 (Badash 1979). Radioactivity was seen as scientific miracle with a wide 
range of positive health effects. Newspaper coverage in the early 20th Century was strongly 
positive, even though it was acknowledged that exposure to radium causes bums and eventual 
death. Scientists who died were considered as 'martyrs to science', and the press, scientists and 
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industry all promoted the view that the benefits of radium, particularly for 'curing' cancer, 
strongly outweighed any hazards. "' This aggressive support for radium and popular interest in 
all atomic discoveries must be seen in the context of the strong support for science and 
technology, which in the 1930s led to the utopian ideology of 'scientism, an unshakeable 
belief in the virtues of the scientific method. Similarly Stephen Hilgartner and his colleagues 
believed that the excessive belief in and promotion of atomic energy led to 'nukespeak', which 
they describe as the language of the nuclear mindset - the world view or system of beliefs of 
nuclear developers. They wrote (Hilgartner et al 1983: xiii): 
"euphoric visions of nuclear technologies are an important expression of the nuclear 
mindset. The discovery ofX-rays and radium at the end of the 19th Century brought 
forward visions of a technological Garden of Eden. The philosopher's stone and the elixir 
of life had been found at last". 
The discovery of nuclear fission produced by U-235 in 1938 unleashed a torrent of similar 
imagery: nuclear-powered planes and automobiles would whisk us effortlessly around the globe, 
while unlimited nuclear electricity powered underground cities, farms, and factories (see 
illustrations in Langer 1940; also in Popular Mechanics January 1941, p3). While the 
destructive possibilities of atomic energy were acknowledged, these were swept away by the 
argument that U-235 was too valuable to waste as an explosive and "Industrious, powerfiul 
nations and clever, aggressive races can win at peace far more than could ever be won at war" 
(Langer 1940: 18). Langer's article in 1940 in the popular US magazine Colliers is an example, 
perhaps extreme, of the then utopian projections of the technical and social transformations that 
U-235 would have on society. While his technologies of nuclear-powered planes soaring to 50 
miles above the surface of the earth and off-road automobilcs roaming the planet were the stock 
of 1930s sci-fi fantasies, his social predictions of the end of poverty, class and war were the 
product of pre-war scientism and faith in social engineering, inspired by admiration for the 
Soviet Union and satirized in novels like Brave New Morld. Langer boldly declared that wc are 
entering (1940: 18): 
,6... a period of unparalleled richness and opportunities for all. Privilege and class 
distinction and other sources of social uneasiness and bitterness will become relics because 
things that make up the good life will be so abundant and inexpensive. Mar itsel(will 
become obsolete because of the disappearance of these economic stresses that immemorially 
have caused it". 
The main problems seen in this future are boredom caused by excessive consuraption, 
uniformity of living standards and lack of novelty. While there may be 'eccentrics and 
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criminals' who might want to use U-235 for 'destructive purposes', this problem Langer 
believed can be overcome by ensuring "that the citizens of the future be educated better than 
they are now with respect to their social responsibilities". If this is not sufficient then eugenics 
can be used, with Langer warning that "Certain kinds of abnormalities will have to be overcome 
or their possessors destroyed' (Langer 1940: 54). Finally Langer proposes a system of 
'proliferation' control saying that "society will have to keep track of all the Uranium produced 
and refined, and take action at once against any individual who tries to accumulate a 
dangerous supply" (Langer 1940: 54). 
Despite its utopian predictions and upbeat message Langer's article unwittingly re-emphasizes 
Soddy's warning three decades earlier, about the possibilities of nuclear destruction if sufficient 
care is not taken. How to exercise this care was to occupy the minds of the more thoughtful 
nuclear advocates for the next three decades, culminating in Alvin Weinberg's proposal for an 
'nuclear priesthood' to watch over us for generations to come (Weinberg 1972). 111 
7.2.1 The atomic bomb: Doomsday or paradise 
After the dropping of the two atomic bombs on Japan in 1945 there was a rush by publishers to 
produce books on the new atomic age. The first was The Atomic Age Opens by Donald Geddes, 
a 256 page paperback compendium of news stories, editorials and pronouncements by world 
leaders, which along with other books, such as Atomic Energy in the Coming Era by David Dietz, 
gave detailed description of the coming atomic utopia. 
The atomic bomb caused intense public debate in the United States on the morality of using 
atomic weapons, and fear and anxiety about the consequences of atomic warfare (Boyer 1985). 
T'he public were presented with two conflicting visions of the atomic future, and journalists gave 
their readers the image of society being at a nuclear crossroads. However this public anxiety 
faded in a year or two to be largely replaced with a post war nuclear euphoria. David 
Lilienthal"', the first Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission created in 1946, helped 
popularize this optimism writing in The Natio in 1946 of "the almost limitless beneficial 
applications of atomic energy" (Lilienthal 1946: 41) while in the mass circulation magazine 
Newswee they wrote about the "miraculous powers of atomic-fission energy" (Ford 1982: 29). 
William Laurence, a well known writer for the New York Time was an enthusiastic promoter of 
what Ililgartncr calls the 'the sunny side of the atom'. In an article in 1948 for the mass 
circulation Woman's Home Companion entitled 'Paradise or Doomsday'. Laurence wrote in 
utopian tones, saying that humanity, had with his knowledge of how to hamcss the enormous 
power of the atom for good or for evil, had been "given a chance to enter a New Eden" and 
that atomic energy gave man a most powerM tool for "abolishing disease and poverty, anxiety 
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andjear" (Laurence 1948: 33). Furthermore Laurence, enthused, provided man managed to 
avert the disaster that could transform him and all his works into 'a cloud of dust', he had in 
atomic energy 'a very philosophers stone' with which he could "remold the world nearer to his 
heart's desire" (Laurence 1948: 75). As Hilgartner comments nuclear advocates after 1945 
promoted the 'sunny side of the atom' downplaying economic and proliferation problems 
(Hilgartner et al 1983: xiv): 
"Once atomic energy was applied for peaceful purposes, a nuclear powered paradise 
would be at hand. Electricity 'too cheap to meter' would power the new Golden Age. No 
problem would be too difficult to solve quickly and economically. Reactors would operate 
safely the disposal of radioactive waste would be a nonproblem; international safeguards 
would allow the benefits of the peaceful atom to spread to every nation while preventing the 
spread of nuclear bomb". 
However as the coming atomic utopia failed to be realized by the early 1950s there was 
increasing public scepticism despite an optimistic facade from its chief promoter the AEC. In 
private many scientists were pessimistic. In a report dated July 1947 to the AEC Robert 
Oppenheimer, the creator of the atomic bomb and post war 'atomic hero', wrote "it does not 
appear hopeful to use natural uranium directly as an adequate source offuelfor atomic 
power" (Ford 1982: 33). Thus by the early 1950s, no AEC statement could conceal the basic 
fact that the era of atomic power was not arriving quickly, because of the reluctance of utilities 
to invest in a completely untried technology. 
As Daniel Ford remarked the "euphoria of the early post war years gave way to gloom about 
the prospects of an atomiefuture" and leading magazines like Newsweek wrote at the end of 
1950, "As yet no deserts have burst into bloom, no polar icecaps have melted away. The brave 
new world of cheap and abundant atomic power seems more remote than it didjust aj? er the 
war" (Ford 1982: 36). 
7.2.2 Atoms for Peace 
In the early 1950s the dream of atomic energy had stalled, despite popular enthusiasm. Some 
economists openly expressed doubts as to its economic feasibility and practicality, and there was 
little immediate prospect and much disagreement on any likely timetable for the construction of 
a commercial nuclear power station. What revitalized the atomic dream and launched a 
commercial program was the 'Atoms for Peace ' speech by President Eisenhower on 8 
December 1953 at the UN. It marked a major shift in government atomic policy ending the 
government monopoly on nuclear power, and rekindled the idea of a nuclear utopia. Ile urged 
that nuclear materials be used for peaceful purposes and to "provide abundant electrical energy 
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in the power-starved areas of the world" and stated that "The United States knows that peaceful 
powerfrom atomic energy is no dream of thefuture. That capability, already proved, is here- 
now- today" (Ford 1982: 40). 
Once again the atomic visionaries rushed into print repeating the old 1940 predictions with a 
few new ones. There would be nuclear powered planes, trains, ships, and rockets; nuclear energy 
would genetically alter crops and preserve grains and fish; and nuclear reactors would generate 
very cheap electricity. New was the idea of using nuclear explosive to alter the landscape -a 
scheme to achieve notoriety as 'Project Ploughshare. 
The most famous phrase of the this era, and one that was to haunt the nuclear industry forever 
more, was uttered by Lewis Strauss, a former Wall Street investment banker, and the new 
chairman of the AEC in his speech to the National Association of Science Writers on 16 
September 1954. Strauss set out the themes that the AEC wanted the media to present to the 
public. Electric power from the atom, he said, could be available, according to the AECs experts, 
in': fromfive tofifteen years, depending on the vigour of the development effort". Ile then went 
on to give his vision of the atomic utopia saying "It is not too much to expect that our children 
will enjoy in their homes electrical energy too cheap to meter, will know ofgreat periodic 
regionalfamines in the world only as matters of history, will travel effortlessly over the seas and 
under them and through the air with a minimum of danger and at great speeds, and will 
experience a life spanfar longer than ours... This is theforecastfor an age ofpeace" (quoted 
in Ford 1982: 49-50). 
The phrase 'too cheap to meter' has become the cliche of the nuclear age and the stick with 
which the anti-nuclear campaigners from 1970 continually reminded the public about the failed 
promises of the nuclear promoters. 101 However Strauss was only repeating the dream of atomic 
promoters since 1940, when Rudolph Langer first said that in the'forthcoming atomic age 
"Energy has become so cheap that it isn't worth making a charge for it" (Langer 1940: 19). 
While the year before Strauss' speech, Ralph Lapp" in his book The New Force had repeated 
an earlier prediction by Robert Hutchins that "heat, light and power.. will be so cheap that 
their cost can hardly be reckoned' (Quoted in Ford 1982: 30). 
In his speech Lewis Strauss invited his audience of science writers to 'work together' with the 
AEC and its scientists to educate the public about the atom and its promise.,,, As Daniel Ford 
commented (1982: 50): 
"From the laudatory articles on nuclear energy that appeared over the next two decades- 
and the rarity of any critical coverage of the potential hazards- it is evident that the 
national media responded to the Chairman's invitation as he had intended'. 
144 
1bus with unquestioning support from the media, and unqualified endorsement by Congress 
and the Administration, the advocates of a large nuclear power program proceeded, 
unchallenged, with their ambitious enterprise. They were aided by the stream of euphoric books, 
with titles such as Our Friend the Atom by Heinz Haber and The Fabulous Future edited by 
Fortune magazine. Ilere were even films, such as The Genie and the Bottle, a 1956 book turned 
into a Walt Disney film (Hilgartner 1982: 33). 
The book The Fabulous Future is subtitled 'America in 1980' and has a series of essays on 
what life in America should be like written by leading figures in US political and social life, 
including Earl Warren, Adlai Stevenson and John von Neumann, then a board member of the 
AEC. Unlike his fellow contributor, the industrialist David Sarnoff, who stated that "it can be 
taken for granted that before 1980- ships, aircraft, locomotives and even automobiles will be 
atomically fueled" (Sarnoff 1956: 17), von Neumann is less optimistic about atomic technology 
seeing its destructive side. In his essay, Can we Survive Technology, he only gives a page out of 
his 15 pages to nuclear power, saying that the future lay not with steam generating fission 
reactors but with exploitation of 'still more abundant modes' (an oblique reference to the fast 
breeder"' or the possibilities of fusion energy). Given steady development he believed that "in 
afew decades hence energy may befree -just like unmetered air" (Neumann 1956: 37). 
In this technologically optimistic era there were few people who publicly raised the question of 
the harmful consequences of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, such as radiation hazards and 
waste disposal. These adverse consequences were known to scientists right from the beginning of 
atomic energy, as they were during the early years of the 20th century during the era of the 
'radium craze'. As early as May 1940 a report for the National Academy of Sciences talked of 
'Radioactive poisons' as products of atomic fission (Basalla 1982: 34). As Basalla commented 
(1982: 34): 
"In all . this euphoria there werejew who discussed radioactive wastes, the dangers of 
radiation, or the possibility of a dangerous accident at a nuclear generating plant. All 
these issues had been raisedpublicly by scientists, but layman and nuclear expert alike were 
all caught in the grips of a myth that portrayed atomic energy as perfect, inexhaustible, and 
utopian in its social implication". 
7.2.3 Nuclear Power comes on line 
After Eisenhower's 'Atoms for Peace' speech in December 1953 there was rapid commercial 
development of nuclear power. Construction started on the first reactor in September 1954 at 
Shippingport and on 18th July 1955 the reactor came on line. Following this success the Atoms 
for Peace rhetoric continued with the issue in July 1955 of an Atoms for Peace stamp (see 
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Hilgartncr 1982: 48 for illustrations of it), and in August 1955, the first UN Conference on the 
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, in Geneva. The pace of commercial nuclear power 
development quickened from December 1963 when General Electric offered a fixed price 
(turnkey) contract to building the Oyster Creek power station. By the end of 1966 another 
eleven turnkey contracts were signed together with 16 other contracts (Cohn 1997: 46). 
The rapid expansion of nuclear power in the US in the 1960s was, according to Steven Cohn, 
partly due to the public's buoyant faith in business and public leaders and their faith in the 
ability of science and technology to unambiguously solve social and economic problems (1997: 
18). Even those who expressed criticism of American society and its political structures saw 
nuclear power as a liberating influence. For instance in 1962 the founding document, The Port 
Huron Statement, of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) declared "Our monster cities, 
based historically on the needfor mass labor, might now be humanized, broken into smaller 
communities, powered by nuclear enere'(Miller 1987: 364). By the mid 1960s with a large 
nuclear programme underway the dream of atomic energy and an all electric future seemed 
imminent. A 1967 Westinghouse pamphlet entitled Infinite Energy declared that nuclear fission 
96 will gives us all the power we need and more. 71at's what it's all about. Power seemingly 
without end. Power to do everything man is destined to do ..... the hope and exuberance of 
boundless energy. We have found what might be called perpetual youth" (Quoted in Ililgartner 
et al 1982: 190). The illustration in this pamphlet of the future gave a vision of the all-clcctric 
future, a world very similar to that drawn in Langer's article in 1940, of homes with movable 
roofs, indoor farming, and computer operated agricultural machines. 
Nuclear researchers such as James Lane"', pointed to graphs showing falling nuclear costs and 
the continued historic decline in electricity prices, and using trend projection exclaimed boldly 
in August 1968 that the "over-all result may lead to fitut'llment of the age old dream of 
electricity too cheap to meter" (Quoted in Ifilgartner et al 1982: 189). As the US anti-nuclear 
movement gathered pace in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the nuclear vision remained 
unabated by its advocates. In 1971 Glenn Seaborg, the head of the AEC from 1961-71, and 
William Corliss published their book Man and the. 4tom subtitled Building a New Morld through 
Nuclear Technology. In predictions for 2000 they forecast that "nuclearpower would be a 
phenomenal success bringing unimagined benefits for the greater part of humaniv'(Smil 
1993: 152). While Daniel Ford described the book as a "a visionary dream of atomic-powered 
plenV' with atomic energy as "a magician's potion that would free industrial society 
permanently from all practical bounds" (1982: 23). Seaborg believed that the future of 
civilization was in the hands of the nuclear scientists who formed the elite team that would 
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"build a new world through nuclear technoloe' (quoted in Ford 1982: 23). The nuclear 
dream was still the same as three decades ago with Ford commenting on Seaborg's vision (Ford 
1982: 23): 
"The deserts could be made to bloom, sea water could be made potable, mountains could 
be moved, rivers diverted- all as a result, he prophesied of : planetary engineering' made 
possible by the miraculous new element that he had discovered. There could be vast ' 
farming and manufacturing centres, or 'agro-industrial complexes, built around giant 
nuclear electric-generating stations- each nuclear power plant surrounded by its own little 
Eden". 
Seaborg was an enthusiastic promoter of the use of nuclear bombs to reshape the landscape and 
alter nature, a scheme that had official US government backing in the form of Project 
Ploughshare. Scaborg wrote "All of humanity's efforts to restore the Garden of Eden have been 
futile so far. Man's machines have not been powerful enough to compete with theforces of 
nature" (Quoted in Hilgartner et al 1982: 50). 
7.2.4 Nuclear euphoria in Britain 
In Britain the 1955 White Paper (IHMSO 1955), on the first nuclear power programme, was 
greeted with acclaim by the press, which followed it up with glowing reports on the triumphal 
opening of Calder Hall by the Queen in October 1956 (see Welsh 2000: 56-8). After the Suez 
Crisis in 1956, the Government took the opportunity to triple the expansion of the nuclear 
industry with nearly all the establishment and the media seeing nuclear power as part of "the 
white heat of an oil-free technology that would bring Britain into a new age ofprosperity 
(O'Riordan 1986: 42). 
However there were critics of this hasty policy of nuclear expansion using an unproven reactor 
system, the Magnox. The Time commented "Atomic energy has the power to evokefantasics. 
It is not only looked on as an 'answer to Suez but as afairy godmother source of cheap 
electricity" (Times 1957). It further cautioned against prophets who visualize that in twenty 
years time there will be "electricity on tap in every home like water, laid onfor a lowfixed 
charge irrespective of the quantities consumed% 
Ile Time unswayed by the myth of cheap atomic energy warned that "The hardfact is that 
electricityfrom thefirst atomic power stations will be dearer, not cheaper, to generate than 
power made in new coal-based stations" (Times 1957). 
One internal critic, who went public, was Kenneth Stretch (see section 2.1.1) who questioned 
both the cost forecasts for nuclear electricity and the wisdom of so large a commitment to one 
reactor system (Stretch 1958). However as Welsh remarks "Such concerns could scarcely be 
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heard within the overall climate of adulation" (Welsh 2000: 64). Even internal critics like 
Hinton who viewed the trebling of the programme as 'complete madness' refused to support 
Stretch and only publicly acknowledged the truth of Stretch's critique in 1975 (Welsh 2000: 
64). 109 
I'liere was further nuclear euphoria in May1965 with the decision to choose the AGR, rather 
than the LWR, for Dungeness. This bought rave reviews for the nuclear industry with Williams 
writing "Echoing 1955 the British press gave the AGR's success an enthusiastic, and mostly 
uncritical, reception. Yhe stock words were used: 'triumph, 'breakthrough'. 'decisive advantage' 
" (Williams 1980: 145). Criticism of the AGR by Duncan Bum (1967) was brushed aside by 
euphoric politicians, including Tony Benn. 
The claims for the utopian benefits of nuclear power were heard during the debate over the 
proposed Stourport reactor in 1970. Its chief supporter Cllr. Stanley Jones, the chairman of 
local planning committee was quoted, in a front page story in the local newspaper under the 
headline 'Stourport a 'Boom' Town', as saying "everyone will get very prosperous from the 
il 00 m station", as several thousand workers would be employed, (KS 23 January 1970: 1). 
However the following week a rival paper the KT&SN (30 January 1970: 12) commented on his 
claims by saying "... many people will need more convincing proof that the erection of the 
E100,000,000 plus nuclear station will indeed bring greater benefits to the majority of the 
inhabitants". 
In response to such criticism of the nuclear station Jones used, in an article entitled 'Nuclear 
Power will bring better life for Millions, the standard pro-nuclear arguments of the need for 
more electricity due to economic growth and the threat of power shortages if the stati6n was not 
built (KS 20 February 1970: 11). However his 'boomtown' claims were dismissed by a fellow 
councillor A. Hall who said that this "cannot be substantiated by thefacts" and in fact fewer 
people would be employed in the new nuclear station than at the current coal-fired station (KS 
20 March 1970). 
The tendency of local officials to be blinded by the supposed benefits of nuclear power was also 
evident at the Portskewett Inquiry in 1971 where it was reported that the public of Portskcwctt 
had 'lost all confidence' in their elected county officials because of "their excessive 
enthusiasm... in projecting the merits of nuclear power" and their 'subservience' to the CEGB 
(DTI 1971b: 32). By then there was no longer confidence in government experts and thcrc was a 
new found willingness to listen to dissenting scientists like Sternglass, Gofman and T=plin. As 
one local objector said "Atomic energy was afield which hadfar too many experts in it. One 
wonders which expert was right and which was wrone' (DTI 197 1 b: 45). 
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7.2.5 The end of the nuclear dream 
By the early 1970s disillusionment had once again set in with the nuclear dream, as it had in the 
late 1940s, as it failed to deliver. This time the factors that had supported its rejuvenation in the 
mid 1950s were under attack, namely public trust in business and government leaders and faith 
in the ability of science and technology to solve social and economic problems. The problems 
with nuclear power, were as always still with it, but now the public no longer had faith in the 
ability of government, business and science to solve them. Since the early years of the 20th 
century there had always been ambivalence amongst the public about the benefits of atomic 
energy and leadership by technocrats, and these cultural countercurrents, submerged during the 
post war era , resurfaced in late 1960s. As Steven Cohn commented "Cultural ambivalence 
towards nuclear energy quietly persisted, however, emerging publicly in the late 1960S and 
early 1970s when a different social context permitted bundles of cultural beliefy to reach critical 
mass and capture social influence" (Cohn 1997: 20). 
The nuclear advocates claimed that their critics were unduly pessimistic, and were acting as 
prophets of doom. As early as 1955 Fred Cottrell, discussing speculation on the impact of 
atomic power, wrote "The prophets of doom say it will condemn man to a return to the cave" 
but more optimistically "there are those who see in atomic energy the basisfor a brave new 
world, in which war is impossible and men arefreedfrom the necessity to work" (Cottrell 1955: 
1). He saw the introduction of new energy sources always giving rise to this speculation of doom 
or utopia, and concluded "man has only abandoned one source of energyfor another because 
of the prospect of overwhelming advantage, and then with reluctance" (1955: 1). So what of 
the dreams of the atomic age bringing unimagined benefits for most of the humanity? Vaclav 
Smil concluded "none of this has come to pass, and the retreat of nuclear generation has 
almost been certainly the costliest technical miscalculation of the 20th Century" (1993: 152). 
Hilgartner and his colleagues lay the blame for the failure of nuclear power on the 'nuclear, 
mindset' of its promoters arguing that (Hilgartner et at 1982: xiv): 
"Time and time again, nuclear developers have confused their hopes with reality, publicly 
presented their expectations and assumptions as facts, covered up damaging information, 
harassed andfired scientists who disagreed with established policy, refused to rccognke the 
existence ofproblems, called their critics mentally III, generatedfalse or misleading statistics 
to bolster their assertions, failed to learn from their mistakes, and claimed that there was no 
choice but tofollow their policies". 
A more measured response is from Steven Cohn who sees the tragedy behind an idcalistic 
venture, and he ends his book with the words (1997: 318): 
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"The sad conclusion from my perspective is that the nuclear dream has not worked out. The 
technology has failed and should be put aside until other energy options have been 
exhausted and the industrial subculture that nurtured thefirst nuclear era dismantled. Ifind 
this a sad conclusion because the nuclear dream was compelling, the imaginations behind 
it were talented, and the human energy and economic wealth mobilized to pursue it were 
enormous". 
7.3 Solar energy: a long standing dream 
The belief in the possibility of a utopia powered by solar energy is long standing, dating back to 
the Renaissance if not beyond. 'I'This belief faded in the early 20th century, as the appeal of 
hydro and nuclear power asserted themselves, but was reborn in the late 20th century as these 
two energy sources fell from favour. Solar energy, renamed 'natural', 'renewable' or even 
'sustainable' energy, is now seen as an essential part of the move to a 'sustainable' society 
which while not a utopian one still possesses much ecological and social virtue (Scheer 2002). 
Solar energy is used in its widest sense, encompassing energy not only directly from the sun but 
also indirectly from wind, waves, the tides, and water (but not from large dams), and from 
biomass sources (such as from trees or agricultural residues). "' 11at is energy from sources 
which are not depletable, hence the term 'renewable' or 'sustainable' (Boyle 1996). Dasalla 
points out that the sun and its life giving powers has long standing religious and mystical 
associations dating back millennia. He remarked "there exists an ancient and pervasive solar 
mythology which has influenced all subsequent responses to the sun. No otherform of energy 
has come to us with the rich symbolic overtones associated with the sun" (Basalla 1982: 36). 
7.3.1 19th Century Solar Utopias 
Given that until the Industrial Revolution, and the widespread use of coal, there was no life, heat 
or power without the sun, it. is entirely understandable that old utopias were ccntrcd around the 
sun, and that the ancient myths and symbolism of the sun as the source of life, wealth and health 
should persist until today. Intimately associated with solar energy is the idea of small 
communities, generally agricultural and decentralized, living in 'harmony with nature', and this 
was a staple of utopian fiction in the 19th century. 
One utopian work that gave detailed consideration to using solar energy was by John Aldolphus 
Etzlcr, a German living in Pittsburgh. In his 1833 work entitled A Paradise Mthin the Reach of 
All Men, Without Labour, by Powers of Nature and Machinery, Etzler proposed the creation of a 
Paradise based on material luxury within ten years simply by harnessing the planct's cost-frce 
energy sources - the wind, the waves, the tides and the sun.. His pamphlet contains detailed 
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mathematical calculations of the power that would accrue and simple descriptions of the 
machines needed to access and store it. His belief was that "Nature affords infinite powers and 
wealth", and its exploitation should be the basis for a more perfect society (Greenberg 1990: 
693). However as John Carey, a chronicler of utopias, comments (Carey 1999: 229): 
"Unlike modern advocates of natural energy, Etzler was not concerned to preserve the 
environment. Very much the contrary: he wanted to change it entirely. Mountains will be 
flattened, rivers willflow in vitrified channels, deserts willflower". 
The natural world would be completely remoulded to man's taste. Etzler proposed that 
America's large forests be 'ground to dust' and then 'cemented by liquor', to provide a 
$universal building material', rather like plastic wood. This would then be moulded by 
machinery to any shape and, if required vitrified, so that it will be virtually indestructible and 
will 'radiate with a crystal-like brilliancy'. Mankind will live in an immense sculpture park, the 
greenery tastefully interspersed with porticoes, foundations and statues, all dazzling to look at. 
Dolores Greenberg, an American historian, believed that Etzler's treatise had a big influence on 
later 19th century utopian thought, particularly on Robert Owen, especially Etzler's idea of 
"abundance without labour, the product of harnessing the energy of the sun, the tides, the 
water and the wind" (Greenberg 1990: 693). However Etzler's idea of utopia as luxurious 
living did not appeal to all, especially Henry Thoreau. He read it with 'deep disfavour' and in 
an 1843 review deplored its emphasis on "gross comfort and pleasure at the expense of the 
higher life" (Carey 1999: 230). According to Carey it seems to have set Thoreau thinking, and 
little more than a year later he built his wooden hut on the edge of Walden Pond and began his 
two year retreat from materialism and the pressures of civilization, described in his classic 
Walden, or Life in the Woods (1854). 
By the late 19th and early 20th century, due to technical advances and mass production, 
renewable energy devices had become widespread, particularly windmills for water pumping in 
the North American plains, solar water heaters in California and Florida, and solar power,, plants 
to produce steam (Butti and Perlin 1980). There was also electricity production from hydro and 
geothermal power. The 'Back to the Land' movement in Britain in the late 19th century praised 
the virtues of small communities and the preservation of nature, and saw electricity from 
hydropower as allowing an escape from cities to the countryside (Gould 1988: 81). The outlook 
for solar energy looked bright, and writers choose it for their rural utopias, contrasting it to the 
evils of urban societies based on coal. William Morris, in his famous utopia, Newsfrom Nowhere 
(18 90), has society powered by electricity generated from wind and water power, while Jules 
Verne in his 1890s short story, In the 29th Century, uses wind, water, solar and geothermal 
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energy; and H. G. Wells has wind and water power (monopolized by Windvane and Waterfall 
Trust) in When the Sleeper Awakes (18 99). While in the 1903 book, The Case of The Fox, 
William Stanley had his utopia powered by a multitude of renewable sources of energy. 112 
However after the First World War interest in solar power quickly declined due to the discovery 
of new sources of oil in Iraq and Iran. There was soon a world oil and gas glut, and solar energy 
disappeared from the public view until after the second World War. 
7.3.2 Solar v atomic energy 
After the second World War there were fuel shortages and rationing in the US and Britain, 
particularly for domestic consumers. There was a great debate about energy for the future, with 
warnings on oil running out, the possibility of cheap atomic power and the promise of solar 
energy. This debate was also set against public concern, raised by conservationists such as 
William Vogt (1948) and Fairfield Osborn (1948) about the dangers of world population 
growth and limits to food and natural resources. Thus the warnings in 1949 by King Hubbert, 
an oil geologist, on future fossil fuel shortages attracted much attention and Palmer Putnam, was 
commissioned in1949 by the AEC to write a report on long term (50 years) energy prospects. 
Putnam, whose book Powerfrom the Wind (1948) had been published the previous year, had 
much personal support for solar and wind power, but in his report he judged solar energy as too 
expensive, and the future energy solution he believed was with the development of nuclear 
power and the electrification of economy. "' This view was opposed by Farrington Daniel, who 
was a keen advocate of solar energy and a leading contributor to the debate about the merits of 
atomic and solar energy (Daniels 1949; 1950; Daniels et at 1949). "' Daniels and his colleagues 
agreed with the conservationists writing that "humanity is on an unrepeatable spending spree, 
that we are using up minerals and energy resources on an unprecedented scale, and that these 
will run out in the foreseeable future" (1949: 19). 
However the solar dream faded with the easing of post-war fuel shortages. New oil and gas 
resources were developed, and the US government committed itself to nuclear power. 
Nevertheless solar advocates persisted, forming the Association for Applied Solar Energy in 
1955, followed up by a World Symposium in Phoenix, Arizona in 1956. Until 1973 this was to 
be a era of cheap oil, but despite this there was a continuous strcam of books promoting solar 
energy, such as from D. S. Halacy (1957; 1963), Franklyn Branlcy (1959), Farrington Daniels 
(1964) and Brian Brinkworth (1972). Solar energy did not however disappear from policy view, 
but it was just considered as a 'backstop' or 'insurance' energy source in case of fossil fuel 
shortages or the failure of nuclear pow er. Typical of this viewpoint is Dennis Gabor who writing 
in 1963 said (Gabor 1964: 83): 
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"There is no need, however, to base our hopefor abundant energy supplies on fusion 
power only. We have seen that thefree and inexhaustible sources ofpower - wind, water, 
tides, geothermal and solar energy - are either too small or too unprofitable at the present 
time. But they could be large enough for a reasonable humanity which prefers civilization 
to numbers, nor will they be unprofitable at a time when oil is no longer there to gush out 
of the earth. Civilization need never be in dangerfor lack ofpower". 
7.3.3 Solar as Hip 
The revival of interest in solar energy (as a utopian energy source) amongst the public was 
started by the counterculture in the late 1960s in the US. One of the first examples was at Drop 
City, a drop out artist community in Colorado, where inspired by the hi-tech utopian writings of 
Buckminster Fuller, they built domes and a solar water heater (Rybczynski 1980: 90). This idea 
Of using free energy and DlY technology received wide publicity, and solar energy received 
extensive mention in Stewart Brand's seminal publication The Tnole Earth Catalog, first 
published in 1968. Brand set out to create a survival manual, and extolled alternative energy and 
the virtues of disconnecting yourself from the grid. In the Catalog Steve Baer "I reviewed 
Farrington Daniels' book, Direct Use of the Sun's Energy and said that it was (Brand 1968: 28): 
"Yhe best book on Solar Energy that I know of.. Any curious and intelligent person can 
learn a great deal about our planet and ourselves by reading this book about ways of using 
sunlight.. I read the book on a Greyhound bus in Texas two years ago and it has changed 
my life and my way of thinking". 
Solar energy was now not just for physicists but could be used by anyone with simple technical 
skills seeking energy independence. Technology, not rioting on the streets, was now the key to 
'revolution' in society. As Langdon Winner conunented the obsession with technology arose 
about the same time - from 1969 - as a general disillusionment with protest politics which had 
become too dangerous or depressing. He wrote (Winner 1986: 65): 
"It was during this period that many in the US dropped out ofpolitical activity and began 
a certain kind of sociolechnical tinkering: roofgardens, solar collectors, and windmills 
became a focus of community action". 
About this time came the belief that what was needed was a new type of technology, one that if 
used morally and ecologically could create a utopian society. This technology went by a wide 
variety of names, the earliest was 'Intermediate Technology' coined by Fritz Schumacher in 
1964 (Schumacher 1966). For the next ten Years a group of countercultural radicals, 
environmentalists, scientists and social activists discussed the concept and invented names like 
Appropriate, Alternative or Radical Technology, often shorted to 'AT'. There were n=crous 
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definitions of AT, each with long lists of attributes, but basically all agreed that AT had to be 
'cheap, simple and ecologically safe' (Kirk 2002: 362). Above all it had to use solar energy. 
There was an immense amount written on AT in the 1970s mostly by enthusiasts"', with 
recollection by two participants, Witold Rybczynski and Langdon Winner appearing in 1980. 
AT merged into the 'soft energy' movement based on energy efficiency and renewable energy, 
popularized by Amory Lovins (1977). This initially had a strong belief, like AT, that the choice 
of energy technology could radically alter society, but its utopian sentiments had to be toned 
down in the 1980s in order to succeed under the 'free market' ideology of the Reagan and 
Thatcher governments. 
Since then utopian sentiments have been strongly suspect, but solar energy now respectable as 
renewable energy is still being promoted as the solution to many of society's problems. In one 
of the few retrospective analyses of AT Andrew Kirk remarked that the AT movement's 
ihoughtful reevaluation of the role of technology in society "is perhaps the most significant 
and lasting contribution of the counterculture to American culture" (Kirk 2002: 355). Despite 
the high hopes of solar enthusiasts in the 21st century, couched in the new utopian language of 
global sustainability, Basalla's words of warning on believing in energy utopias from 1982 may 
still be relevant. Solar energy myths he warned "have been exposed as naive and unrealistically 
optimistic. Yhe energy of the sun will be utilized, but it will not be done soon; it will be more 
costly than we can imagine; it will not be without environmental problems; and it will notform 
the basisfor a new utopian way of life" (Basalla 1982: 38). 
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Conclusion 
Tle year 2003 is an ironic time to examine the myths of the nuclear age. Fifty years ago (on 8 
December 1953) President Eisenhower gave his Atoms for Peace speech which launched the 
nuclear age, to be the 'dream of the future'. However fifty years later we instead see the 
collapse, perhaps bankruptcy, of British Energy, the UK's main nuclear generator. Furthermore 
underlining this fall from grace is the stated refusal of the current Labour government, in its 
latest White Paper on Energy, to support the construction of any more nuclear power stations 
(DTI 2003). British Energy's demise is due partly to technical problems with old plant, but 
mainly due to financial problems caused by NETA, the new electricity trading arrangements, 
whereby the electricity wholesale price has been forced below the cost of nuclear generated 
electricity. Thus we are witnessing the end of one of the most famous myths of the nuclear age 
that has lasted for nearly 50 years, that electricity from nuclear power stations would become 
'too cheap to meter'. 
This Chapter pulls together the arguments and analyses made in this thesis, in particular arguing 
that existing accounts have been inadequate in some respects. It makes the following general 
points about the anti-nuclear movement and how it has been portrayed by observers: 
I- There were very mixed motives for the opposition to nuclear power, not all 'environmental'. 
2. There were two distinct yet related national campaigns against nuclear power in Britain, the 
first in the mid 1960s, the second in the mid 1970s. 
3. The origins of opposition to nuclear power are complex, but are best summarized as 
gnuclear fear'. 
4. There has been a tendency in the histories to concentrate on the role of FoE, and ignore 
other anti-nuclear groups and activists. 
5. The role of women activists has been neglected, due to an emphasis on technical and policy 
debate. 
Finally it poses the question of whethe r the current promotion of solar (and renewable) energy 
has the characteristics of 'energy utopianism', and if so is this likely to be successful at creating 
a sustainable future? Or will the opposition to its prescriptions (such as windfarms) emerge as it 
did to nuclear utopianism? 
8.1 Reasons for opposition 
iss 
What exactly were the campaigners against nuclear power opposed to? Their motives were 
diverse, ranging from NIMBY concerns through to opposition to capitalism. Motives for 
opposition to nuclear power can be divided into four categories: 
I- NMMY - opposition to any large scale development that threatens the status quo. 
2. Vested interest - opposition by the coal miners fearful of their jobs. ' 
3. Intellectual - based on aesthetic, ecological, ethical and economic reasons. 
4. Opportunistic - an opportunity by political groups to attack government policies. 
8.1.1 NIMBY concern 
NMIBY (Not in My Backyard) opposition is easy to understand and identify, and forms the 
bedrock of local opposition to proposals for nuclear plants. In its early days it was termed the 
Garnenity issues' lobby, that is people opposed to developments in unspoilt countryside. Partly 
this was out of aesthetic concern by urban intellectuals for preservation of outstanding scenery, 
and partly due to the rural aristocracy and middle class attempts to prevent economic 
developments that might undermine their privileges. Hence Anthony Crosland's allegations in a 
1971 Fabian society pamphlet about the conservation lobby being hostile to growth and having 
a manifest class bias that "reflects a set of middle- and upper-class valuejudgements Lfor which] 
preservation of the status quo is the sole consideration" (Crosland 1971). All large scale 
developments in rural areas will bring benefits and costs to different sections of society, and 
nuclear power was no exception. Communities were often divided over the issue, but the more 
vocal and well organized middle classes, organized into ad-hoc amenity societies, were better 
able to put their views across and drown out less well articulated working class support (Lowe 
1977: 53). This occurred in 1956 over the Bradwell and Hunterston nuclear stations - see 
Luckin (1990: 175) for details of class conflict at Bradwell. Welsh acknowledges, as many 
argued at the time, that the objectors at Bradwell and Hunterston could represent an attempt to 
protect commercial and landed interests. However he comments (2000: 89): 
" Whilst these may have formed the kernel of the objectors position tile evidence presented 
here demonstrates that they quickly attracted layer upon layer ofpublic concern over 
nuclear power and the ability of democratic institutions to maintain democratic process in 
the face of the technology. These are themes whieh have never disappeared but have grown 
over time". 
Later in the late 1970s, with the mushrooming of local groups opposed to proposed nuclear 
power stations, there were again accusations of NIMBYism with one sympathetic commentator 
saying "The people who join such groups would probably oppose a coal fired power station or 
an airport on the same site, and many are not perhaps, strictly anti-nuke" (Weightman 1979). 
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Ian Welsh however, defends local middle class opposition (in the early 1980s) to nuclear power 
stations from charges of NIMBYism, characterized he says by the media as "piece-meal, 
irrational responses based in parochial concerns"(Welsh 2000: 211). Ile argues that such local 
groups recognized the importance of opposing nuclear power nationally and hence developed 
links to a network of anti-nuclear organizations, such as the Anti-Nuclear Campaign (ANC) or 
SCRAM (Welsh 2000: 198). Thus while local nuclear opposition can be seen as NIMBY, it can 
redeem itself (in the eyes of sympathetic commentators) if it is willing to become part of a 
national network opposing nuclear power. To cynics this is simply 'greenwash' the adoption of 
an environmental position to finther self-interest. 
8.1.2 Vested interest 
The coal miners had a clear economic or 'vested interest' in opposing nuclear power, due to 
their determination to stop job losses in their industry. This opposition, by the coal miners, their 
union the NUM, their supporters in the Labour Party and the National Coal Board (NCB), in the 
mid 1960s to the expansion of nuclear power at the cost of coal has been overlooked by most 
historians of the anti-nuclear movement, and is covered in Chapter 2. The campaign was led by 
Alf Robens and Fritz Schumacher, at the National Coal Board, in the 1960s but ended in defeat 
in 1968. Robens, the NCB Chairman, wished to protect the coal industry from a too rapid shut 
down, and argued vociferously that nuclear power was being unfairly subsidized. Particular 
significance was the role played by Fritz Schumacher, then chief economist at the NCB, and later 
after the publication of his best seller Small is Beautiful (1973) a leading spokesmen for the 
environmental movement. Schumacher had a longstanding opposition to nuclear power dating 
back to the mid 1950s and he was actively involved in the 1970s campaign. Opposition to 
nuclear power from sections of the NUM continued in the 1970s with Arthur Scargill, its 
President, involved in the creation of Energy 2000, which was part of the opposition at the 
Windscale Inquiry in 1977. 
8.1.3 Intellectual dissent 
There was criticism of nuclear policies and siting based on aesthetic, ecological, ethical and 
economic reasons but these were until the mid 1970s largely confined to academic journals and 
small movement publications. There has always been critici of the government's nuclear 
policies, but these were brushed aside by the nuclear institutions determined to proceed with 
their plans. Dissent initially came from industry insiders, concerned about the feasibility of too 
rapid an expansion of the industry (Stretch 1958; 1961) followed by criticism from academics 
critical of nuclear economics (Goldring 1964) and the AGR reactor choice (Bum 1967). There 
was little public discussion of radiation or safety issues, until Schumacher raised the issue in a 
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speech in 1967, which proved highly controversial but was quickly forgotten (Schumacher 
1967a). Few people saw the linkages between nuclear weapons and nuclear power, and whilst the 
publid were fully aware of, and campaigned against, the dangers from radiation 'fallout' from 
nuclear testing, they appeared unaware of radiation emissions from nuclear power plants. 
This changed in the early 1970s due to the books from the United States by Curtis and Hogan 
(1969), Gofinan and Tamplin (1971), and from Germany by Graeub (1972) which publicized 
the safety hazards and dangers of radiation emissions from nuclear power plants. Ilese 
arguments were quickly adopted by American campaigners against nuclear plants, who had 
initially relied on ecological arguments about 'thermal pollution', disturbance of habitat and 
aesthetic damage to the landscape. 
The concerns of Sternglass over the hazards of low level radiation were given prominence by the 
national press in Britain, and were raised during the debate over the proposed Stourport reactor 
in 1970 by some of the consultants to the County Council (see Leslie & Shaw 1970: Volume 
3: 5). Very rapidly scientific dissent over 'safe' limits for radiation exposure, and also the 
unresolved problems over radioactive waste storage, became translated by eco activists into the 
prime reason for the public to oppose nuclear power. 
8.1.4 Opp'ortunistic 
Intellectual critics of nuclear power were also concerned with issues of democracy and equality, 
seeing nuclear institutions as examples of remote and over bearing bureaucracies that threatened 
civil liberties and must therefore be curbed (Flood and Grove-White 1976; Jungk 1979). This 
criticism of the 'nuclear state' built on previous criticism of the modem technocratic state and 
the power of corporations, such as by Roszak (1968) and Lewis Mumford (1970). Nuclear 
power in the US thus became a rallying point for New Left and student radicals and other social 
critics, particularly after the end of the 'campus wars' and demonstrations against the Vietnam 
War in the early 1970s. "I Previously the New (and the old) Left had shown little interest in 
environmental or nuclear power issues, sometime attacking it as a distruction from more serious 
social issues (Neuhausl971; Enzensberger 1974). In the US protest against nuclear power (like 
environmentalism) was seen as a middle class provincial movement, concerned with NIMBY 
issues, whereas in Europe it was seen as a means of uniting peasant farmers with students (Nelkin 
1981: 39; Weart 1988: 344). Bupp and Irvine commented on this difference (1978: 198): 
"American opposition to nuclear power crosses traditional Ideological and party lines. To 
a certain extent the same appears to be true in Europe. But there is an important difference. 
In Europe opposition to nuclear power has become a means to achieving more 
fundamental ends by true radicals - who ofien label themselves 'ecologists' - desiring basic 
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change in the economic and socialfabric of their societies. In other words, opposition to 
nuclearpower is one of the most effective rallyingpoints around which European social 
critics gather". 
This can be seen in Britain by the gradual adoption of the anti-nuclear power by the New Left, 
starting with the Socialist Workers Party in 1976. It also attracted religious, peace and women's 
groups who had a long established concern with nuclear weapons. 
8.1.4.1 The US Anti PWR campaig 
FoE's anti-nuclear campaign of the 1970s had its origins in the US anti-nuclear movement, 
since FoE started in California and both its main anti-nuclear campaigners, Patterson and Lovins, 
were (North) American. Their criticism of nuclear power, particularly the PWR, rested heavily on 
US evidence and expertise they had gained from attending US hearings. Furthermore it can be 
argued that this American influence is symptomatic of the general cultural dominance of youth 
in Britain by the US since the late 1960s, which manifested itself in terms of music, fashion and 
politics. 
The motivations and goals of US and British critics were not always similar. In the US critics 
need not be 'environmentalists' and vice versa. Bupp and Irvine made these interesting 
comments on nuclear critics (1978: 198): 
"The motivation and the real objectives of many American and European nuclear critics 
are not completely clear, but afew generalisations seem safe. A difficult thingfor 
Europeans to understand about American nuclear critics is that some of the most prominent 
and influential are neither political radicals or even 'ecologists' as that label is commonly 
used in Europe. For them opposition to nuclear power does not go beyond rejection of a 
specific technology". 
For instance Duncan Bum (1967), a scathing critic of the UK programme and the British AGR, 
was very much in favour of the American LWR (on economic grounds). In contrast Lovins and 
Patterson, in their early criticism, were against the LWR on safety grounds but in favour of the 
AGR, with Patterson writing in 1972, "the gas cooled designs are not only more efficient. but 
more environmentally sound and considerably less suspect on the score of safety" 
(Patterson I 972b: 6). FoTs submission to the Select Committee in 1973, together with media 
appearances and press articles by Patterson and Lovins, was seen as an attack on the safety 
record of nuclear power (in the form of the PWR). This appalled nuclear supporters who until 
then had counted on conservationists for support in their campaign against the poor 
environmental and safety record of coal. Pocock in his review of the British anti-nuclear 
campaigners spoke of this bias (1977: 255): 
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"It is perhaps significan't that the environmentalists groups who were openly critical of the 
postulated hazards of the nuclear indust? y werefar less outspoken about the actual deaths 
of coal miners or about the proven long-term dangers of coal wastes such as enguyed 
Aberfan in 1966 and threatened Trehafod ten years later". 
However British social concerns over the dangers of coal mining were of no concern to 
American disputes over PWR safety, which can be seen as a civil war waged on British soil by 
largely American experts from a branch of an American organization, FoE. A war ultimately 
directed against the attempt of the 'nuclear barons' to make the American PWR the dominant 
nuclear reactor worldwide (Pringle and Spigelman 1981). Thus it is important to remember in 
the words of Bupp and Irvine that "nuclear critics are not always environmentalists, nor are all 
environmentalists opposed to nuclear power" (Bupp and Irvine 1978: 198). 
8.2 The two anti-nuclear campaigns 
In the decade from the mid 1960s to the mid 1970s there were two distinct yet related national 
campaigns against nuclear power in Britain. The first in the mid 1960 was the campaign by NCB 
and the miners against the replacement of coal by nuclear power. It was strictly a vested interest 
campaign, with a clear agenda which used conventional political methods of lobbying. Ile 
second was the less focused campaign against nuclear power in the mid 1970s organized by a 
wide variety of environmental and political groups, using new tactics of street protest. Despite 
their very different agendas and styles they used very similar arguments against nuclear power. 
These arguments (detailed in the many p olicy histories of nuclear power were: 
I- Lack of transparency in nuclear costings 
2. Lack of accountability of nuclear executive 
3. Excessive secrecy in nuclear discussions 
4. Misuse of national resources 
5. Opposition to the electrification of the economy 
6. Dangers of excessive centralization and monopoly power 
7. Existence of desirable alternatives. 
New arguments added in the 1970s were: 
1. Safety concerns: hazards of radiation and potential for accidents 
2. Problems of radioactive waste disposal 
3. Dangers from nuclear proliferation and terrorism. 
4. Threats to civil liberties from nuclear state. 
The first two of these new arguments had been raised by Schumacher in his 1967 lecture, bascd 
on concerns raised in the US literature, but at that time they were considered outrageous slurs on 
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the competence of the British nuclear industry. The last two were 1970s concerns bought about 
by the use of terrorism by various political groups and some countries in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s (Flood and Grove-Whitc 1976; Montefiore and Gosling 1977: 61-75). 
Both campaigns similarly failed to achieve their goals. They did not make any impact on the 
political support given to nuclear power. The 1960s campaign was politically far stronger. It was 
lead by Lord Robens, a former Labour minister and Chairman of the largest nationalised 
industry, and was backed by many Labour MPs and the NUM, the most powerful trade union. It 
had unequaled access to the highest levels of Government and the Civil Service. It could, and 
did, put its message across to those in positions of power. It was inside but not listened to. The 
prevailing opinion was that coal was finished, nuclear was the future. The only important issue 
was how to run the coal industry down as humanely as possible. This was the view of most MPs, 
the media and even most of the NCB. The anti-nuclear campaign was seen as purely vested 
interest. It also failed to attract any support outside the coal industry; all sections of society 
being convinced that nuclear was the technology of progress. 
Ile 1970s campaign had far less political support and access. But it had more media coverage 
and some public support. It had style but no power. It influenced public opinion somewhat but 
failed to attract established organizations, like business, trade unions or the professions. It was 
outside and ignored by the establishment. As Jeremy Bugler summed up the achievements of 
environmentalists in 1981 (Quoted in Vernon 1981: 42): 
"I am driven to the conclusion that it has been a decade of considerable intellectual 
achievement and success in consciousness raising, but one of great practicalfailure. 
Environmentalists in the UK havejailed to prevent Windscale's growth... or indeed an 
expanded nuclear programme; they have opposed motorways and delayed them for a few 
years, but in the end the Civil Service has come back to build them". 
Tlis power of the Civil Service and politicians, to ignore and rebuff attacks on their policy, was 
also remarked on by Robens who wrote in his biography (Robcns 1972: 226): 
"It saddens me to think that the country suffered because the advice I and my colleagues 
(notably Schumacher) gave was ignored by the civil servants and the politicians. We were 
regarded as bloody nuisances at the time" 
Schumacher continued to be a 'nuisance' to policy makers, taking an active part in the 1970s 
campaign. His involvement in both campaigns makes him almost unique, and certainly the most 
famous, amongst conservationists who in the 1960s were almost wholly in favour of nuclear 
power, viewing it as less polluting than coal. The reason nuclear power was to fall out of favour 
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with them is almost certainly to do with the voicing of public concern about the dangers of 
radiation, and this was evident at Stourport in 1970. 
8.2.1 Stourport Protest 
The local debate over the proposed Stourport nuclear power station in 1970 contained all the 
elements that were to re-occur in the mid 1970s: local risk, national benefit, radioactive dangers 
and amenity concerns. Despite the local councillors not being able to find any credible scientific 
or legal grounds on which to oppose the station, they nevertheless persisted in their opposition 
fueled by a fear of the risks involved (from possible release of radiation). 
It could be maintained that this was a NIMBY excuse, that the opposition were looking for any 
grounds, the more alarmist the better, on which to oppose the building of a power station. 
Opposition could be ascribed purely to an 'anti-modemization' fear, mentioned by a local 
paper as existing in the nearby town of Bewdley over a by-pass proposal (KT&NS 30 January 
1970). Undoubtedly there was such an element, and the proposed nuclear station would have 
had a massive dominance over the town of Stourport. However there was an existing coal fired 
station at the site, and the Stourport council had lobbied the CEGB, for several years to build a 
new station there. However, even councillors who ended up opposing the nuclear station were 
not against the building of a new coal fired plant. Cllr. Eric Higgs, secretary of the APS said "A 
power station will come, but do we want it to be nuclear or conventional? We would rather have 
a conventional one" (KT&NS 5 June 1970). 
Thus it was opposition to a nuclear station, rather than to any power plant, that motivated the 
local councillors. And the driving force behind that opposition to nuclear was fear of radiation, 
of an accident that would contaminate them. Eric Higgs sumnied it up as not wanting to live with 
an 'element of fear'. This fear was long-standing, dating back to the controversy and public 
debate about the consequences of nuclear fallout from atmospheric tests in the 1950s and early 
1960s (Welsh 2000: 90). Radiation after the use of the atomic bomb, had never had a good 
image. It was something to be feared, a 'deadly invisible menace' (Boyer 1985), or as 
O'Riordan commented (1986: 44): 
"Radioactivity falls into a specialised class of toxic substances that strikesfear into the 
public mind because it is unknown, unfamiliar and is associated with lingering death which 
the innocent cannot avoid'. 
Perhaps this image lay dormant in the minds of the councillors for many years, until an cvcnt 
came for it to be confronted. This, combined with dislike of the CEGB's patronizing and 
arrogance ways, and of its supporters' nuclear hype and phoney claims, laid the basis for what 
was in essence an emotional, rather than a rational, opposition. It was bascd on pcssimism about 
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the risks of nuclear power, and typical of this attitude was the objection by Kidderminster 
Borough Council on the grounds of the possibility of radio-active fallout in the event of 
accident, they commented "that the risk is to great a price to payfor benefits" (WCC 1970: 
Appendices 9458 p2). 
This fear was despite all existing scientific opinion in Britain about the desirability and safety of 
nuclear power. As the consultants, to the County Council, Leslie and Shaw remarked (1970: 
Volume 3: 1): 
"We consider that, provided there are no overriding objections to it, the proposal to site an 
A GR power station at Stourport is in the national interest. The demandfor electricity is 
increasing, and we must hope that the rate ofgrowth of demand will increase as the 
economy recovers... weJeel that, provided the Council is satisfied about the radiation safety 
aspects of the proposal, a nuclear station is much to he preferred to one fired by a 
conventional fuel such as coal". 
The public fears raised at Stourport about the dangers of radiation, were carried over into the 
public inquiry into the proposed reactor at nearby Portskewett a year later. They were a 
particular concern to the local women's group, the Portskewett Young Wives, and were perhaps 
stoked by media publicity given to Sternglass, such as in The Observer in May 1971. Tbus the 
debate at Stourport and Portskewett in 1970-71 showed that an increasing minority were not 
satisfied by experts about the 'radiation safety aspects', and this concern was to become over the 
next five years the principal rallying point of the anti-nuclear movement (but not of its 
movement intellectuals). 
8.3 Origins of anti-nuclear power attitudes 
The reasons for the emergence of the anti-nuclear power movement in the UK in the 1970s are 
complex. Like all technological evaluations made by the public the reasons were only partly 
based on what scientists would call a 'rational' evaluation of the risks and benefits. There were 
of course many 'technical' concerns, but the movement was at heart an emotional response to 
'nuclear fear, to dystopian images of an atomic future laid down since the beginning of the 
19th century. That the movement emerged in the early 1970s was in part due to opportunistic 
reasons: the public collapse in confidence in government institutions and authority, as well as 
internal dissent within the nuclear establishment. 
The nuclear proponents in the 1970s persisted (as with the 1957 WHO study) in seeing 
opposition to nuclear power as simply 'emotional'. Len Brookes, a leading propagandist for the 
UKAEA, wrote in 1975 that anti-nuclear feeling was (1975: 95): 
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44a largely irrational reaction stemmingfrom deep emotional conviction rather than any 
dispassionate analysis of the problems and the practical options for dealing with them. [7t] 
relies for its wider support on attitudes that are largely emotional and irrational". 
In common with elements of Labour Party opinion - as with Crosland (197l)- he saw the anti- 
nuclear movement as predominately elitist and middle class. This opinion continued through to 
1980 with Frank Chapple, the leader of the electricians union, denouncing the (Chapple 1980): 
"Hysterical voices of environmentalists, ecologists and sundry political opportunists, who 
exploit public ignorance. 71ey re-write all our known experiences with nuclear energy, 
embellishing every detail, exaggerating every mishap and behind this smokescreen 
(sometimes euphemistically described as a low energy strategy) they skiINIly conceal the 
fact that the logical outcome of their policies will, at worse, leave us with a shortage of 
energy around the year 2000 and, at best, lead us first to stagnation and then to reduced 
standard of living". 
The source and dynamic of the anti-nuclear opposition may have been emotional but they were 
not irrational. The author, I believe, who comes closest to identifying the causes of opposition is 
Spencer Weart who in his book Nuclear Fear. A History of1mages identifies four main themes 
in the web of association that influenced the way people thought about nuclear power. These 
were (1988: 373-4): 
1- The technical realities of reactors, both the economic opportunities and the hazards, as seen 
by scientists and transmitted to the public. From these realities particular 'facts', such as on 
hypothetical radiation dangers, were selected and stressed. 
2. Nuclear energy's social and political associations, especially ideas involving modem 
civilization and authority. These associations explain what happened when reactors became a 
condensed symbol for all modem industrial society. 
Weart argues that nuclear power was singled out for this symbolic role largely as a result of. 
3. The old myths about pollution, cosmic secrets, mad scientists and apocalypse that were 
historically associated with atomic power and radiation, indestructible myths with deep 
psychological resonances. 
4. The threat of nuclear war, never for a moment forgotten. 
Thus to Schumacher the old myths of scientists trespassing on forbidden territory were still 
valid; writing in 1955 he said (quoted in Wood 1984: 304): 
"Atomic energyfor ýeaceful purposes' on a scale calculated to replace coal and oil, is a 
prospect even more appalling than the Atomic or Hydrogen bomb. For here unregenerate 
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man is entering a territory which, to all those who have eyes to see, bears the warning sign 
'Keep Out- 
For John Davoll it was mistrust of scientific experts (Davoll 1973b): 
"Nuclear power is only part of a even more intimidating nexus ofproblems related to the 
use and generation of energy.. Can any society so dependent on the advice of experts... 
have any hope of arriving at informed ands democratic decisions on the most vital 
questions thatface it". 
and pessimism about the ability of humanity to manage vast amounts of nuclear wastes safely 
for millennia. (Davoll 1973a: 5). Thus in summary this thesis concludes that the anti-nuclear 
movement was a continuation of protest by a network of activists driven in part by images of the 
nuclear future as much as by specific fears and concerns. 
8.4 FoE Hagiology 
Most of the history of the 1970s anti-nuclear campaign has been written from a FoE perspective, 
chiefly by Walt Patterson, its main anti-nuclear activist. Another major source of information is 
from Robert Lamb's hagiology on FoE, which draws heavily on material provided by Patterson 
- his previous accounts and interviews- with a few quotations from Czech Conroy, in its 7 page 
account (Lamb 1996: 81-88). Of the five members of the anti-nuclear campaign identified by 
Tom Burke - Czech Conroy, Mike Flood, Amory Lovins, Walt Patterson, and John Price - John 
Price is not mentioned in Lamb's book, and none of them are mention in Patterson's two books 
(according to the index). 
In Williams' excellent and impartial account of the Windscale decision, there is wider mention of 
the FoE team, with the publications of all five being referenced (Williams 1977: 307-310). In 
two other more partisan histories of nuclear power by Crispin Aubrey (199 1) and Fred Roberts 
(1999), there is no mention of the five by name, though Aubrey in his 'Further Reading' 
section lists books by Flood (1988) and Patterson (1976,1985), while Roberts lists books by 
Patterson (1976,1985). This aversion to naming people's contribution is one-sided, plenty of 
people on the pro-nuclcar side get mentioned in all accounts. Similarly in discussion of the anti. 
nuclear groups, FoE is almost invariably the only organization mentioned. Lamb does not 
mention the campaigns by ConSoc, Half Life, NIN or any of the other groups while Patterson 
only mentions them in his first account in 1979 and not in his later publications: their account is 
exclusively FoE. centric. Conroy (1978) in his history of the Windscale campaign makes no 
mention of ConSoc's involvement (and hardly any of Half-Life), stating only the FoE branch's 
involvement. While Williams mentions Half Life's campaign three times it is FoE that gets by far 
the most extensive coverage. Similarly Aubrey mentions 11alf-Life twice and FoE extensively 
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(and to be fair many anti-nuclear groups in the 1980s as his book is mainly on the Campaign 
against the proposed PWR at Hinkley). 
Thus the existing histories of the anti-nuclear campaign are one sided; while they detail the 
complexity of the organizations and people on the pro-nuclear side, on the anti-nuclear side 
there is just FoE, lead by Walt Patterson with help from Amory Lovins and a few others, able to 
call upon up a mass of amorphous 'environmentalists' to demonstrate. The history thus 
becomes the myth of 'David versus Goliath', a handful of people battling against the multi- 
headed nuclear hydra. This myth is reinforced by Patterson's aversion to the contribution of 
others less intellectually gifted than himself, who he claims 'muddied the waters' with their 
evidence, allowing Parker to discredit FoFs evidence (1998; also see Lamb 1996: 88). To him 
the efforts of the other anti-nuclear groups were a big embarrassment, and responsible for the 
failure of FoE to achieve success at the Windscale Inquiry. That the failure of RE was, in the 
words of their contemporary critics, because they were politically naive and too kccn on 
becoming part of the establishment has never been addressed by them (Bugler 1981; Pyc-Smith 
and Rose 1981). 
The dominance of FoE in the accounts written by Walt Patterson particularly his 1985 book, 
together with the media attention to FoE as the premier environmental group opposing nuclear 
power (achieved by its articulate performance at the Windscale Inquiry) has meant that anti- 
nuclear histories have been little more than FoE hagiology. It is the intention of this thesis to 
rectify this, by showing that the anti-nuclear movement in the 1970s was a great deal more 
complex and diverse than the written accounts indicate. 
8.4.1 FoE Expertise v ConSoc democracy 
The Windscale Inquiry made FoE but broke ConSoc. It is somewhat ironic that the methods FoE 
used to its success- elite lobbying together with rational and highly technical argument - were 
the antithesis of the values it supposedly stood for as an organization - decentralized, informal 
and inclusive. In contrast ConSoc stood by its organization values: democratic decision making 
- with members voting and a committee structure- and espousal of environmental values. 
FoE was never a democratic organization, it has supporters not members. It was run by the Ilead 
Office, with the Director having total control over policy and staff, particular under an 
authoritarian character like Tom Burke (Undercurrents 1978c). Head office ran campaigns not 
branches. This was in contrast to ConSoc where members could put forward a policy resolution 
at the Annual General Meeting and then if accepted could start campaigning. Mius it is no 
surprise ihat the anti-nuclear movement started at ConSoc, as it was better able to reflect the 
concern of members. There may have been similar concern in FoE branches but they had no 
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mechanism for articulating or acting within FOE until Head Office decided on an anti-nuclear 
campaign (in late 1975). 
FOE head office was an avowedly elitist organization, more concerned with maintaining their 
reputation for technical competence (and the access that went with it) than combining forces 
with other groups. This is typified by their decision before the Windscale Inquiry not to ally 
themselves with any of the other groups but to present their evidence alone. Tbus Wynne 
characterizes much of the conflict amongst groups at Windscale Inquiry as due to "FoE's 
unwillingness to co-operate with other groups except on its own terms, and a resultantfeeling 
that the career ofFoE as a semi-establishment group took precedence over the more radical 
sentiments of many of its members" (Wynnel982: 100). 
As Walt Patterson remarked about the Inquiry (Lamb 1996: 88): 
"If it had been left to us, there was no way that the anti-case could he ignored. I think that 
it was a successful tactical move hy BNFL to invite everybody into the room so that they 
could get under each other'sfeet and clutter up the arguments. Mat happened, there was 
a huge smear of arguments rangingfrom the very well worked out to the wildly angry and 
exaggerated, which left room for Parker to do what he did, to tar everybody with the same 
brush and say it was totally over the top, indefensible and so on, invoking everybody at the 
same time". 
Tom Burke commented in 1996 on the impact of the Inquiry "the lessonsfrom this were only 
slowly learnt, and some environment groups, like FoE, haven't been able to come to terms with 
it. (faith in rational argument] At the time we thought we hadjust lost another battle and hence 
carried on to do Sizewell" (Burkel996). The Report shaped the future debate. FoE was more in 
favour of technical expertise than democratic access: a result of their organizational structure 
which concentrated power into the hands of head office staff. This approach won the 
organization favourablc press publicity and enhanced the staffs reputation amongst fellow 
professionals but it did not win it friends amongst the other fcllow organizations (of NIN) and 
was inimical to building a mass movement. Perhaps this suspicion, even envy, did not matter to 
FoE: it was at least admired and acknowledged (by the press) as the Icadcr of the anti-nuclcar 
campaign. 
ConSoc in contrast decided to become part of a broad umbrella of groups, the WA, at die 
Inquiry. Its decision to delegate handling of its wide ranging cvidcnce to an ad-hoc group, die 
WA committee, was a disaster for ConSoc. It won no favourable publicity and lost prcstige to 
FOE. But as Wynne commented on the Windscalc Inquiry "Yhe objectors were in an impossible 
position: if they took the wider view, the Inquiry would be swampcd and Parker would not take 
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them seriously; if they took the narrower approach, they would disappearfrom the political 
debate" (Wynne 1982: 108). This conflict between expertise (or rationality) and democracy (or 
emotion) always plagues campaigns and organizations. To be successful a balance needs to be 
struck, in the words of Martin Ince, between the "rather ill-matched types of activist, in a word, 
the public inquiry'type and the street campaigner" (Ince 1978). Without the first, found at Head 
Office, there is no credible case and no favourable publicity; without the second there is no mass 
organization, campaign or movement. 
The anti-nuclear power movement of the 1970s used FoE's Head Office as their brains and a 
widely disparate group of environmental and radical activists as their feet. Its success was that it 
produced in the three years, from March 1975 to April 1978, a movement capable of mobilising 
over 10,000 people to march in London, and several thousand to camp the weekend at Torness, 
Scotland. Its tragedy, or irony, was that this movement had nowhere directly to go - its focus the 
expected Fast Breeder Inquiry was scrapped. As new issues arose, the movement merged itself 
from 1979 into such 'direct action' organizations as the Torness Alliance, CND, ANC and 
Greenpeace. Both ConSoc and FoE were unable to capitalize on this new mood of militancy 
because their leaders, John Davoll and Tom Burke, were personally opposed to direct action 
(Vole 1978c; Bugler 1981: 296; Davoll 1999). 111 The result was that ConSoc went into a long 
period of decline, as members drifted away, and it was wound up in 1987. FoE however 
continued to expand and was to play a significant role at future nuclear inquiries at Sizcwcll and 
Hinkley. Like the Windscale Inquiry, these two were similarly lost. 
8.4.2 FoE retrospective 
Ile Windscale Inquiry has assumed that status of an epic battle, nearly won, amongst FoE 
hagiographers. As Czech Conroy reminisces about Windscalc to Lamb (1996: 88): 
"It's true that we lost, but we gained a great deal in the process. 71cre was a massive 
raising ofpublic awareness about nuclear issues because of the daily media coverage and 
there was a bigjump in the credibility of Friends of the Earth. They couldn't dismiss us as 
eco-freaks any more". 
Conroy also points out that it established a significant precedent, that of holding a public 
inquiry when considering any major nuclear development and this delayed the progress of the 
nuclear industry, particularly over plans to build the Sizcwcll PWR. Furthermore Conroy 
believes that FoE's anti-nuclcar campaign (Lamb 1996: 88): 
44 ... was one of the most effective campaigns Friends of the Earth ever ran, especially when 
you consider what we were up against. Britain was a world leader in nuclear technology, 
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with both civil and military programmes. To stop the expansion of the civil industry in only 
twenty years of campaigning was an incredible feat". 
Walt Patterson, commenting on Windscale Inquiry two decades afterwards, believes that if FoE 
had not opposed THORP and gone to the Inquiry, BNFL would have started building in 1976, 
with the plant perhaps opening in 1982 (Patterson 1998). That would have resulted in the 
accumulation of far more plutonium, and there also would be reprocessing plants in other 
countries. He believed that FoE's success was that "We delayed it by 15 years. Me delayed the 
programme. We achieved a lot and feel proud' (Patterson 199 8). Robert Lamb, FoE's 
biographer, is similarly upbeat about their achievements (1996: 88): 
"In retrospect, FoE's presence at the inquiry had done enormous good raising the 
organisation's profile to a level it had never previously achieved and marking it out as the 
credible voice on nuclear issues. It had severely undermined the case for nuclear power, 
rattled a powerful but complacent industry and challenged the conventional wisdom that 
nuclear waste should be reprocessed". 
However Joe Weston believed that he impact on the FoE movement was devastating. Ile wrote 
(1989: 54): 
"The Windscale issue had taken up a whole year and had resulted in many other campaign 
areas being reduced in terms of their profile and the amount of resources spent on them. 
The campaign had cost the organization far more than the SI 00,00 in lawyers and expert 
witnessfees used during the course of the inquiry. For all that time, effort and expenditure 
the organization had, apparently gained nothing. The groups had been asked to raise 
moneyfor the campaign and at the end of the day, had received nothing in return". 
Weston remarked that while the FoE head office believed that having lost, the campaign was 
over, many in local groups did not accept defeat so easily and continued to oppose local nuclear 
plants. Tbc energy campaigners of RE felt excluded from these informal local alliances, such 
as the Torness Alliance, and saw them as threat, "as ifFoE was in danger of losing its lead over 
the anti-nuclear movement" (Weston 1989: 56). 
Wynne doubts that the Inquiry changed anything in nuclear policy (1996). Some environmental 
campaigners did however benefit, learning about doing research, putting evidence forward, 
forming international links, and creating a name for themselves. As Weston perhaps cynically 
remarked Inquiries do "provide campaigners with a stage on which they can display their 
talents and their arguments" (1989: 102). But the Inquiry did not raise the profilc of nuclear 
issues amongst the public as there was little media publicity in the mass circulation prcss like 
312JAý= as Inquiries are arcane and intimidating to the public. Wynne in an interview two 
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decades'later, said he had no illusions as he "never expected to win but he didn't expect it to be 
fixed. There was enough evidence for Inspector to write an anti-nuclear case but Parker had a 
predisposition to accept evidence from Government bodies as they were considered accountable 
and democratic" (Wynnel996). 
Wynne however argued that FoE, in its desire to put a compromise case and establish credibility 
with the government, was outflanked by Parker at the Inquiry. Although it was "the most 
seasoned and erudite of the objectors", it refused to join the other groups (and the desire of its 
own local members in NNQ in mounting an anti-nuclear case, arguing instead for delay and the 
availability of technical alternatives to reprocessing (Wynne 1982: 105). When the Inquiry was 
widely seen by both the press and parliament as a battle for or against nuclear power, the end 
result was that FoFs position "was not even seen as an alternative political option" (Wynne 
1982: 108). While Bugler gives FoE praise for its high quality work and advocacy on nuclear 
issues, he believed their Windscale campaign was a failure due to their political naivete, 
remarking "If nuclear power has suffered rebuffs, it has been almost entirelyfrom its own 
mistakes, not through public opposition" (Bugler 1981: 296). 
8.4.3 Emotion versus expertise 
Media praise for FoE at the Windscale Inquiry was based on their using a rational approach and 
rejecting emotional arguments, in contrast to the evidence of many other groups. However a 
plea for the acceptance of 'emotion' as a valid premise for opposition to nuclear power was 
made by Peter Taylor of PERG, in his evidence at the Windscale Inquiry on the right approach 
to decision making on complex technical decisions (Breach 1978a: 171). Taylor in his evidence 
said that we lived in a society ruled by rationalists and rcductionists because of our dependence 
on advanced technology, and therefore there is seldom an opportunity to discuss fundamental 
alternatives. He said (quoted in Breach 1978a: 171): 
"If one were to say "I oppose nuclear power because it threatens the very stuff of life", one 
would be branded as emotional and incapable of rational argument... there is far "lore 
scope for interaction if one says "I oppose nuclear power because the disposal of long- 
lived actinides to geological formations of unprovcn permeability or long-term structural 
stability cannot guarantee against radiological ha: ards due to concentrations In the food 
chains ". 
71us, anyone who can actually say that sentence and get the words right (they do not 
necessarily have to understand them) may become a front-line protagonist. Tile othcrs must 
stay at the back and maintain a dutiful silence whilst their 'champions' do battle". 
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Taylor illustrates this point by the testimony to the Inquiry by Barbara Fish, from a small 
religious commune, who posed simple questions like "ny must we always live with the 
blunderings of science all in the name ofprogress? " and " How dare we 'mere mortals' reason 
that our industries and refrigerators are important enough to put the balance [of nature] at 
stake? " (quoted in Breach 1978a: 171). As Breach commented "Such non-scientifically 
assembled questions lack credibility in a controversy dominated by economic and political 
Yact' ". He finiher remarked that groups like FoE, for all their use of specialist witnesses and 
technical evidence "drawfor their support on a very large number ofpeople like Ms Fish and 
herfellow communards who feel, instinctively, that 'things' are going wrong and that the move 
towards dependency on nuclear power is potentially the final mistake" (Breach 1978a: 172). 
To the mass of activists the Inquiry was an obscure ritual of expertise in which their 
'champions' took part, it was not part of their political campaign. As Wynne remarked "It is 
easy toforget that the Inquiry parties were a very small elite minority ofactivistsfor or against 
some aspect of nuclear energy... The 'environmentalist' may have been in there fighting, but he 
too was an alien expert more akin to the industry's experts than the ordinary person" (Wynne 
1982: 169). Brian Wynne, writing after the Windscale Inquiry remarked that participation in 
public inquiries for interested but less experienced, less organized groups and individuals 
becomes all the more daunting the technical they become (Wynne 1979: 1079): 
" Representation becomes less and less meaningrul the more inquiries are highly elite, 
professionalised and semi private exchanges between strongly committed adversary parties. 
More elaborate inquiries may buy more naturaljusticefor professional objectors only at the 
expense of even more alienation of the wider public". 
8.4.4 Green Alliance 
The tendency to focus on the views of the 'ch=pions' - the expert and the clite- rather than the 
ordinary activists was further reinforced by the founding of the Green Alliance at the end of 
1978. This was founded by Liberal peer Tim Beaumont at a meeting on 23 Dcccmbcr 1978 at 
the National Liberal Club, attended by 30 people (Green Alliance 1978). John Davoll and Irene 
Coates from ConSoc attended, but Davoll did not join, though Edward Dawson did. By March 
1979 it had 85 members, mostly the 'great and the good' from the environment groups, with 
hardly any overlap with the NIN activists except for Irene Coates who initially refused to join 
because of "the gross disparity of sexual representation" as only 2 of the initial 30 people 
invited were women. By March 1979 there were more women, 9 out of 85 members, a sex ration 
of only 10%, far worse than ConSoc in the 1960s. 110 
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There were women activists - 10 out of the 41 member groups of NIN had a women as contact 
point, there were 8 women in the 29 people attending the 'Windscale post-mortem' NIN 
meeting in November 1977, but they were overlooked. This tendency to overlook women's 
contribution still continues. For instance Robert Lamb in his biography of FoE, mentions a 
Joanna Gordon-Clarke who was 'pipped' for the post of Director of FoE in 1975 by Tom 
Burke (Lamb 1996: 92). The only other mention of her is on the previous page where she is 
referred to as 'a former environmental policy manger for the oil and gas multinational BP'; of 
her contribution to FoE nothing is written. Similarly Renee Chudleigh, the Energy Campaigner 
and initial leader of the FoE Sizewell team and co-author of two FoE books on the case against 
the PWR (Flood et al 1980; Chudleigh and Cannell 1983), only get one mention though the 
Sizewell campaign gets 5 pages (Lamb 1996: 105). 
In fairness to Lamb he does give extensive mention to the work of two women activists, Angela 
King, FoE's original wildlife campaigner and to Iris Webb, FoE Board member and anti- 
Sizewell campaigner. Regretfully the extent of mention in any historical account will often 
depend on the individual's published record and availability for interview. Most of the male 
anti-nuclear activists from the 1970s have gone on to successful careers in academia and 
journalism. They are ease to trace and to interview (as I have done), besides often having 
produced their own accounts of their activities. Women activists from the 1970s are not so easy 
to trace, as I have failed to do. 
This is definitely a task for future historians of environmental activism, and has been done for 
the US by Carolyn Merchant (1985) and Vera Norwood (1993). Also the previously neglected 
role of women activists against pollution from energy sources is being given increasing 
attention, ranging from the 19th century campaign by the Ladies Health Protective Association 
of Pittsburgh against coal smoke, to Mary Sinclair's long and ultimately successful, campaign 
against the building of a nuclear power plant in Midland, Michigan"' (Gonzalez 2002: 135-7; 
Breton 1998: 88-93). 
8.5 Soft energy utoplanism 
As we have seen in Chapter 7, energy technologies have been associated with a mixture of 
utopian and dystopian viewpoints. Utopian views initially dominate society, but over time there 
is an wavering of support as promoting institutions fail to deliver the expected benefits and the 
disbenefits become apparent. Sometimes there is a sudden shift in support for a technology, as 
sections of society abandon it in response to the impact of new ideologies. Ilis can be seen widi 
nuclear power in the early 1970s, where conservationists and many elements of the New Lcft 
quickly switched their allegiances from nuclear to solar energy. Often driven by dystopian fears 
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of a 'nuclear state' they joined the campaign by the new environmentalists against the 
expansion of nuclear power. 
Solar energy, soon to be rechristened renewable energy, was to be the way forward to a 
'sustainable' world. This energy utopianism started in the early 1970s with the AT movement, 
and its latest expression is in books like The Solar Economy by Hermann Scheer (2002). In it he 
claims that the adoption of solar energy will cause a revolution that will replace our present 
hierarchical society based on fossil fuels with one which is more democratic and egalitarian. As 
Fred Pearce remarked in his review "Scheer's is a heady Utopian vision" (Pearce 2002). 
So at the beginning of the 21st century is solar energy to be the future energy source? 
Ultimately does it matter? Does choice of energy technology really affect how society is 
organized? Is Scheer correct when he claims that history shows that new technologies, like 
electric grids and nuclear power, have caused a technological revolution that have reshaped the 
world. The history of energy utopianism in fact, I believe, shows the opposite: new energy 
sources do not automatically bring desirable social and economic change. Rather it is the way 
society is organized, or in the classic Marxist phrase 'who controls the means of production', 
which determines the scale and nature of the impact of energy technologies. All energy 
utopianism suffers from the flaw of 'technological determinism', a point made by social critics 
of technology in the 1960s (Cross et al 1974). 
In an era of global capitalism energy sources are likely to be part of a globally traded energy 
network. This could be the 1960s vision of Buckminster Fuller for a global electricity grid based 
on solar energy coming from deserts, or more recent ones for a hydrogen economy based on 
wind, hydro or nuclear power. Whilst economic control of energy systems may still rest in 
corporate hands the physical infrastructure of energy generation is becoming more 
decentralized, under the impact of much smaller sized generating plant. For the UK this trend 
will undoubtedly continue, strengthened by Government policy in its latest Energy White Paper 
for far more renewables and small-scale distributed electricity generation (DTl 2003). Whether 
this energy decentralism will bring the social and political benefits desired by solar supporters is 
uncertain, and is certainly not automatic. Unless there are other Govcrnment policies in support 
of political and economic decentralization the world they aspire to may thus remain solely in the 
realm of utopian or science fiction writers, or occasional 'islands' of greenness always 
vulnerable to conquest by outside forces. '. " 
8.5.1 A nuclear revival? 
So does the history of the anti-nuclear power movement in the 1970s have any lessons for 
nuclear protest in the 21 st century, or teach us anything about why people protest against new 
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energy technologies. Does the current protest against windfarms have anything in common with 
previous protest against nuclear power plants? Can the promoters of wind learn anything from 
the experiences of the 1970s nuclear promoters? Does the Civil Service, as Bugler claimed, 
always in the end get its way, despite a few years of delay caused by opposition (quoted in 
Vernon 1981: 42)? 
The wind power debate is similar in rhetoric and tone to the nuclear power debate in the 1970s, 
although public opinion is far more in favour of wind power than it ever was of nuclear power. 
Just as the nuclear lobby in the 1970s could not conceive or accept the fact that people did not 
want any nuclear power stations (and wanted to close down existing ones), so much of the wind 
lobby is unable to accept the rationality of opposition. For instance the BWEA (British Wind 
Energy Association) uses the same language, as was used by nuclear promoters in the 1970s, of 
94 misconceptions and misinfor7nations distributed by groups aiming to stifle wind energy 
development completely" and "a small but vociferous number ofpeople have generated a 
disproportionate amount ofpress coverage" (quoted in Elliott 1997: 163-4). Similarly wind 
promoters call for education, well informed debate and local consultation and an end to 
NIMBYism. The technology is different but the debate and language is the same. 
Just as the nuclear establishment was split in the 1970s, so there are divisions amongst 
denviro=cntalists' over windfarms. This division could reflect NIMBY concerns, with some 
local and regional groups in areas where wind farms are planned being opposed, whilst all the 
big national groups are in favour. Long established regional groups, like the CPRW (Council for 
the Protection of Rural Wales), are seeking the protection of the countryside based on the 
aesthetics of landscape, whilst national groups (RSPB, WWF, FoE, Grccnpeace, SERA etc) are 
united in seeing windpower as a symbol of a sustainable Britain. "' What needs to be understood 
is that opposition to wind, like that to nuclear, is partly a political protest, against the (social) 
vision of its promoters. Some people simply do not like or want a 'sustainable Britain' or a 'soft 
energy future, just as some did not want a 'nuclear state' or 'breeder economy' in the 1970s. 
This protest can be considered as partly intellectual and partly opportunistic, and is supported 
by those sections of the media opposed to the energy and social policies of the current Labour 
Govern m ent, (Marren 2003). Wind, like nuclear, power is promoted not just as an energy 
technology but as a means by which its supporters can achieve their social goals, hcnce Ole 
utopianism of Hcrmann Scheer (2002). 
So could anti-wind campaigners change environmentalism towards the old preservation idcas (or 
perhaps deep green approach) of the protection of 'Nature' rather than 'Man'? Could 
conservation groups concerned with rural protection, like the CPRW and the CPRE, rcturn to 
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their 1960s support for nuclear power with their argument that it is better to damage already 
blighted urban areas rather than 'unspoilt' rural areas, with its unspoken assumption that it is 
better to subject people to some hazard rather than sacrifice nature? This seems unlikely, for 
much as they may wish for an energy source that does not 'spoil' the countryside, the options 
are limited: nuclear is too expensive and is not supported by Government, whilst fossil fuels are 
accused of causing global warming. A nuclear revival is unlikely, at least for the UK, unless: 
1. Renewables fail to deliver technically and economically causing the 'environmental 
establishment' to become split on energy policy. 
2. The public become disillusioned with the promises of solar utopianism. 
I Minority countryside concerns are taken up by the urban majority. 
Thus it seems likely the age of expansion for nuclear power is over, although, of course, 
whatever happens we will still have large amounts of nuclear waste to remind us of its history. 
Likewise the dream of a utopian society will still be with us, but the energy source through 
which it is expressed will change over time. The old vision of nuclear power may be over, but 
the dream of a utopian energy technology still lives on. Renewables is the current favourite, but 
whether it will be any more successful than nuclear power remains to be seen. 
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Footnotes 
IA discussion of this issue occurred on the ASEH email group II-Enviromnent@ll-Net. msu. edu in April 2002' 
2 From an interview with Hinton by Ian Welsh in 198 1, quoted in Welsh 2000: 64. Hinton was to keep his doubts to 
himself, and only speak publicly in a House of Lord debate in 1975, and publish them in 1976 in a N= 
Scientis article - see Hinton 1976. 
3 Captain Herbert Atkins from Vickers Nuclear Engineering, first put forward his criticism of AEA decisions on the 
nuclear ship programme in the journal Engineering in June 1959. His criticism of AEA policies in February 
1963 to the Working Group on Marine Reactor Research, were disowned the following day by Sir Leslie Rowan, 
the managing director of Vickers, in a telephone call to Sir Roger Makins, Chairman of AEA, and Atkins was 
summarily dismissed that day from Vickers. Next day the press carried headlines announcing Atkins' dismissal 
and a political storm followed, with a subsequent Parliamentary debate where Lord I lailsharn the Minister for 
Science, defended its policies (see Pocock 1977: 137-140). 
The Nuclear Power Committee, otherwise known as the Powell Committee after its chairman Sir Richard Powell, 
was set in secrecy in the summer of 1962, issued an interim report in 1964, which formed the basis of a 
Government White Paper announcing the second nuclear programme (I IMSO 1964 Cmnd 2335) but did not 
present a final report until September 1965 (see Welsh 2000: p126-134, Williams 1980 Chapter 5. 
Ironically Lord Robens, before being appointed chairman of the NCB in 1960, played a leading part in the 
construction of the Trawsfynydd nuclear power station as Industrial Relations Adviser to the nuclear consortium. 
Atomic Power Constructions Ltd., who built it. (Pocock 1977: 172). 
6A short synopsis of the grounds for opposition at each of them based on the Inquiry Report is given in Rudig 1990: 
114-117. 
7 Tom Driberg gave evidence at the Inquiry on 'amenity' issues, with Welsh describing his submission as 'one of the 
most articulate cases' put forward by individuals (Welsh 2000: 77). Ile claimed that the modernity of the power 
station would clash grotesquely with the antiquity of the marshland envirorunenr. "a building ofthat sort rising 
out ofour subtly delicate horiz-ontal landscape cannot but be an eyesore " (quoted in Luckin 1990: 177). Driberg 
was a supporter of Schumacher since the 1940s, and Schumacher's defence of the coal industry in the 1950s 
would have endeared him to Driberg, a mining MP[? ]. 
1 For coverage of the opening of Calder Hall by the Queen in October 1956 see Welsh 2000: 56-59. Six months 
previous the Financial Times issued a special supplement on 'Atomic Energy' on 9 April 1956, which was 
published with The Times which was the start of euphoric press coverage. 
By coincidence protest at Dungeness power station was to feature as the first anti-nuclear event of two future 
groups, FoE in 1975 and Earth First! in 1991 (on FoE protest see Patterson 1979: 159; on Earth Firstl protest 
see GA 199 1; Wall 1999: 46-7). 
'0 Schumacher was later to achieve worldwide fame with his book Small is Beautiful published in 1973; he died in 
1977. 
Obviously a pseudonym, the Latin phrase 'pro bono publico' meaning for the good of the public. 
As outlined in a letter to the Clerk of WCC from D. J. Philips, Ministry of I fousing & Local Government. IS 
February 1970. (County Records Office, Worcester. Planning Committee M inutes, 22 April 1970: 90-9 1.1 
Perhaps these are reference to the controversy caused by the claims of Sterriglass, which appeared on die front page 
of 'llie Times on 27 January (Wright 1970a) and on the same day in a 'Mames TV documentary 'Report on 
Pollution- And on the Eighth Day' in which he said "It now looks as ((in countries like United States and 
England as many as one in two children that died before reaching age one died because ofnuclear testing " (Wright 
1970a). 
I lis views were disputed the following day by Profe&wr Joseph Rotblat in a 'llianics TV debate, and in *ne Timei 
where Rotblat dismissed Stcmglass' theories (Wright 1970b). Ila only support for Sterriglass came from Arthur 
Tamplin who believed that "the Sternglass work should cause us to taAe a more serious look at thepotential 
effects ofradiationfrom whatever source", and that Timplin opposes "those who profess that exposure to low 
dosei ofradiation is harmless" (Wright 1970b). 
Ile book Perils ofthe Peaceful, 41om by Curtis &I login had also been reviewed in ne Tinici. in March. Ilia 
reviewer said that the book was "clearly designed to dofor nuclearpollution what Rachel Carson's book Silent 
Spring d1dJor chemicalpollution " (I ferbert 1970). Most attention in the review was given to graphic pa. "Ages 
from the book on nuclear waste described as "a violent lethal mixture ofshort and long-lived isotopes " k- ept in 
storage tanks that could fail with catastrophic consequences a lcrt>crt 1970). 
Both the accidents at Three Nfile Island on 28 March 1979 and at Chernobyl on 26 April 1986 occurred in the early 
hours of the morning due to human error. 
Protest against the proposed twin AGR at Porukcwctt continued throughout the 1970s, becoming In die late 1970s 
part of the Severnside Alliance, a coalition of 25 local groups. The Poriskcwctt and Sudbrook Acdon Group, 
ne3rcst the proposed reactor, had in 1979 just 15 members, of which 8 were active (Weightman 1979). 
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16 Davy was an long time writer on this theme, having published in 1962 an article entitled 'rbe deadly wastes of 
nuclear powee, also articles in Sgm in September 1970 and May 1971 (Davy 1970b; 197 1). 
See also Peter Harpees criticism (1972) of the Stockholm Conference, and his report on the unofficial forums. 
John Fremlin, Professor of Applied Radioactivity at Birmingham University was a ConSoc member and a prolific 
letter writer in support of nuclear power. He was also, according to Ian Breach (1977c) a long time CND 
supporter and helped found BSSRS. In 1976 he was appointed a consultant on radiation risk to the Cumbria 
County Council, and gave evidence to the Windscale Inquiry. His letters, over the period 1972-78, range from 
that in The Ecologis in July 1972 (Fremlin 1972) to those in Conservation News Nos. 44,54,69 & 70. For a 
statement of his views see his article 'Let us Conserve' in Conservation News No. 75, November 1979/January 
1980, p 12. His book Power Production: what are the risks? was published by Oxford University Press 1987. 
19 ConSoc's interest in energy issues was long standing. Colin Hutchinson, Chairman of ConSoc, had already put 
forward an Energy Resolution before the Liberal Assembly in 1973 which had been adopted unanimously (CN 
47). It urged that "To ensure that safety, polluting effects and moraljustification are takenfully into account 
before nuclear reactors are allowed to proliferate " (CN 47). 
20 For another statement of Lord Avebury' s views see the editorial by Lord Avebury on nuclear power irLL, &SM 
the Liberal Party magazine on Science and Technology, No. 39 (September 1974), pp. 4-5. 
21 This policy of 'keeping the nuclear option open' has dominated UK nuclear policy since the 1970s, and has been 
restated in every energy policy review, the latest in the 2003 Energy White Paper (DT1 2003). 
22 Undercurrents had by far the largest circulation of the new wave of environmental magazine founded in the 1970s. 
A 1978 Directory described it as (Herring 1978: 9): 
"The magazine of alternative technology and science with emphasis on self-sufficiency, home electronics, free radio, 
workers co-ops. Good news coverage on energy, communications, industrial co-ops and the best in radical 
intellectual thought.,, 
2' Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution inquiry on Nuclear Power and the Environment was announced on 
19 March1974, and published as 6di Report on 22 September 1976 (HMS0 Cmd 6618); often referred to as The 
Flowers Report. 
The PWR (pressurized water reactor) is a type of LWR (Light Water Reactor), the other being the BWR (Boiling 
Water Reactor), both types were developed in the US. Ile SGIM (Steam Generating I leavy Water Reactor) 
was a British design with only one prototype built at Winfiith, Dorset. 
2' Pocock is probably referring to such articles as those in 311C Sunday Times on 18 November and by Amory Lovins 
on 25 November 1973. 
John Price was a researcher for FoE on energy analysis of nuclear power see John Price & Amory Lovins, 1974, 
Dynamic Energy Analysis and Nuclear Power, London: Friends of the Earth. I [a left FoE in the 1970s and went 
to Australia. Interesting neither Lamb 1996 nor Patterson 1986 mention his work for FoE. 
27 There had also been stories in many of the main papers about BNFL'3 plans for new thermal oxide reprocessing 
plant (111ORP) since late 1974: for instance see: Financial Times 13 November 1974, and 31 January 1975, and 
Observe of 23 March 1975 (Ilawkes 1975a); also article, 'Looking to the future of nuclear fuel reprocessing' in 
Electrical Review. of 7 February 1975, PP 160-1 (Wynne 1982: 188 n5O). 
21 See Lancaster Comment of 9 December 1971, p 11-14; for an obituary of Paul Smoker see Ian Welsh (1998) who 
dedicated his book. Mobilising lVodernity to him. 
2' See Wynne 1982: 75-78 on the conflict the Windscale proposal caused amongst Cumbrian councilors, most of 
whom supported a quick decision in favour. 
30 His wife, Mrs. G. J. Acland was one of the only two county councilors (out of 98) who were sympathetic to the 
Windscale opponents (Wynne 1982: 80,195 note 22). 
)'The issue of local support for TlIORP was examined in evidence given by the West Cumbria branch of Foll at the 
Windscale Inquiry (see Breach 1977c). 
Brian Wynne was a lecturer in the School of Independent Studies at Lancaster University. Aflcr the Win, 14cale 
Inquiry, Brian Wynne wrote a series of articles for New Scientist (Wynne 1978a: c). in 1982 his book Rationality 
andRitual was published on nuclear decision making and the role of public inquiries (Wynne 1982). It contains, 
in Chapter 6, much detail about the conflicts between the groups, represented at the Inquiry. Wynne received 
praise from Ian Breach in the New Scientist on 28 July 1977 for putting "some outstandingly well researched 
questions " and his evidence on institutional failure amongst nuclear bodies got a bit %%Tito up (Breach 1977g). 
Wynne has continued to write on Windscale and radiation issues (e. g. Wynne et &11993). 
Sir Frank Layfield was to achieve widespread publicity in the 1980s as the Iruipcctor at the Sizewell Inquiry (see 
Incc 1984: 1). 
ý4 For details of the Torriess public inquiry see Patterson 1979: 159, Pattcrsonl984: 47-8; Lamb 1996: 83. 
Patterson wrote about the North Sea oil campaign in the Fol! ncwslc"cr in The reologist during 1973 (Patterson 
1973a and 1973b). 
)6 For extensive details and analysis of action at Torness from 1978-80 see Welsh 2000: 166-80. 
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Ten year later, the proposed Hinkley C PWR galvanized local opposition, which became the Stop Hinkley 
Expansion (SHE) group; see Aubrey 1991: 65-68. In his book however there is no mention of the Nuclear 
Reactor Vigilantes. 
38 For an insider's view of the conflict between the groups at the Windsicale Inquiry, see the detailed account in Wynne 
1982: 100-111. 
39 For details of the Lawyers Ecology Group's role in influencing the decision to hold an inquiry, see Wynne 1982: 
82. 
40 The letter from Parry to Taitz of 5 August 1977 has scribbled on the bottom PS "We arejust sending another f500 
to Beryl Kempfor CONSOC and the same to FOE! " (Parry 1977). 
According to Ian Breach (1977b), Peter Taylor was a former social anthropologist who had spent six years in 
industry and teaching. His nuclear expertise had come from acting as an advisor to local citizens' groups opposed 
to the construction of a reprocessing plant at Aschendor& West Germany and from working alongside university 
lobbyist from Bremen. 
42 John Tyme was a well known, even notorious, anti-roads campaigner who achieved much media publicity through 
his direct action activities, including disrupting 'dozens of road inquiries in Britain' (Breachl977i) His 
campaigning resulted in personal tragedy: he suffered a nervous breakdown and retreated to a monastery. 
According to his speech at the 1986 ConSoc National Conference his 15 years of impassioned efforts "have 
4 
mostly resulted in completefailure, much to his anguish " (CN 95). 
3 For details on Energy 2000 including committee minutes and correspondence see Leonard Taitz archives at Sheffield 
Archives (ref 19931108 Box 4). 
44 Transport 2000 was formed in 1973 at the initiative of the National Union of Railwaymen (NUR) as a federation of 
groups, including environmental ones, in favour of developing the railways. The NUR provided the secretariat 
and much of the finance for Transport 2000 (see Kimber et al. 1974 for discussion of its activities). 
See Boyle 1983: 16 for photo of front page of the Daily Mirro on Tuesday 21 st October 1975 - the text is legible. 
46 There is a great deal published on the Windsicale Inquiry; it was covered in detail by the press, mainly by Ian Breach 
for New Scientist (1977 a- 1; 1978; 1978a). Also books by The Guardian (1978); and Wynne (1982). 
47 Speakers included the MPs Geoffrey Podsworth and Millie Miller, John Donoghue the safety assessment manager 
from BNFL, Len Brookes, economic adviser for AEA, and Peter Adams, local trade union official (NS 1976b). 
42 See also coverage in Peace News Nos. 2019-2020, April 1976. 
49 For Patterson's Views on the National Energy Conference see Patterson 1985: 55,114. 
so Sir Kelvin Spencer, was a former chief Scientist with the Ministry of Power in the 1950s. According to Patterson 
(1985: 86) he had become a'fiercely outspoken opponent of official British nuclear policy' after having been an 
'enthusiastic supporter of nuclear powee. He gave evidence for the SEI at the Windscale Inquiry (Breach 1977i). 
Perhaps echoing remarks made by Walter Marshall in a speech reported in New Scientist (8 July 1976: 85), where 
he asked "Everyone is always talking about the nuclear lobby, but where is it? I have never seen the slightest 
sign of it". 
Other groups spent significant sums on the Inquiry NNC spent L8,000, TCPA 0,000 just in the first 4 weeks of 
the Inquiry. Other groups were left with large debts which active members had to pay off. such as PERO (Wynne 
1982: 102). 
53 According to Wynne (1982: 102), James Goldsimith was persuaded by his brother Edward and Gerry Levine - who 
was James Goldsmith solicitor and influenced by George Dobry QC, a leading member of the Lawyers Ecology 
Group and counsel for the Isle of Man at the Inquiry. 
The evidence on Euratom. and European nuclear policies was presented by Ircne Coates; &f1cr a wait of 14 weeks to 
give it she was told by Justice Parker that her evidence was redundant (Breach 1977f). 
Charles Wakstein had published an article critical of Windscale's safety procedures in the Whitchaven Nem in 
December 1975, which was enthusiastically reprinted in Undercurrentt No. 16 (Wakstein 1976), with a further 
supportive article for his views in No. 18 by Martyn Partridge (1976). 
For extensive papers on this legal dispute and the internal conflict in ConSoc see Sheflield Archives 1993/108 Box 
I and 3, Folders Windscale Appeal and Windscale Inquiry Nov78ng. 
17 According to Wynne "Cynics also noted that the unusualprocedure adopted to allow a parliamentary debate 
convenientlyprohibiled review ofthe government's decision In the courts " (1978: 35 1). 
$1 This criticism was published later as a book: Wait Patterson & Czech Conroy 1978.7he ParArr Inquiry. London: 
FoE. 
59 The assessors were Sir Frederick Warner and Sir Edward Pochin. On die assessors imputiality see Wynne who 
coninients "Neitherfigure appeared to be without an Interest "(Wynne 1982: 87ý 
60 Criticism of the Parker Report has been well covered elsewhere, particularly in Wynne 1982. For the views of 
participants see the views of FoE in Patterson & Conroy (1978), of the 17-colneilt in Goldsmith et Al (1978), of 
TCPA in Stott & Taylor (1980), of the UKAEA in Wyatt (1980). and of eight opposition witnesses in Vole 
(1978). For more neutral views see Pearce (1979), Taylor (1979) and Williams (1980: 301-307), and press 
comment at the time (a list in Williams 1980: 3 10 notes 81 & 87). 
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6' Ile report on the Windsicale Assessment and Review Project (WARP) was published in 1979 as Pe=e et &11979. 
62 The UK Department of the Environment was founded in 1970, the magazines Your Fnvironment in 1969, and 31a 
Ecoloeis in 1970. 
63 The 'environmental justice' movement which originated in the USA in the late 1980s argues that living in a poor 
quality environment (often next to hazardous waste dumps) is not a matter of choice but of power interests 
(Gottlieb 1993: 235-269; Roberts & Toffolon-Weiss 2001). 
"For details of 19th century societies founded to protect wildlife see I loldgate 1999: 6-9; Sheail 1976; Fitter & Scott 
1978. 
This split in sex roles continued into the 1980s, with a 1987 internal report for FoE commenting that there was a 
clear split in the organization between campaigners who were all men and support staff who were virtually all 
women (Weston 1989: 184). 
Perhaps the first book written by a women activist was Groundfor Concern: Australia's Uranium and Human 
Survival. by Mary Elliott, a longstanding anti-nuclear Australian Activist, in 1977. 
67 In 1980 the National Trust had a million members and the RSPB 300,000 (Lowe & Goyder 1983: 182). 
Graham Searle of FoE edited the book Concorde: the Case Against Supersonic 7ýansport (197 1) written by 
Richard Wiggs, and the organization is listed in the paperback, The Environmental Handbook produced by FoE. 
69 
For FoE's role in this campaign see Lamb 1996: 5-56. 
The numbers are based on my estimates of members per society, based on extrapolation of their 1955 and 1975 
figures, giving 150 in 1960 and 200 in 1969. 
Due to pressures of space a chapter on the role of the 1960s counterculture and its alternative press in promoting 
environmental issues had to be omitted from this thesis. Hopefully it will appear in a forthcoming (1994) paper. 
Very little has been written about the Dwarfs; they are not mention by Allaby in his book on Ile Eco-Activists 
(197 1), although they are mentioned in Shipley (1976: 204). They had an extensive network of branches, their 
own magazine Dwarf News and were active in 1971 in protesting about air pollution (see the underground 
magazines hk No. 12 and E=dz No. 13). They adopted a form of 'anarchist ecology', modcled on previous 
groups like the Dutch Provos, and were well known to hippie3for their festivals and concerts. I lowevcr a 
contemporary and similar group, the Diggers, is better known though it received less coverage in the alternative 
press, mainly because of the antics of Sid Rawle, its self-appointed leader. 
One specific mason given (by Robert Lamb) for David Brower's resignation from the Sierra Club was the Board's 
refusal to oppose the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant. Brower had initially supported nuclear power as an 'smart alternative' to hydro-power dams but by the late 1960s was opposing them on grounds of safety and 
economics (Lamb 1996: 34). See also note 99. 73Richard Sandbrook was former student union president at the University of East Anglia, and an cnvironniental 
activist within the NUS. Ile became the director of the IIED. 741t was also at Dungeness nuclear power station where Earth Fir3tl held their first public action in the UK in 199 1, 
when about 60 people from a variety of peace and anti-nuclear groups such as the Brighton Peace Centre, Sea Action. and Dungeness Action Society of I lastings blockaded the plant (WAII 1999: 4 6). According to. G= 
Anarchis in 1991 the Dungeness area contained "the best example ofa cuspateforeland in the %wrht.. home to 
over 600 species offlora andfauna; some ofthich are rare" (GA 199 1ý An exactly similar point had been made by protesters at the Public Inquiry in 1958 (see section 7.2.4). Protest it seems is rarely novel, arguments and 
methods am handed down from one generation of activist to another. The results of protest, generally failure, am 
unfortunately depressingly similar. 
A UK Govcr=cnt Minister, Lady I lollis, reported that 50.000 people have died In the UK fronlAsbestos-related diseases in the 30 years between 1968 and 1998 (1 lollis 2002). The dangers from asbestos have been well known 
since the first century BC, and asbcstosis has been a recognized industrial disease since the 1920s (Gottlieb 1993: 275-7). The much higher number of deaths through mining accidents and industrial disease in use of coal versus 
7 
nuclear power was a point emphasized by nuclear supporters, like Beckmann (1976: 81-87) and Frcnilin (1987). According to Morgan (1980: 29) the first to use the term 'atomic bomb'(to refer to die ultimate in destructive 
power) was Robert Cromic in his novel The Crack ofDoom (1895), in which a mad scientist realizes that one 
grain of matter, if 'ethcrizcd', contains vast amounts of energy and plans to blow up the worldL Other prophecies of atomic bomb occur in Harold Nicolson Nblic Ftices (1932) and Neil Bell's 77se Lordqf1((e 
(1933). both containing warning against uncontrolled scientific experimentation and the dangers In die creation 
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and testing of an atomic bomb. (Morgan 1980: 95). 
Thomas Sturgeon was later to write deeply pessimistic SF novels, Atemorial (1946) and 27tunder andRoses (1947), on the dangers and perhaps inevitability of nuclear holocaust (Boyer 1985: 258). 
Ritchie Calder. was a journalist, author And academic, later to become Lord Peter Ritchie-Calder. In the 195N he 
WASScicnce Editor, of the London New,. 4 Chrontelt then became in the 1960s Professor of International 
Relations at Edinburgh University. His f=c and interest in food and population issues lead him to be chosen ai 
the President of the Conservation Society, where he gave die 1968 Presidential Address entided'I Idl on Earde. 
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lo The significance of milk and radiation can also bee seen in the impact of the Windscale fire in October 1957 (Welsh 
2000: 96-120). This received minimal adverse publicity until slightly radioactive milk was collected and dumped 
in the sea. One of the members of the WHO Study group attributed this media concern to 'breast fed editors' 
(Calder 1962: 25). 
11 See W 11 Adams remarks in Section 5.2.3. Other instances of childhood experiences are given in my paper 
Childhood Erperiences as Triggersfor the Ecological Impulse, Paper to the Annual Meeting of the European 
Association for Environmental History (UK), the Open University, 9 May 2003. 
12 Written in February 1955 during his visit to Burma (see Wood 1984: 246-248) and published in 1962 by the 
Gandhian Institute of Studies, Varanasi, India in Roots ofEconomic Growth. Schumacher later used it in his first 
book, Small is BeautiAl, and a companion paper 'Non-Violent Economics' was first published in The Observer- 
Weekend Review, on 21 August 1960 (see McRobie 1981: 2 1). 
13 This lecture was revised and used as a chapter entided'Nuclear Energy -Salvation or Damnation'in his book, 
Small is Beautiful (Schumacher 1973a: 124-135) and was also published by the National Society for Clean Air 
in 1967. 
Patterson made similar comments in 1973, when he wrote in his Preface to his first book on nuclear power (1973) 
that "a nuclear reactor is scientifically no more mysterious than a transistor radio " and of the need to dispel "the 
impression that nuclear reactors can only be understood and discussed by the 'experts (Patterson 1973: 
Preface). 
Stemglass' views achieved worldwide distribution in mid 1969, with a front page story in the London Observer 
appearances on Canadian TV, and features in broadcasts in Australia and in New Zealand, besides writing pieces 
for the New Scientist (Boffey 1969: 198). Stcrnglass' views however were not well known amongst British 
environmentalist until the mid 1970s with the publication of his book Low level Radiation (1973) by Earth 
Island, the FoE publishing arm. 
For an account of this episode see Freeman 198 1; Patterson 1976: 148-15 1; on Stertiglass see Boffey 1969; for 
Gofinan's views see Gofinan 1979; 1983. 
17 Quoted in Pringle & Spigelman 1981: 369. For an account of the ECCS debate and hearing see Patterson 1976: 
193-198; Berger 1977: 46-48; Ford 1982. Also see series of four articles by Robert Gillette on 'Nuclear Safety' 
in Science in September 1972: Vol. 177: pp771-776; pp867-871; pp970-975; pp1080-82. 
For details of other individuals and groups active in opposing the Vietnam War who turned into anti-nuclcar power 
protestors, see Cohn 19971 133-135 and 378-9 notes 13-14. 
This tactic of getting usually pro-nuclear newspaper to run critical stories on the bureaucratic shortcomings of 
nuclear power, was copicd by Walt Patterson and Amory Lavins of FoE in Britain in 19734. At a time of large 
media coverage of the $energy crisis'journalism were hungry for energy stories, particularly of the 'cover-up' 
type. Walt Patterson -a vocal critic of the AEA- was able to exploit this desire, such as when he leaked the story 
that the AEA, perhaps out of defensiveness, requested him not to ask questions at their press conference 
(Patterson 1998). 
This observation is not made cynically but reflects the fact that NGOs rely for their survival on membership fees 
and donations from the public and thus have to continually find issues that appeal to their constituencies. See Weston (1989: 205-6) on the pressures to run campaigns that are 'winnable' and 'fundable'. 91 Ile result of the conference was the founding of Critical Mass, probably the largest national anti- nuclear group 
with several hundred local affiliates and an estimated 200,000 supporters (Olson 1975 in Cohn 1997: 134). 9' See note 13. 
93 Reprinted in Hughes 1975: 250 and Winner 1986: 95. 
11cre is an extensive fiction in the 1930s. in the form of poems, short stories, novels, essays and 'countrymen 
notes' on the techno-a=dia themes of urban decline, rural regeneration and scientistic progress. For a good 
example see the poem 'Back to the Land' originally published in 7he Observer in 1933, and reprinted in Luckin 1990: 86. 
For an appreciation of the pioneer environmental thinking of Mumford see Guha 1996. 
For other accounts and discussions on the impact of pylons in the inter-war years see I lannah 1979; and Shcail 1991. 
For a discussion of the issues involved see Chapter 5 in Ncuzil & Kovarik 1996; see also discussion in Smith 
1987, Udall 1988, and Worster 1988. 
For a very detailed history of the opposition to nuclear power in California see Wellock 1998. 
Brower left die Sierra Club in 1969 to set up FoE, but after bitter internal battles with his staff he was forced to 
leave in 1984. and established the Earth Island Institute (Gottlieb 147-8). 
For details of opposition over the 1948 Snowdonia hydro scheme and the 1952 Rheldol hydro & Festiniog pump 
storage schemes, see Shcail 1991: 77-82. and 86-88. `For it discussion of early 20th century attitudes by scientists and the press to radium, see Chaptcr 2 IMAinstrearn 
Media: the Radium Girls' in Ncuzil & Kovarik 1996. 
103 Weinberg said (Quoted in Cohn 1997: 172): 
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"It is a Faustian bargain that we strike. - In returnfor this inexhaustible energy source, which we must have ((we 
are to maintain ourselves at anything like ourpresent numbers and ourpresent state ofaffluence, we must 
commit ourselves- essentiallyforever- to exercise the vigilance and discipline necessary to keep our nuclearfires 
well behaved As a nuclear technologist who has devoted his career to this questfor an Winite energy source, I 
believe the bargain is a good one". 
103 For other articles of his at the same period see Lilienthal 1947; for his later views on atomic energy see Lilienthal 
1963; and for assessment of his role in promoting atomic energy in the 19408 see Boyer 1985. 
The phase 'too cheap to meter' was the title of a critical book on the US nuclear dream by Steven Cohn (1997) as 
well as in the title of a report on nuclear mythologies by Makhijani & Saleska (1996). 
los Ralph Lapp was a physicist, early critic of nuclear bomb tests and respected writer on nuclear and scientific 
research issues in the 1950s and 60s, winning praise from Lewis Mumford (1970: 454). 1 lowever in the 1970s he 
was, according to Daniel Ford, to cam controversy by his activities as a PR consultant to the nuclear industry. In 
February 1974 an article on nuclear safety, discussing the Rasmussen report, appeared in Ile New York Tim" 
Magazirie, but he identified himself as'member of the Sierra Club's energy policy committee'(Ford 1982: 158). 
For an alternative account of his views, which deals with the complexities of dissent over the ICRP radiation 
standards, see Caufield 1989: 171-3. 
Strauss did his bit by writing articles in popular magazines like The Reader's Digest see Strauss 1955. 
The development of the fast breeder was the ultimate goal of nuclear scientists. Glenn Scaborg said in 1961 "A 
'breeder reactor * is the nuclear Goddess offertility, sojecund that, whileproducingpowcr In plenty, it also breeds 
morefissionable material than it consumes" (Quoted in Calder 1962: 6 1). Similarly Alvin Weinberg said "Our 
main belief.. is that nuclear energy is barely worth the candle,.. unless you develop the breeder" (Quoted in Nye 
1994: 234). 
James Lane was a researcher at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and produced W&Wy optimistic forecasts of 
plant size, installed capacity and costs to the year 2010, which he presented to a symposium organized by the 
AEC and Oak Ridge in August 1968. For references to his work see Cohn 1997. 
Hinton only speak publicly of his doubts in 1975 in a House of Lord debate, and publish them in 1976 in a Nm 
Scientis article - see Hinton 1976. 
One of the most famous Renaissance utopias was The City of the Sun by Tommaso Capanella, published in 
1623. For a summary see Carey 1999: 60-62. 
... Geothermal power is often included amongst renewable sources of energy, though there is debate as to whether it 
is 'renewable' utilizing as it does heat from the interior of the eaWL 'Me fast breeder reactor and fusion energy am 
also claimed to be 'sustainable' energy as their fuel supply is practically unlimited but all nuclear power is 
rejected by solar advocates on environmental and ethical grounds. 
For a quotation from Fox on tidal, wave, wind, hydro and geothermal power, and use of solar collectors, a" 
Clarke 1979: 207. 
The report, with a forward by US AEC, was published as a book on 19 March 1953 (Putnam 1953). There was a 
similar report by Eugene & Charles Scarlott Ayres, in 1952, which covers the debate on atomic v solar cnerg)r 
see pp. 168-76,186-218.279-83. Also out in 1952 was the report Resourcesfor Freedom from the President's 
Material Commission (or Paley Commission) predicting fossil fuel shortages by 1975, and urging greater 
support for solar energy. 
114 For details of this post-war debate see Butti and Perlin 1980: 223-6, and Rome 2001: 49-5 1. 
Steve Baer was well known as a dome builder At Drop City and the author of Domes Cookbook (1968). See 
Rybczynski 1980: 12 for his photo. 
In Britain the main work, in the style of ne Whole Earth Catalog, is Radical Technology, edited by Godfrey 
Boyle and Peter I larper (1976), two participants in the British AT magazine. Und=irrenti. 117 See Searle 1972, Gitlin 1987: 422; Cohn 1997: 378 03. 
See Pocock 1977; Bum 1978, Williams 1980, Patterson 1985, Roberts 1999; Welsh 2000, with the 1977 
Windscale Inquiry providing a forum for the full range of arguments (Breach 1978. Guardian 1978). 
For a statement of FoVs position on direct action, see letter by Tom Burke (1978) to 111c. allcr Y21c's "torw 
in No. 12 highlighting FoE's 'conspicuous lack of enthusiasm' for direct action. For Burke's views on the anti. 
nuclear movement in 1980, see Grant (1980). 
In February 1967 six out of 23 Committee Members of ConSoc were women - 25% (ConSoc Newsletter No. 2, March 1967); in March 1970 nine out of 35 members of the executive Committee were women - 25%. For a more neutral view of the campaign against the Midland I& 11 nuclear plants by the Saginaw Intervenors, of 
which Mary Sinclair was part, see the cast study in Ebbin & Kasper 1974: 59-89. 
The most famous one being the 1962 utopian novel Island by Aldous I luxley. 133This opposition by the CPRW is longstanding: at the Connah's Quay Inquiry In 1971 die CPRW supported the 
construction of nuclear power stations in industrial areas, rather than in 'umpoilt'rural coastal rcgions (Rudig 
1990: 118). 
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